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One in every six children aged 5 to 17 worldwide is exploited by child labour
in its different forms, according to estimates made by the ILO in 2002.
Many of these children are forced to risk their health and their lives and
mortgage their future as productive adults.
More information has raised awareness of the scale of the problem and
given new urgency to developing and financing policies and programmes
to remove children from work situations. More knowledge has also pro-
voked new questions about the cost of removing children from work, pro-
viding them with education and ensuring them a decent childhood. At the
same time, policymakers are also enquiring to what extent the effective
abolition of child labour will pay off for national development and poverty
reduction, and how children and their families stand to gain.
This report is based on a wide range of data and technical assumptions
about the quantifiable elements of the costs and benefits of ending child
labour. While it has to be noted that some important benefits of elimi-
nating child labour such as enhanced possibilities for personal develop-
ment can hardly be measured in monetary terms, our calculations clearly
led us to the conclusion that the elimination of child labour is a high-
yielding global investment. With an affordable amount of financial re-
sources, enormous benefits would be generated in all regions of the world.
In the light of this finding, we can assert with even more conviction than
ever before that the elimination of child labour deserves to be pursued with
utmost determination.
The investments necessary to end the scourge of child labour can be made,
and they must be made. We owe it to our children to ensure that they can
v
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fully develop their talents and strengths, which are the key to the future of
their families and societies. We must strive for children to enjoy their child-
hood, playing, learning and preparing for a decent working life as adults
and parents. It is our responsibility to ensure that this is the last genera-
tion to be exploited as child labourers.
Frans Röselaers
Director
International Programme on the
Elimination of Child Labour – IPEC
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FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
The goal of eliminating child labour is embodied in ILO conventions, na-
tional legislation and the objectives of workers’ and employers’ and other
civil society organizations around the world. But what resources would be
required to achieve this goal? What would be the economic consequences,
and how would they be distributed across different sectors of the global
community?
IPEC has conducted the first integrated study of the economic costs
and benefits of eliminating child labour throughout the developing and tran-
sitional world. A general programme of action was developed which was
hypothetically applied in all countries, and estimations were made of the
cost of each element in this programme as well as the projected economic
gains from eliminating deleterious child labour and replacing it with edu-
cation. The study does not tell us whether to eliminate child labour – these
commitments are already in place – but it sheds light on the financial burden
this may entail and the economic impacts we can expect as a result. Equally,
it does not offer specific policy prescriptions, since the action programme it
models is generic, whereas actual policies must be tailored to specific country
conditions – but it provides information that may assist those who formu-
late policies or campaign for their acceptance.
The programme had these components:
a) Education supply: an expansion of school capacity and an upgrading
of school quality, in conformity with ILO Convention No.138, which
envisions education as the principal activity for children up to the age
of 14. The study estimated both the capital (building construction) and
recurrent costs of making this education available to all children not
currently attending, while making allowances for changes in the child
population. It also considered the cost of reducing class sizes and sup-
plying sufficient materials in instances where current practice does not
meet international quality guidelines. The goals set forward were
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universal primary education by 2015 and universal lower secondary
education by 2020. It is important to note that much of this commit-
ment is not unique to our proposed programme; achieving universal
primary education is one of the Millennium Development Goals em-
braced by the world community. In this context we regard child labour
elimination as building on already-existing objectives. While we calcu-
late its total cost in this study, it should be borne in mind that the in-
cremental cost of our programme, its addition to costs already entailed
by other commitments, is far less.
b) Income transfers: the institution of income transfer programmes in
each country to defray the cost to households of transferring children
from work to school. These programmes would target all families with
school-age children now living in poverty, providing benefits according
to a formula taking into account the average value of children’s work,
the number of children per household and the degree of the house-
hold’s poverty.
c) Non-school interventions: a programme of interventions aiming at the
urgent elimination of the worst forms of child labour, in conformity
with ILO Convention No. 182. These programmes would remove and,
if necessary, rehabilitate children in the unconditional worst forms,
such as bonded labour and prostitution, as well as those engaged in
hazardous work. Interventions would also target socially excluded chil-
dren, including refugees and those from lower castes, who may require
particular attention. More broadly, we can envision these interven-
tions addressing the cultural factors that often play a crucial role in
2
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Table 1.1. Cost and benefit items
Costs
Education supply Costs of building new schools, training and hiring new teachers,
supplying additional educational materials
Transfer implementation Cost of administering the income transfer programme
Interventions Cost of achieving the urgent elimination of the worst forms of child
labour and addressing the needs of special populations
Opportunity cost Cost borne by households due to the value of child labour foregone
Benefits
Education Benefit of improved productivity and earning capacity associated
with greater education
Health Benefit of reduced illnesses and injuries due to the elimination of
the worst forms of child labour
reproducing and legitimating child labour, complementing the econ-
omic factors addressed by the rest of the programme. Such cultural
concerns often have important gender dimensions; while these may be
crucial to the planning and implementation of interventions, for the
purposes of this study we assume that gender considerations do not
have a bearing on programme costs.
These three make up the costs of eliminating child labour, along with the op-
portunity cost of this labour itself – that is, the economic benefits that would
be lost if children were removed from a portion of their productive activities.
Details concerning the calculation of these items will be discussed in
this report. For now it should be noted that, as is the usual practice in studies
of this sort, the transfer of income itself (from taxpayers to programme ben-
eficiaries) is not regarded as an economic cost, since no “real” resources are
allocated in conjunction with the money. Nevertheless, the cost of admin-
istering the programme is included, since it absorbs the time and effort of
programme officials who might be put to other tasks.
There are also two principal benefits, the added productive capacity a
future generation of workers would enjoy due to their increased education,
and the economic gains anticipated from improved health due to the elimi-
nation of the worst forms of child labour. Of course, there are many other
benefits of eliminating child labour, such as enhanced opportunities for per-
sonal development and social inclusion, that are resistant to economic quan-
tification. Therefore, this report makes no attempt to account for them.
In order to quantify these costs and benefits, we drew on country data
at three levels of detail. Research teams gathered information in eight coun-
tries, Brazil, Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Ukraine, Pakistan, Nepal and the
Philippines; these provided our most complete cases. A second tier consisted
of approximately two dozen additional countries for whom household sur-
veys, primarily conducted by IPEC and the World Bank, have been imple-
mented during the past decade. While not complete, these provided a high
level of detail for most cost and benefit factors. (These countries are listed
in Appendix 2.) For the remaining countries we used publicly available de-
mographic, economic and education data as the basis for extrapolating from
those with more complete information. This report presents findings at the
global and regional levels, but it also uses our country studies to illustrate
some of the issues involved in measurement, and it includes condensed ver-
sions of three country reports as illustrative annexes. (The full-length ver-
sion of these reports will be published separately by IPEC.)
The methodology used in this study takes into consideration alterna-
tive estimations at every stage. Thus, there is not one result but a range of
possible results, depending on what assumptions are employed. Neverthe-
less, we have produced a baseline estimate, resting on what we regard as the
most plausible, typically mid-range assumptions (see Chapter 2). The results
are summarized in Table 1.2.
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The cost and benefit items are those listed in Table 1.1, with “transfer
implementation” referring to the administrative portion of the income
transfer programme. By net economic benefits, we mean the difference be-
tween total economic costs and total economic benefits. Net financial ben-
efits deduct from this the financial cost to the public sector of the income
transfers themselves. The figures are reported by regional grouping and glob-
ally, in billions of dollars and as percentages of total income in year 2000.
These are discounted present values: they condense the entire stream of costs
and benefits over the twenty years of the programme (and further years of
education benefits as former children continue to work as adults) into a
single number, reducing today’s equivalent of future amounts at the rate of
5% per year.
The single most import result is that the elimination of child labour
and its replacement by universal education is estimated to yield enormous
economic benefits – in addition, of course, to the social and intrinsic ben-
efits that make this issue so salient. Globally, benefits exceed costs by a ratio
of 6.7 to 1. This is equivalent, given the time distribution of costs and ben-
efits, to an internal rate of return of 43.8%. These figures, it should be noted,
suggest a degree of precision that is not warranted in light of the very large
uncertainties in measurement that surround most aspects of this study. As
the body of the report makes clear, our tabulations could well be above or
below these amounts. Nevertheless, the gap between benefits and costs is so
4
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Table 1.2. Total economic costs and benefits of eliminating child labour
over the entire period (2000 to 2020), in $billion, PPP
(Percentage of aggregate annual gross national income in parentheses)
Region Transitional Asia Latin Sub- North Global
countries America Saharan Africa and
Africa Middle East
Total costs 25.6 458.8 76.6 139.5 59.7 760.3
Education supply 8.5 299.1 38.7 107.4 39.6 493.4
Transfer implementation 0.7 6.3 1.2 1.5 1.1 10.7
Interventions 0.4 2.4 5.8 0.6 0.2 9.4
Opportunity cost 16.0 151.0 30.9 30.1 18.8 246.8
Total benefits 149.8 3 321.3 407.2 723.9 504.1 5 106.3
Education 145.8 3 307.2 403.4 721.8 500.2 5 078.4
Health 4.0 14.0 3.8 2.1 3.9 28.0
Net economic benefits 124.2 2 862.4 330.6 584.4 444.4 4 346.1
(5.1 %) (27.0%) (9.3%) (54.0%) (23.2%) (22.2%)
Transfer payments 13.1 125.8 23.5 29.1 22.1 213.6
Net financial benefits 111.1 2 736.6 307.1 555.4 422.3 4 132.5
(4.6%) (25.9%) (8.7%) (51.3%) (22.0%) (21.1%)
great that it is sure to withstand reasonable adjustments that might be made
to its methodology. All regions experience very large net gains, although
some benefit more than others. The same results are displayed graphically
in Figure 1.1.
By demonstrating that the benefits of expanded education are well
above their costs, this study concurs with research conducted by the World
Bank (e.g. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002) and other institutions that
there are significantly positive rates of return from investments in this sector.
A second approach is to consider the economic flows that transpire
over the twenty-year duration of the hypothetical programme, followed by
the next twenty years of benefits. Figure 1.2 shows the pattern at the global
level; regional patterns are similar.
In this figure, undiscounted net annual flows are tracked across time.
For the first eight years they trend downward (more negative); then they
reverse direction, becoming positive in year 2016. This reveals the econ-
omic character of the child labour elimination programme as a genera-
tional investment, a sustained commitment to our children in order to reap
the benefits when they reach adulthood. For approximately one and a half
decades during which the programme is first implemented, its economic
burden will exceed its returns. After this the net flows turn positive, dra-
matically so after 2020, since past this point there are no further costs, only
the benefits derived from improved education and health. Hence, taken as
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Figure 1.1. Net economic benefits as a percentage
of annual Gross National Income
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Figure 1.2. Undiscounted annual net economic benefits (costs), in $billion, PPP
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Figure 1.3. Public sector costs of eliminating child labour, in $billion PPP
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a whole, these delayed benefits more than recoup the costs, even allowing
for the effects of discounting (which Figure 1.2 does not). It should be
noted that the information in Figure 1.2 does not include the amount of
income transfers, since these do not represent a real deduction from the
output of society. Incorporation of transfer payments delays the year at
7Executive summary
which benefits overtake costs, but it does not fundamentally alter the overall
pattern of results.
From a practical standpoint, the burden on the public sector in par-
ticular is important to consider. Resources must be mobilized to finance ed-
ucation, the transfer programme and the targeted interventions that make
these benefits possible. Figure 1.3 tracks these programme costs over their
20-year duration. It includes the income transfers but excludes opportunity
costs borne by households. It also deducts 20% of the benefits that accrue
in each year, under the assumption that the public sector would capture
about a fifth of these through higher revenues. Costs rise continuously over
this period, but less steeply after universal primary attendance is achieved
in 2015. Costs end altogether after 2020, as we have seen, so, if we extended
this chart beyond that year we would see only the revenue gains associated
with the economic benefits (about $60 billion per year).
What would it mean to the world community to make an investment
of this magnitude? One way to answer this question is to compare the costs
observed in Figure 1.3. with other categories of expenditures. In Figure 1.4.
we contrast the average annual cost of eliminating child labour during each
of the programme’s two decades with four other expenditures on the part
of developing economies in the year 2000.
The average annual amount during the first decade pales in comparison
with the burdens currently borne to finance debt service or the military; it is
even small relative to existing social expenditures. The corresponding average
Figure 1.4. Average annual cost of eliminating child labour
compared to other annual costs, in $billion PPP
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during the second decade is larger, but still manageable in light of the other
items, particularly if it follows a period of sustained economic growth.
Putting together these two analyses – net economic benefits and public
sector costs – what conclusions can be drawn? Figures 1.2. and 1.3. demon-
strate that a protracted period, approximately fifteen years, of net costs is
followed by an even longer period of still larger net benefits. Indeed, the
costs are complete after 20 years, but the benefits continue for as many as
40 years past that point. The critical question is how to finance an invest-
ment of this magnitude and duration. We believe that, in light of the ex-
isting funds that are potentially available, this is primarily a political rather
than economic question. The child labour elimination programme repre-
sents a noticeable but not exorbitant increase in current social expenditures
(averaging about 11% during the second decade). It should again be stressed
in this context that universal primary and lower secondary education, goals
which command widespread support already, make up the bulk of our econ-
omic costs and benefits. Where we go further is to place them in the con-
text of eliminating child labour, particularly in its worst forms. Thus, the
incremental cost of this commitment should be regarded as far less than the
total reported here. We therefore hope that some version of this child labour
elimination programme can be placed on the table in discussions over debt
relief and development assistance.
METHODOLOGY
In the remainder of this summary we will present secondary results and
consider the extent to which our findings might be modified on account of
the uncertainties surrounding measurement and the assumptions required
to perform the necessary calculations.
Chapter 3: Who are the child workers ?
Our approach to measuring the extent of child labour is grounded in the
two principal ILO conventions governing this question. Convention No. 138
prohibits all economic activity by children beneath the age of 12 and per-
mits light work only for 12 and 13 year-olds in developing countries and
13 and 14 year-olds in the developed world. It calls for universal compul-
sory education through the age of 14 in developing countries and 15 in the
rest. Convention No. 182 prohibits and targets for urgent elimination the
worst forms of child labour for all children below the age of 18. Since our
study considers only developing and transitional countries, we identified all
economically active children below the age of 12, all children ages 12 to 14
working more than 14 hours per week, and all children below age 18 in the
8
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worst forms of child labour as “child labourers”. We used the same data
and similar methods to estimate the 5 to 14 age group as were employed
in the recent IPEC report, Every Child Counts (ILO, 2002), involving an
extrapolation from 28 countries with reliable survey data to the rest of the
world. The result was a global enumeration of just over 182 million such
children, 18.5% of all children between these ages. (Due to apparent dif-
ferences in survey methodology, the observations did not prove amenable
to extrapolation via regression, so we applied the unweighted regional av-
erage of the ratio of working to all children aged 5 to 14 to countries without
surveys.) We did not attempt an extrapolation of older children in the worst
forms, however; instead, we simply added up the numbers for the countries
available to us. This resulted in a total of 10.8 million children in hazardous
occupations and between 8 and 20 million in “unconditional” worst forms,
such as trafficking, bonded labour and prostitution. Many of these chil-
dren are under 15 and have therefore already been counted in our estimate
of total child labour.
Chapter 4: The cost of increasing the quality
and quantity of education.
We used the existing costs of education as a basis for calculating the addi-
tional cost of achieving universal attendance, with the following exceptions.
First, we checked to see if the pupil-teacher ratio was less than 40; if not,
we budgeted the extra funds to achieve this level. Second, we considered
whether non-personnel expenses, such as supplies and textbooks, made up
15% of all recurrent costs; if not, we budgeted the difference. We also made
adjustments for shortages in the teacher-training capacity of tertiary edu-
cation, for the role of direct household contributions and for special cir-
cumstances like HIV/AIDS in the hardest-hit countries. Based on these
calculations for our eight study countries, we extrapolated to the rest of the
world, creating low, medium and high estimates.
Net attendance rates (NAR) at primary and lower secondary levels
were derived from household surveys, which typically yield lower figures
than the enrolment rates reported by education ministries. Globally, the av-
erage NAR for primary education was 76.2% and 48.9% for lower secondary.
We proposed to close the primary gap in three five-year “waves” beginning
in 2000, and the lower secondary gap in three waves beginning in 2005.
Our baseline global cost for achieving 100% NAR at both levels was
$493 billion. Our lowest estimate of potential education cost per student
resulted in a reduction to $438 billion, while our highest estimate yielded
$606 billion. This last figure represents a significant increase, but hardly
sufficient to alter the overall results in light of the large surplus we find in
Table 1.2.
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Chapter 5: The direct household costs of eliminating child labour.
Households in our programme face one major cost and enjoy one major
benefit. They lose the economic value of their children’s labour as it is pro-
gressively eliminated over a 20-year period. But, if they are poor, they stand
to benefit from an income transfer programme that is phased in over the
same duration. (To the extent that the transfers are not financed by funds
diverted from other uses, of course, non-poor household may pay more in
taxes.) This chapter estimates each of these and compares them.
Attaching an economic value to the labour of children is a crucial as-
pect of this study. Perhaps no concern about the desirability of eliminating
child labour is more widespread than the notion that households, particu-
larly those in poverty, cannot afford to lose the contribution currently made
by their children. Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence regarding
the value of child labour, and the information available to our country teams
was not always sufficient. In the end, we chose to assume that a child worker’s
contribution is 20% of an adult’s. This is reflected in our baseline estimates,
although raising this fraction to 25% (almost certainly an upper limit) would
raise the total cost of eliminating child labour by approximately $60 billion,
a minor adjustment in the context of Table 1.2.
The income transfer is a more ambitious version of programmes that
have already been implemented, such as Brazil’s Bolsa Escola. It uses a for-
mula that transfers 60-80% of the average value of child labour per school-
age child attending school to poor households irrespective of whether this
child is a past or current worker. (The exact percentage depends on the de-
gree of poverty and the number of school-age children per household.) To
estimate the total amount of funding such a programme would require, we
used our estimates of the value of child labour and extrapolated from survey
data on the extent and depth of poverty, as well as the number of school-
age children per poor household. Evidence is provided in this chapter that
the cost of the transfer programme is not very sensitive to plausible changes
in the formula used to calculate it or the estimated value of child labour
itself.
Comparing the lost value of child labour and the added income due
to transfers, we find that the first exceeds the second by a relatively small
margin – $247 to $214 billion. However, these amounts pertain to different
populations. Some poor households receive benefits without curtailing child
labour because their children were not working previously, and other house-
holds curtail child labour without receiving benefits because they are not
poor. Thus the moderate aggregate shortfall of the household sector reflects
the size of the second group relative to the first.
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Chapter 6: Public sector costs of eliminating child labour
There are two principle costs facing the public sector, apart from those having
to do with expanding the availability and quality of education. The first is
the cost of administering the income transfer programme; the second is the
cost of interventions targeting children in the worst forms of child labour
and those whose work or lack of schooling is tied to social exclusion. Our
primary objective in this second set of activities is the complete elimination
of these worst forms by 2010.
We assume that the administrative cost of the transfer programme will
amount to 5% of the sum transferred to poor households. This is an arbi-
trary amount, although not implausible. (Bolsa Escola and other existing
programmes provide little guidance, since they include other functions in
addition to income transfer.) As Table 1.2 indicates, however, the amounts
are very small in relation to most other costs and benefits; a doubling of
administrative expenses would have virtually no effect on the conclusions of
this study.
We calculated intervention costs based on tabulations of the number
of children requiring such intervention and the unit costs of past efforts in
this field. To achieve the first of these, we added up the number of children
identified as working in hazardous conditions or highly excessive hours (more
that 43 per week), those in the unconditional worst forms of child labour,
those who were included among the refugee populations tabulated by
UNHCR, and those whose caste identification in Nepal would suggest their
social exclusion. Due to the highly country-specific nature of most of these
numbers, we did not attempt to extrapolate them. Thus, our totals signifi-
cantly undercount the number of children who might be targeted for inter-
vention. On the other hand, we assumed that every such child would be
targeted, which overstates the cost since many children would be removed
from such work due to other aspects of the action programme, and spillover
effects would make it likely that interventions would change the circum-
stances of children who were not their specific targets. Combining these two,
it is likely that our underestimate of the number of children to be served is
moderate rather than extreme.
Unit costs (costs per child removed from work or rehabilitated) were
derived from a study of IPEC projects in 18 countries. They ranged from a
low of $139 in North Africa and the Middle East to over $1,600 in Latin
America. (A high percentage of Latin American programmes have targeted
prostitution, which entails large costs to rehabilitate children.) We applied
these averages to the number of children either socially excluded or in the
worst forms and arrived at the totals in the row labelled “Interventions” in
Table 1.2. This is the smallest of all the cost items. Indeed, even if it were
multiplied tenfold it would have relatively little effect on the overall struc-
ture of the results.
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Chapter 7: The benefits of education
The principal economic benefit from the elimination of child labour would
be the enhanced productive capacity stemming from universal education
through age 14. This is difficult to dispute, yet it is also difficult to quan-
tify. Ultimately, the economic value of expanded education will depend on
other changes taking place within a country over the same period: the ef-
fectiveness and stability of its institutions, the creation of new enterprises
organized to take advantage of higher levels of human capital, and econ-
omic policies to stimulate growth and development, among others. We are
not in a position to forecast these factors. Instead, we have relied on recent
evidence of the relationship between education and earnings at the indi-
vidual level, which are predicated on the existing set of institutions and
policies.
Estimates of the value of education constructed in this way have been
conducted in many countries around the world. We took an average value
– that each extra year of schooling results in an additional 11% of future
earnings per year – and applied it to all countries. To translate this into
amounts of money, we multiplied it by the average unskilled wage prevailing
in each country. We also assumed that individuals would begin work at age
15 and retire at age 55. In some respects this is a conservative approach,
since it assumes that unskilled wages will not rise over time (except as a re-
sult of increased education), that individuals will work for only 40 years,
and that education benefits only its direct recipients, and not the rest of so-
ciety through indirect channels. On the other hand, we may be overesti-
mating the effect of education, since its value might be less for those who
do not enter paid employment, might be reduced as it becomes more wide-
spread (“credential inflation”), or might be overestimated in the earnings
studies we relied on.
Any monetary value attached to education can be approximate at best.
We regard our baseline estimate as plausible. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to consider how the results of the study would change if it turned out that
education were much less valuable. One way to do this is to lower the per-
centage effect of years of schooling on earnings. If it were 5% rather than
11% – a reduction of more than half – the global benefit would fall from
just over $5 trillion to about $2.3 trillion. This would reduce but not elim-
inate the large disparity between costs and benefits in our study; it would
still exceed $1.6 trillion, yielding an internal rate of return just under 23%.
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Chapter 8: Health benefits
ILO Convention No. 182 urges us to give priority to the elimination of the
worst forms of child labour. This entails costs, as we have seen in our re-
view of programme interventions. Most of the benefits are humanitarian,
yet it is likely that tangible economic gains will accrue from the resulting
improvements in child health. It is important to stress that the attempt we
have made to quantify these benefits does not signify that we view health
as having only an economic value. Safeguarding the health of children is
vital in many ways; the economic benefit is just one of them and may well
be one of the less important. Nevertheless, since this is a study of the econ-
omic costs and benefits of eliminating child labour, we are required to esti-
mate the value of improved health in some manner.
Our approach is based on a comparison of potential health gains from
eliminating hazardous child labour to those of eliminating certain other health
risks that have already been studied for their impact on economic growth.
To do this, we need a common system of measurement for the extent of these
risks. We adopt the World Health Organization’s (WHO) DALY – disability
adjusted life year – for this purpose. DALYs express each specific type of
health impairment as a fraction of a year of life lost, based on the degree
of function lost by the individual. Using this index makes it possible to add
up a wide variety of illnesses and injuries and arrive at a single summary
number. We selected four high-profile studies of the economic effects of ill
health, one on occupational safety and health in the United States and three
on malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa. By converting the health risks to DALYs
(using data from WHO’s Global Burden of Disease), we were able to express
the results of these studies in the form of percentage of national income
lost per DALY.
At this point, the chief difficulty we encountered is the absence of sys-
tematic data on the health consequences of hazardous child labour. A spe-
cial study was therefore commissioned on the health benefits of eliminating
child labour (Fassa, 2003). Despite a large quantity of information on the
risks faced by specific groups of children, the only nationally representative
survey proved to be one conducted in the United States, providing injury
incidence rates for children according to major industrial classification. These
were converted to DALYs and applied to a set of 18 countries for which we
had survey data on the industry composition of child labour. From these
we extrapolated to the rest of the world.
The baseline result for health benefits in Table 1.2 reflects this method-
ology, utilizing an intermediate relationship between DALYs and per capita
national income from one of the malaria studies. Two of the malaria studies
give a DALY-income relationship approximately one order of magnitude
lower, while the occupational safety and health study generates a relation-
ship approximately one order of magnitude higher. Thus, health benefits
could well be a tenth of the baseline amount, or ten times that amount.
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We believe on intuitive grounds that the baseline relationship is reasonable,
since it indicates that for each year of life lost prematurely the society will
bear a cost of somewhat less than 40% of its average per capita income. The
other major uncertainty stems from the use of United States data as the
source for the work-risk relationship in developing and transitional coun-
tries. We believe this is probably an underestimate, both because work is
likely to be more dangerous in less developed countries, and also because
the US data included injuries but not illnesses. Overall, there is a potential
for the true economic benefit to be gained from eliminating hazardous child
labour to be several times the amount we have estimated.
Chapter 9: Implications of the study
for policy and future research
Policy issues have already been addressed in the first section of this sum-
mary. From a methodological standpoint, in the course of pursuing the first
global study of the economic aspects of child labour and its elimination,
we have made more visible key gaps in the available information. A serious
commitment to ending child labour will require much more reliable esti-
mates of costs in particular, in order to implement and finance programmes
at the national and regional levels. Further research is indicated in such areas
as the earnings and productivity of child workers, the evolution of child
labour indicators over time within individual countries, the appropriate in-
dicators of educational quality, the accessibility and cost of lower secondary
education and the health outcomes associated with the worst forms of child
labour. In all of these areas we were forced to make strong assumptions due
to lack of hard data. Real, and not hypothetical, policy calls for real data.
14
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The ILO perspective is that child labour is not only, nor perhaps even pri-
marily, an economic problem. The justifications for ILO Convention No. 138
(minimum age of work) and No. 182 (worst forms of child labour) are largely
ethical and social in nature, although the economic consequences of child
labour are also taken into account. By the same token, these conventions
do not anticipate that countries should wait until economic development
“solves” child labour, if indeed this could ever be expected. Rather, they call
for immediate action by all countries at all levels of development.
Notwithstanding these commitments, the ILO has a stake in the on-
going debate about the economic aspects of child labour in general and its
worst forms. Those who formulate policy or allocate resources in this field
ought to have a rough sense of the economic consequences of different poli-
cies. They should know not only the overall economic costs and benefits,
but also their distribution across countries and sectors of society. This will
help them make realistic judgments regarding the feasibility of child labour
elimination programmes, and identify financial bottlenecks that may pre-
vent potential gains from being realized. It is one thing to turn to economics
for fully-packaged answers to child labour questions – something we do not
do here – and another to provide information about economic aspects to a
broader decision-making process.
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AND PRINCIPLE RESULTS 2
DEBATES SURROUNDING THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS
OF CHILD LABOUR
Much of the debate over child labour in the developed countries since the
mid-nineteenth century has centred on economics. Very generally, we can
identify three questions:
1) Is child labour really a problem at all? If the economic value con-
tributed by working children exceeds the costs of this activity, should
it not be permitted to continue? Some economists are inclined to as-
sume that, if children or their parents choose child labour over its al-
ternatives, it must be the case that the net economic value (benefits
minus costs) is positive. A different way of putting this is to ask, if we
implement programmes that successfully reduce the prevalence of child
labour, will we be making households even worse off than they were
previously?
2) If child labour is a problem, is it solved “automatically” in the course
of economic development? Is the best course in less developed coun-
tries to put preventive activities on hold and wait for economic growth
to produce the right conditions for future action?
3) If child labour is a problem that demands immediate attention, are
there economic factors (“market failures”) that call for correction? If
so, what are they?
These questions are inspired by economic theory, which give pride of place
to the role of individual choice within the constraints imposed by resources
and technology. The tendency within economics is to view undesirable con-
ditions as problems to be solved only if they can be shown to be related to
market failures – the task for which conventional economics is designed.
From a wider perspective, these questions do not by themselves resolve all
the issues that need to be addressed, but they are still worth exploring. Thus,
even though, in conformity with ILO conventions, we are committed to elim-
inating child labour, we would still want to know if households expect to
lose more income from the withdrawal of this portion of their labour than
they would gain from the beneficial consequences. Similarly, if economic de-
velopment is related to a reduced incidence of child labour, this would play
a role in evaluating tradeoffs between economic and other objectives.
In recent years, much of the economic debate has revolved around the
interpretation of the historical record in the developed countries. There is
little dispute that these countries have undergone extensive economic de-
velopment during the past one or two centuries, while also reducing the ex-
tent and severity of child labour. The lessons to be drawn from this experience
are in dispute, however. It may be that development, by increasing house-
hold incomes and the return to education, played the principle role in re-
duced exploitation of children. It may also be the case, however, that social
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reform, through legal and political channels, coupled with investments in
education, played a larger role, and that the reduction in child labour was
itself an explanatory factor in subsequent economic growth.1 This is not the
place to assess the weight of these two arguments, but it is clear that the
historical debate is highly relevant to the current situation of developing
countries. One contribution of the present study is that it offers evidence re-
garding the potential for immediate action against child labour to spur econ-
omic development along the lines of the social-reform approach.
In the course of this investigation, we will also be in a position to shed
light on the situation at the household level. Rather than simply assuming
that children or parents are accurately weighing economic variables, we will
provide empirical estimates of the costs and benefits they face. This infor-
mation can then be combined with other social or cultural factors – which
our study does not consider – to investigate household decision-making
criteria.
As for the third question, we are not directly testing for the presence
of market failures; nevertheless, the issue is central to our approach. One
possible explanation for child labour whose costs exceed its benefits is the
failure of credit markets: parents are unable to borrow against the future
earnings of their children in order to finance their withdrawal from work
and placement in education.2 While such a situation is undoubtedly common,
this study does not pursue credit market reform as a strategy, for two rea-
sons. First, the insufficiency of credit markets to finance investments in
human capital is a ubiquitous problem, owing to the inability of human
earning capacity to be collateralised. Second, poor families in particular face
enormous barriers to the acquisition of debt, including uncertain future
health and employment status and the large burden that servicing such debts
would place on limited incomes. In any event, as a matter of social equity,
we would prefer to see reductions in child labour and investments in human
capital as social objectives, not tied to the degree of impoverishment to
which large portions of the world’s people are currently subjected. Instead,
as we shall discuss shortly, our approach is to propose income transfer pro-
grammes that would address financial constraints at the household level
without the accumulation of debt.
Before proceeding to a detailed description of the methodology, it is
important to stress the limited objectives of the study. It is not a cost-ben-
efit analysis (CBA) in the conventional sense. In principle, a CBA encom-
passes all factors that bear upon policy judgments; an excess of costs over
benefits means “stop” and the reverse means “go”. This requires the CBA
analyst to convert all the consequences of a proposed course of action to
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1 See Basu and Van (1998), for instance, for a model in which multiple child labour
equilibria coexist in an economy, and in which there is a case for collective action to move
the society from a less- to more-desirable path.
2 See Ranjan (2001), Dehejia and Gatti (2002) and Beegle et al. (2003).
monetary equivalents. In the current study, we are not doing this. As we
shall see, only a subset of the consequences of eliminating child labour is
modelled, and we make no effort to be fully inclusive. We would describe
this exercise as an estimation of the economic aspects of eliminating child
labour up to the extent permitted by the available data. We intend it to be
one among many inputs into decision-making. In particular, in accordance
with the approach embodied in Conventions No. 138 and No. 182, we view
the economic benefits of eliminating child labour as one component of the
larger social benefits. We would support this elimination even if the results
of the study show that there are net economic costs, just as many other
choices in life are justified even if they do not pay for themselves in solely
economic terms. Of course, if it appears that permitting child labour to con-
tinue is economically costly, this will suggest that more aggressive elimina-
tion programmes are feasible, and that social objectives, in this case, do not
need to be traded off against economic ones.
SUMMARY OF THE METHODOLOGY
Our study attempts to calculate the economic costs and benefits of the elim-
ination of child labour, with specific results for the various forms of child
labour, different sectors of society and different national and regional enti-
ties. In a general sense, the project considers the elimination of child labour
as an investment and calculates its economic return. In doing so, it suggests
the commitment of resources necessary to achieve this elimination, and it
indicates how the costs and benefits accrue to different stakeholders.
Because the full complement of data required for such an analysis is
not available at the global level, we opted for a two-stage process. In the first
stage, eight countries were selected for their representativeness of different
regions and levels of development, and for the availability of data on child
labour: Nepal, Philippines, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, Brazil and
Ukraine. Teams in each country tried to fill in the data gaps through un-
covering sources of information not known or utilized internationally, as
well as through surveys of knowledgeable informants and direct estimation.
Based on this, they implemented country-level studies of costs and benefits.
A second set of countries, while not intensively studied, offered more de-
tailed information as a result of hosting household surveys. Many of these
surveys were assisted by IPEC in conjunction with its SIMPOC programme
or the World Bank as part of its LSMS (Living Standards Measurement
Survey) programme; others were developed by national statistical offices.
Thus, between these two types of data sources, we had between 8 and 28 ob-
servations on all variables measurable by survey methods. (Details for each
variable can be found in Annex 2.) For the remainder of the countries we
relied on publicly available data, most commonly from the World Bank’s
18
IPEC · Investing in every child
World Development Indicators (WDI) data set. As described more fully in
Annex 2, the largely complete WDI and related data were used to extrapo-
late from the first two sets of countries (those studied in conjunction with
this project and those with household surveys) to the third.
While the project was ambitious, the time frame was condensed, so the
methodological framework seeks a middle ground between completeness
and simplicity. It focuses on three sources of cost – the cost of providing a
quality education to all children in lieu of work, the cost of programme in-
terventions to alter attitudes and practices, and the opportunity cost of elim-
inating this work, i.e. the value of children’s labour. A central feature of this
study is the hypothetical implementation of an income transfer programme
in every country. The purpose of such a programme would be to indemnify
poor families for a portion of the value of child labour foregone as a result
of its elimination. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, only the administrative
portion of this programme is a true economic cost, although the much larger
transfer amounts have important effects on the distribution of costs and
benefits to households and the public sector. On the benefit side, we calcu-
late economic gains from a more educated and healthier population, with
the latter resulting from the elimination of the worst forms of child labour.
Calculations were based, whenever possible, on direct measurements from
sources such as IPEC’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme
on Child Labour (SIMPOC), the World Bank’s Living Standards Mea-
surement Survey (LSMS), and national or local surveys and censuses. Where
numbers had to be constructed or imputed, simpler methods were generally
preferred to more complex ones.
The study models a process taking place over 20 years beginning in
2001 and calculates the present value in 2000 of the costs and benefits as-
sociated with this time period. Specifically, the model proposes to achieve
full enrolment and attendance of all children in primary school by the end
of 2015 and in lower secondary school by 2020. It would eliminate the worst
forms on a more accelerated schedule, to be completed in 2010. Expendi-
tures to achieve these goals are tracked on a year-by-year basis and summed
and discounted to arrive at a present value. Similarly, the opportunity cost
of foregone child labour is calculated for each year during this 20-year pe-
riod and reported as a present value. The health benefits are calculated on
the basis of impairments that would be prevented during these 20 years as
the worst forms are eliminated, bearing in mind that long-lived impairments
(including premature death) entail costs that extend beyond 2020. Similarly,
the education benefits encompass the gains anticipated over the entire fu-
ture work life of child beneficiaries. Hence, both benefits apply to the years
of child labour eliminated or education expanded during the period 2001-
2020, but incorporate effects based on years well beyond this cut-off point.
While each year is calculated individually, for reporting purposes the
study was structured as a series of “waves”. A wave is assumed to take place
over a five-year period, and each wave begins as the preceding one ends. So,
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wave 1 begins in 2001 during which one-third of the children ages 6 to 11 ini-
tially out of school will be enrolled in school, one-fourth of the poor chil-
dren will be part of an income transfer programme, and 50% of the worst
form of child labour will be prevented. In 2006, wave 2 closes an additional
third of 6 to 11-year-old children’s attendance gap and an initial third of
the 12 to 14-year-old children’s attendance gap. In addition, the income transfer
programme will now reach half of the poor children, and all the worst forms
of child labour will be eliminated. Wave 3 starts in 2011, completing the
process of closing the attendance gap of 6 to 11-year-old children and closing
the gap by another third for the 12 to 14 year-olds, while providing transfer
funds to tree-fourths of poor children. Finally, in wave 4, which starts in 2016,
the model envisions all children in school and all poor children subsidized by
transfers. Essentially, then, each wave consolidates the annual changes taking
place according to the projections established in the model.
Because this process takes place over a 20-year period, discounting is
required to convert future values to their present equivalents. To this end,
a real discount rate (r) of 5% was employed together with a set of growth
rates (g) based on demographic projections. There are complications in-
volving discounting, however, that we will address later in this chapter.
Based on the assumption that children are engaged in full-time work
either because there are no schools at all within a convenient distance, or
the schools are of such low quality that parents cannot see the advantage
of enrolling their children, the costs of the supply side of education were
computed, involving school quality as well as quantity. To obtain the costs
of achieving universal primary and lower secondary education, the number
of children out of school was multiplied by the expenditure per pupil. The
costs required for lowering the student-to-teacher ratio to an average of 40:1
and purchases of material sufficient to reach the objective of 15% of overall
recurrent education expenditures were used to obtain an estimate of the ex-
penditures that would improve school quality. Moreover, capital expendi-
tures necessary to have enough school establishments for achieving the goal
of universal coverage were calculated.
Besides having enough school establishments and education of suffi-
cient quality, parents must be able to overcome the purely economic bar-
riers to having their children engaged in study. This includes the direct cost
of schooling, such as books and uniforms, but also, and especially, the op-
portunity cost, or the value of the work children might have to give up if
they increase their school participation. Based on this, in addition to the
opportunity costs of the children’s work, the cost of the demand side of ed-
ucation was calculated. These costs involve income transfer programme tied
to school attendance when households’ income is below poverty line. All
school age children coming from poor families would receive a percentage
of their opportunity cost of work. Finally, we envisaged the need for an
array of interventions targeting children who might not be reached through
either education expansion or income transfers. These include in the first
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instance all children engaged in the worst forms of child labour, since this
work must be eliminated as a matter of priority and cannot wait for other
processes to run their course. Specifically, we propose an intervention pro-
gramme designed to remove children from all such situations within the first
ten years. Second, we expect that children subject to social exclusion may
require extra attention, and this will provide an additional purpose for tar-
geted interventions. Finally, some children may be steered toward unsuit-
able work or away from education due to cultural factors that need to be
addressed through such interventions as awareness-raising. This category
would include programmes that target gender-specific factors, which are oth-
erwise not formally incorporated in the model. In the study methodology,
we do not distinguish between these different motives or gender of the tar-
geted children and simply multiply the number of all children identified as
falling into one of these three categories by the yearly expenditure per child
based on the experience of existing child labour programmes.
To obtain the benefits of education, the present value of increased life-
time income attributable to greater educational attainment was measured.
To this end, the total number of children out of school was multiplied by
the Mincerian coefficient (marginal effect of an extra year of education on
wage), and by unskilled adults’ wages.
The results encompassed 152 countries divided into 5 regions, based
on the groupings developed by the ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labour
Market (KILM), and as adjusted for consistency with the World Bank: Tran-
sitional countries (26 countries), Asia (32 countries), Latin America (29 coun-
tries), Sub-Saharan Africa (43 countries), North Africa & Middle East
(22 countries). High-income countries were not considered due to a lack of
access to data, especially considering that their patterns of child labour may
differ from those found elsewhere (Dorman, 2001). Turkey, included among
the developed countries in the KILM schema, was retained due to its value
as the host of a SIMPOC survey; for accounting purposes it was transferred
to the North Africa & Middle East region. Slovenia was dropped from the
list of transitional countries, because we considered it a fully developed
economy.
Data at the national level, except for a few of the study countries men-
tioned above, are incomplete. Nevertheless, the study methodology requires
calculation at the national level. Typically, various national-level variables,
such as population, income and wages, and educational or health condi-
tions, are combined in the formulas for economic costs and benefits. This
precludes working with regional averages. To overcome this problem, we
used the observations derived from country studies, household surveys and
other credible sources, along with economic and demographic variables for
which complete (or nearly complete) series were available, to impute the
missing observations required. The principal method was regression analysis,
supplemented by the trimming of outliers and the estimation of residual
cases by neighbourhood approximation. (As a last resort, we duplicated the
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relevant value from a nearby country with similar socio-economic condi-
tions.) Annex 2 provides detailed description and analysis of every imputa-
tion employed in the study.
Individual country totals derived from imputation are less reliable, how-
ever, than their regional aggregates, since errors are largely asystematic.
(Some country estimates will be too large, others too small, but the sum will
be closer to hypothetical “true” values.) Consequently, we report only the
regional and global totals. Of these, it should be noted that the results for
the transitional countries and North Africa and the Middle East are some-
what less reliable, in the first case because this region encompasses a wide
range of levels of development, and in the second because of the lack of
an intensive country-level study. Concise summaries of three country studies
developed during the first phase of this project, each representing one of
the remaining regions, are included as annexes.
KEY RESULTS
Table 2.1 reports our baseline results, against which potential changes in the
methodology and assumptions of our model will be compared. Figure 2.1
displays the net economic benefits as a percentage of regional and global
aggregate national income. Table 2.2 provides more detail on the row head-
ings employed.
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Table 2.1. Total economic costs and benefits of eliminating child labour
over the entire period (2000 to 2020), in $billion, PPP
(Percentage of aggregate annual gross national income in parentheses)
Region Transitional Asia Latin Sub- North Global
countries America Saharan Africa and
Africa Middle East
Total costs 25.6 458.8 76.6 139.5 59.7 760.3
Education supply 8.5 299.1 38.7 107.4 39.6 493.4
Transfer implementation 0.7 6.3 1.2 1.5 1.1 10.7
Interventions 0.4 2.4 5.8 0.6 0.2 9.4
Opportunity cost 16.0 151.0 30.9 30.1 18.8 246.8
Total benefits 149.8 3 321.3 407.2 723.9 504.1 5 106.3
Education 145.8 3 307.2 403.4 721.8 500.2 5 078.4
Health 4.0 14.0 3.8 2.1 3.9 28.0
Net economic benefits 124.2 2 862.4 330.6 584.4 444.4 4 346.1
(5.1 %) (27.0%) (9.3%) (54.0%) (23.2%) (22.2%)
Transfer payments 13.1 125.8 23.5 29.1 22.1 213.6
Net financial benefits 111.1 2 736.6 307.1 555.4 422.3 4 132.5
(4.6%) (25.9%) (8.7%) (51.3%) (22.0%) (21.1%)
As can be seen, the global benefits of the elimination of child labour
and the redirection of these children to education greatly exceed the costs.
This result is so strong that it is unlikely that any plausible adjustment to
the methodology would reverse it. As reported above, the study shows the
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Figure 2.1. Net economic benefits as a percentage
of annual Gross National Income
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Table 2.2. Economic categories
Opportunity Opportunity cost of child labour, the value of child labour foregone
cost due to its elimination
Transfer The administrative cost of the income transfer programme to promote the
programme demand for education
Interventions The cost of programme interventions targeting children in the worst forms
of child labour or who experience social exclusion
Education The cost of expanding the quantity and quality of education
supply
Education The economic benefits anticipated from children receiving additional years
benefits of schooling at upgraded levels of quality
Health The economic benefits of improved health outcomes due to the elimination
benefits of the worst forms of child labour
Net economic The net economic benefits of eliminating child labour; total benefits minus
benefits total costs
Transfer The income to be transferred to poor households with school-age children
payments to promote the demand for education
Net financial Net economic benefits minus transfer payments, a measure of the financial
benefits reward (burden) of eliminating child labour
present value of benefits in excess of costs approaches $4.5 trillion, and this
pattern is replicated in each of the five regions. The principle benefit is, not
surprisingly, the economic boost that most countries would experience if all
children were educated through lower secondary school. The health benefit
is far smaller, although, as we shall demonstrate in Chapter 8, this amount
is almost certainly underestimated.
Unfortunately, achieving these large economic gains is not painless.
Countries face two main difficulties. First, the expenses they must bear are
up front, whereas the benefits accrue over several decades. Specifically, the
education benefits first appear in 2006 and accumulate over the following
55 years. (We will investigate this problem in detail in Chapter 9.) Second,
the income transfer programme at the heart of this study’s model shifts over
$200 billion to low-income families over the period 2000-2020 (on a present
value basis). While this is not a resource cost in the economic sense, it is a
financial burden on governments, and one many would be unable to bear
without external assistance.
In subsequent chapters we will subject these results to sensitivity
analysis, considering the effect of alternative assumptions on the individual
cost and benefit components. Here we consider just one overall alternative,
namely revisions to the discount rate r. There are two important issues as-
sociated with the determination of r. First, there is disagreement over the
criteria for establishing discount rates in studies such as this, with the
common sense position being that no single rate can adequately represent
all the effects associated with the passage of time. We choose 5% because it
is conventional in a wide range of studies. The second problem is more dif-
ficult to resolve. Most of the projections in this study are expressed as per-
centages of some economic variable, such average wages or unit costs of
supplying education. If these grow over time, so do the values tied to them,
such as the costs and benefits of expanded education. Technically, such
growth would be expressed as a deduction from r. For example, suppose
that r is set at 5%, and that we are measuring the cost of education. If this
cost rises by 2% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, and if the cost in the cur-
rent period is $100, the present value of next year’s cost is $97.14, rather
than $95.24, which would be the amount if costs were constant. Specifically,
for a discount rate of r and a growth rate of the underlying variable g, the
adjusted discount rate is (r-g)/(1+g). In our example this comes to 2.94%.
To see the role that this adjustment of effective r would play in this
study, let us recalculate the costs and benefits of eliminating child labour
when r is set at 2.94%. That is, let us assume that all relevant underlying
economic magnitudes – per capita income, wages, personnel and materials
costs, the value of child labour, the poverty line – increase in every country
at the uniform real rate of 2% per year for the entire duration of the study
period. Our new results matrix would appear as in Table 2-3.
All magnitudes increase, of course, but those that depend most on
events well in the future increase the most. The cost of supplying education,
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the largest debit item, increases by just over 27%, while the education ben-
efits increase by nearly 70%. Since the 5% discount rate used in the baseline
results is predicated on no change in real economic variables, it is apparent
that net benefits are depressed by this highly conservative assumption.
While the sensitivity of the model to other changes in assumptions re-
mains to be explored (this will be undertaken in the following chapters), it
is evident that the primary result – that the elimination of child labour is
advantageous in solely economic terms – is not likely to be overturned. This
demonstrates that doing the right thing for children, an imperative derived
from humanitarian values, is also consistent with economic criteria. It shows
that the world cannot only afford to do this; it can hardly afford not to. But
it also shows that it will take global cooperation and forward-looking lead-
ership to overcome the economic obstacles in the way of this goal.
In the following chapters, we will examine the various components of
the results, looking in more detail at the different methodological tools ap-
plied in each case and discussing the sensitivity of the results.
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Table 2.3. Costs and benefits of eliminating child labour with r = 2.94%,
in $billion PPP (Percentage of aggregate gross national income in parentheses)
Region Transitional Asia Latin Sub- North Global
countries America Saharan Africa and
Africa Middle East
Total costs 32.5 584.8 97.3 179.4 76.5 970.4
Education supply 10.7 378.9 49.6 137.6 50.4 627.3
Transfer implementation 0.9 8.5 1.6 2.0 1.5 14.4
Interventions 0.4 2.6 6.1 0.6 0.2 10.0
Opportunity cost 20.5 194.8 39.9 39.2 24.3 318.7
Total benefits 253.9 5 627.0 659.3 1 247.9 854.3 8 642.4
Education 248.9 5 609.3 654.5 1 245.2 849.4 8 607.2
Health 5.0 17.6 4.8 2.7 5.0 35.1
Net economic benefits 221.4 5 042.2 562.0 1 068.5 777.8 7 671.9
(9.1%) (47.7%) (15.9%) (98.7%) (40.6%) (39.3%)
Transfer payments 17.7 169.6 31.7 39.2 29.8 288.0
Net financial benefits 203.7 4 872.6 530.3 1 029.3 748.0 7 384.0
(8.4%) (46.1%) (15.0%) (95.1%) (39.0%) (37.8%)

CHILD LABOUR TARGETED FOR ELIMINATION
The ILO’s Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), states that the min-
imum age for entry into employment should not be less than the age of com-
pletion of compulsory schooling, and not less than 15 years, or 14 in the
case of countries “whose economy and educational facilities are insuffi-
ciently developed” (Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4.) Accordingly, work that
interferes with this education, either through direct substitution or through
excessive hours, is prohibited. Hence, for this report, we counted all econ-
omically active children aged 5 to 11, considering their work as child labour
that ought to be eliminated.
The situation is not so clear-cut for children aged 12 to 14, because
Convention No. 138, Article 7, paragraph 1, permits light work for 13 to 14
year-olds (or 12 to 13 year-olds in developing countries).1 Such light work
should (a) not be harmful to a child’s health and development and (b) not
prejudice attendance at school and participation in vocational training nor
“the capacity to benefit from the instruction received”. What does this mean
in statistical terms? Keeping close to recent ILO child labour estimates (ILO
2002) we considered as light work by children aged 12 to 14 that which is
not hazardous in nature and which does not exceed 14 hours per week.2
Consequently, the country-specific number of children in light work had to
be subtracted from the national total of economically active 12 to 14 year-
olds, and then added to the remaining number of 5 to 11 year-olds.
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1 In our model, we opt for 15 as a minimum age of work, anticipating the development
of the latter group of countries, and 12 as the minimum age for light work.
2 This threshold is one of several cut-off points available from SIMPOC national house-
hold surveys and was used in ILO (2002), in line with ILO Convention No. 33. Ongoing re-
search is expected to generate a larger pool of information on which to base assessments of
the impact of different levels of hours of work per week in various occupations on children’s
educational participation and performance.
In addition to the children whose labour should be eliminated because
of their age, millions of children worldwide are entrapped in the worst forms
of child labour, which should be eliminated “as a matter of urgency”, as
the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182) stipu-
lates. Thus, the worst forms concern all children below the age of 18, in-
cluding those above the minimum age of work.
COLLECTING CHILD LABOUR DATA
Data about children and their lives are still inadequate. Children are often
effectively excluded from official statistics, which tend to focus on adults or
formal institutions rather than on children. For example, children may be
merely counted as members of households or as students in schools. Even
where data on children are available, they may not be disaggregated by sex,
age or other groupings, which would allow an understanding of the differ-
ences in situations and needs between these groups. Different government
agencies often collect information for distinct purposes, using various age
groupings, methods and time periods, so that the data sometimes cannot be
centrally managed, shared or compared. National-level statistics are fre-
quently not disaggregated to the levels at which programme interventions
are planned and implemented (e.g. districts, sectors or villages) and this
makes it difficult to undertake proper needs assessment, to target interven-
tions and to evaluate their impact.
The ILO has made considerable strides over the years in assisting
member States and other partners to collect and disseminate information
about child labour, using innovative research methods. Since 1979, when a
large number of country studies were commissioned for the International
Year of the Child, there has been an ongoing programme of child labour
research providing new insights through counting, describing and analysing
the work of children in a variety of economic settings. This work was given
a boost in 1998 with the launch of the Statistical Information and Moni-
toring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC) within IPEC. SIMPOC as-
sists ILO member States in collecting information on children’s work through
national household surveys and a variety of other data collection efforts.
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WORKING CHILDREN AGED 5 TO 14: RESULTS
For this report, data from 28 national household surveys were available and
used for extrapolations, constituting the same data sets employed in Every
Child Counts (ILO, 2002). We adopted the same adjustments to these data:
for age rebracketing, standardization on year 2000, and discrepancies between
SIMPOC and non-SIMPOC surveys.3 Our extrapolation procedure was sim-
ilar but not identical. Due to apparent differences in survey methodology, the
observations did not prove amenable to extrapolation via regression, so we
applied the unweighted regional average of the ratio of working to all chil-
dren aged 5 to 14 to countries without surveys. The results are as follows:
Table 3.1. Working children aged 5 to 14 in thousands,
using unweighted regional averages
Region Total Percent of Cohort
Transition countries 8 310 14.6
Asia 110 390 18.7
Latin America 16 466 17.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 902 25.3
North Africa and Middle East 9 027 10.2
Total 182 096 18.5
The third column reports working 5 to 14 year-olds as a percentage of the
entire age group. According to the data available to us, the incidence of child
labour varies greatly across regions, with the greatest concentration in sub-
Saharan Africa. Indeed, this regional average might be regarded as an out-
lier, except that it is drawn from the largest number of household surveys.
It may be observed that our estimates of the incidence of child labour
closely approximate those reported in Every Child Counts. Thus, the global
total of child labourers in that document is 186.3 million, only slightly higher
than ours. The discrepancy is attributable primarily to differences in the
country composition; the current study excludes the developed countries and
a few others for which economic and demographic data were not available.
In addition to comparing the global totals, it is useful to compare the
regional composition. Here a direct comparison is not possible, because
the current study excludes children ages 12 to 14 in light work (less than
14 hours per week), while Every Child Counts provides regional aggregates
only for the more expansive category of economically active children, which
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3 For details, consult the first two appendices to ILO (2002).
includes light work. Nevertheless, the distribution is broadly similar, as
Table 3.2 demonstrates.
Differences can once again be explained by somewhat different country
compositions of regions, as well as by differences in the extent of light work
across regions. In either formulation, however, well more than half of all
child labour or economic activity is accounted for by Asia and the Pacific,
and more than half the remainder by Sub-Saharan Africa.
Behind these regional averages lie substantial differences at the country
level. One of the countries providing input into this study was Nepal. Ac-
cording to its National Child Labour Survey (assisted by SIMPOC), of the
6.2 million children ages 5 to 14, nearly 2.6 million, or 41.6%, were engaged
in some form of work. Of these, 1.7 million were working for remuneration.
Clearly, child labour in Nepal is far more common that the 18.7% regional
average for Asia would suggest. Thus, care should be taken in drawing in-
ferences from average regional incidence rates; variation within regions is as
substantial as variation across them.
THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR
These extremely exploitative activities can be classified into (a) hazardous
work and (b) the unconditional worst forms of child labour.
Hazardous work by children is any activity or occupation which, by its
nature or type, has, or leads to, adverse effects on the child’s safety, health
(physical or mental), and moral development. Hazards could also derive
from excessive workload, physical conditions of work, and/or work inten-
sity in terms of the duration or hours of work even where the activity or
occupation is known to be non-hazardous or safe. In principle, the number
of children ages 15 to 17 engaged in hazardous work should be added to
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Table 3.2. Percentage distribution of child labour and child economic activity, 
ages 5 to 14, across regions
Region Child labour Child economic activity
Transition countries 4.6 1.2
Asia 60.6 61.1
Latin America 9.0 8.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.8 23.0
North Africa and Middle East 5.0 6.4
Totala 100.0 100.0
a Total child economic activity excludes the developed countries.
Sources: Current study (child labour), Every Child Counts (child economic activity)
the child labour population ages 5 to 14 to arrive at a complete estimate of
the extent of child labour. We do not do that in this study because the main
role of our child labour total is to serve as an input into the calculation of
opportunity costs. Hazardous work performed by older children presents a
different problem, however, because its eradication would not typically en-
tail an opportunity cost: children would be transferred from hazardous to
non-hazardous activities, with no necessary loss in production or pay. Hence,
for purposes of calculating opportunity costs, our measure of child labour
does not include the 15 to 17 age group. On the other hand, we have, as
Chapter 8 explains, incorporated a measure of the older age group in our
calculation of the health benefits of eliminating child labour.
Hazardous work for all children’s age groups also figures into our cal-
culation of programme intervention costs. As we discuss more fully in Chapter
6, it is assumed that particular programmes will be required to remove child
from such work, alter the work so as to make it no longer hazardous, or re-
habilitate children who have experienced harm as a result of their hazard
exposures. For purposes of consistency, in this context we do not extrapo-
late to create regional or global totals for hazardous work; we simply add
up the existing observations, as is the case for other worst forms as well. The
data were taken from the country tabulations used to construct Every Child
Counts, which in turn were based on the numbers of children in mining, con-
struction and a list of detailed occupations, as well as those working exces-
sive hours. These were supplemented by the number of children working in
mining and construction in countries for which more detailed information
was unavailable (and which were therefore not used in Every Child Counts).
Table 3.3 reports our data for hazardous work by region.
No particular significance should be attached to these numbers. They
largely reflect the extent to which surveys in the various regions incorpo-
rated questions on the detailed industry and occupation of child workers.
For the purpose of this exercise, we considered children in forced and
bonded labour, armed conflict, prostitution and pornography, and illicit
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Table 3.3. Number of children in hazardous work by region,
ages 5 to 14 (in thousands), underlying this study
Region Hazardous work
Transitional countries –
Asia and Pacific 5 078
Latin America 4 587
Sub-Saharan Africa 751
North Africa and Middle East 420
Global 10 836
activities4 as unconditional worst forms of child labour. Trafficked children
were excluded from the calculations in order to avoid double-counting. The
figures for the unconditional worst forms of child labour are based on a
comprehensive secondary data review, involving data collection, data vali-
dation, data selection and calculation of the global estimates.5 When no re-
liable figure was found for a country, it does not appear in our calculations;
unlike the other variables used in our calculations, no extrapolation from
one country to another was made. This is because the observations, where
they exist, are based on identified populations and are themselves not gen-
erally representative of the complete counts that would be obtained through
comprehensive surveys. Therefore, the results in Table 3.4, based on avail-
able data from 56 countries, should be considered as conservative minimum
estimates. Columns 2 through 4 provide low, medium and high estimates,
based on uncertainties regarding the totals in specific countries.
Table 3.4. Children in the unconditional worst forms of child labour,
ages 5 to 17 (in thousands)
Region Low Medium High
Transitional countries 9 9 9
Asia and Pacific 6581 12691 18450
Latin America 887 952 1018
Sub-Saharan Africa 689 770 851
North Africa and Middle East 71 71 71
Total 8236 14492 20398
It has to be noted that national micro data sets on unconditional worst
forms on child labour are almost non-existent. This is an area where there
is an urgent need for the development of appropriate survey instruments.
Given the limited evidence at present, the above figures are likely to under-
estimate the true extent of the unconditional worst forms of child labour
in the 56 countries where data were available. Moreover, children in these
countries account for only 56% of the total child population in developing
and transitional countries. In other words, no data at all exist on countries
that harbour 44% of the children that should in principle be surveyed for
this study. While in the case of some worst forms of child labour, such as
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4 For a definition of these terms, see ILO (2002).
5 For an in-depth description of these steps, see ILO (2002).
child soldiers or bonded labourers, it is fairly easy to exclude several coun-
tries from the list, there is every reason to believe that the number of chil-
dren involved in the other unconditional worst forms (e.g. sexual exploitation
or illicit activities) is not zero in the remaining countries. Nevertheless, we
did not have a basis for extrapolation, because our country totals do not
represent reliable estimates of the true number of children engaged in these
forms of exploitation but rather confirmed populations, and the discrep-
ancy between these two varies unsystematically across countries.
From a programme point of view, addressing these unconditional worst
forms presents a particular challenge, as they are often hidden and/or re-
lated to some form of social exclusion or stigma. Hence, the children in-
volved in these activities will not be easily integrated into the formal school
system. It is clear that a sustainable withdrawal from their exploitative work
situations will require specific, targeted interventions to overcome social and
cultural obstacles to school attendance (see Chapter 6).
Since ILO Convention No. 182 calls for the urgent elimination of the
worst forms of child labour, our model envisages their effective elimination
over a ten-year period, that is, during the first two waves.
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EDUCATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CHILD LABOUR
ILO Convention No. 138 links the minimum age for work to the age of com-
pletion of compulsory schooling. By establishing such a link, the aim is to
ensure that children’s human capital is developed to its fullest potential, ben-
efiting children themselves, their families and communities and society as a
whole by the increased contribution they can, when grown, make to econ-
omic growth and social development.
Education is indeed the most compelling potential alternative to full-
time work for children. Millions of children are engaged in full-time work
because a satisfactory alternative is not available to them: either there are
no schools at all within a convenient distance, or the schools are of such
low quality that parents cannot see the advantage of enrolling their chil-
dren. Even if children do attend such sub-standard schools, they may not
receive the benefits that ought to be available to them as a result of fore-
going child labour. 12 to 14-year-old students of such schools, who are per-
mitted to combine schooling and light work, might regard their out-of-school
time better spent working excessive hours than preparing their homework.
For these reasons, quality as well as quantity (and location) are central to
education supply. Finally, formal enrolment alone is not sufficient for real-
izing the benefits of education; actual attendance is required as well.
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AND QUALITY OF EDUCATION 4
METHODOLOGY
Research teams in the eight study countries applied the following methodology.
The first step was to ascertain the physical accessibility of primary and
lower secondary education. Accessibility is a function of mobility, of course.
In an area in which people travel mostly on foot the accessibility radius of
a school is smaller than in one in which people can travel by other forms of
transport. In addition, a degree of capacity sufficient to serve a portion of
the relevant age cohort is not the same as that needed to serve all such chil-
dren, including those not currently attending.
Second, the country teams determined how many children have access
to some form of age-appropriate school, but lack access to quality education.
This is a difficult and controversial question to answer (Matz, 2003). There
is no universally agreed-upon set of criteria for quality; different analysts have
different approaches. Quality may not mean the same thing in one country
as another, since the challenges set before the school system may differ. More-
over, any dividing line between “adequate” and “inadequate” quality is nec-
essarily arbitrary, and observers may disagree about where it should be drawn.
Despite these qualifications, the following criteria were applied:
 Pupil-to-teacher ratio: this should not exceed 40 for any school. This
seems to be a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition for the provi-
sion of quality education (Mehrotra/Vandemoortele, 1997). Prescribing
such a ratio on a national basis is a conservative minimum require-
ment, as a national average of 40 would presumably include many
schools that fail to meet this standard.
 Books and other teaching materials: non-salary recurrent costs must
not be less than 15% of overall recurrent expenditure. At least until
minimum thresholds have been exceeded, additional learning materials
have been found to be priority to improving school quality in devel-
oping countries (Colclough/Lewin, 1993; Wolff et al., 1994). Allocating
15% of total recurrent expenditure is a benchmark derived from de-
veloped countries’ education budgets (Delamonica et al., 2001).
Even though they are to some extent arbitrary, these measures have the ad-
vantage of not only identifying such quality gaps as may exist, but also pro-
viding a method for calculating the cost of closing them. Thus the formula
used to determine quality upgrade was:
Quality upgrade cost = additional salary cost to achieve
minimum pupil-to-teacher ratio + additional non-salary costs
An example of quality upgrade costs in the context of one of our study
countries is provided by Kenya. In 2000 teachers’ salaries comprised 97.2%
of all recurrent costs in primary education, well above the quality guideline
given above. In order for non-salary costs to account for 15% of the total,
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the 2000 expenditure must be increased more than fivefold. This was incor-
porated into our estimate for Kenya’s future recurrent costs. Similarly, teacher
salaries comprised 94.5% of secondary recurrent costs, requiring a corre-
sponding quality adjustment.
Quality upgrade costs were expressed on a unit basis, that is, per stu-
dent in the relevant target population. It was not always possible to differ-
entiate between unit costs for primary and lower secondary schools, as
teacher salaries, the most important determinant of unit costs, vary greatly
according to age, qualification and location and were not reported in detail
in most of the study countries. Moreover, attendance data is reported on
the basis of national school norms, and different school systems have dif-
ferent age break-ups, which means that the ratio of primary to lower sec-
ondary for students below the age of 15 varies greatly across countries. Thus,
a single unit cost was usually prescribed for quality upgrades at both levels.1
Where no education existed before, the existing recurrent unit costs
(cumulative) and capital unit costs (non-cumulative) of supplying education
were applied, and the upgrade costs added. In addition, the country teams
were asked whether a sufficient infrastructure (e.g. teacher training facili-
ties) to support the provision of quality education were available. Where the
answer was no, the cost results were multiplied times 1.25.
The country teams were alerted to the possibilities of economies or
diseconomies of scale affecting the unit costs. However, no findings emerged
that would have shed light on this question, so we assumed constant returns
to scale.
In all calculations, the projected growth rate of the target population
over time was taken into account.
DATA
The enrolment data reported by national Ministries of Education and by
UNESCO have little relationship to actual attendance rates as measured by
household surveys. Since, from both a child labour and an economic stand-
point it is actual attendance that matters, we opted for the survey results.
Specifically, we used the attendance series reported by UNICEF for 89 coun-
tries (The State of the World’s Children, 2003) as a basis for extrapolation.
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1 Data collected by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics indicate that the expenditure
per pupil in developing countries is only slightly higher in lower secondary school than in pri-
mary school (OECD/UNESCO, 2001). The reported ratio of lower secondary to primary ex-
penditure per pupil corresponds roughly to the ratio of overall unit costs (recurrent and capital)
between lower secondary and primary education in our calculations. Two caveats should be
noted, however: the UNESCO sample was taken from middle-income countries whose teacher
salary distributions may differ from that of lower-income countries, and within these sample
averages are large variations in the second-to-primary ratios across countries.
These values were trimmed for the purpose of imputation, and the regional
average was applied to the remaining countries, since there was relatively
little variation within regions.
For lower secondary education, we used net attendance rates (denom-
inated in the same fashion as net enrolment rates) collected in six of our
country studies and added attendance rates from four SIMPOC national
household surveys. The subsequent extrapolation was performed as a mix
of neighbourhood imputations and assigning secondary-to-primary ratios
from countries where data were available for both levels to countries where
data were available only for the primary level. The resulting regional and
global population-weighted averages are reported in Table 4.1.
The projection of education needs is complicated by expected changes
in the population of the relevant age brackets over the duration of the
model. In some countries, particularly in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa,
North Africa and the Middle East, the number of children of primary or
secondary school age is expected to increase significantly by 2020. This
means that each year’s expenditure must incorporate a growth factor, so
that eliminating a constant fraction of the NAR gap translates into a rising
cost over time. On the other hand, many countries anticipate population
declines in this age group. This could be due either to reduced population
overall or to a changing age profile. If the population of school-age chil-
dren diminishes, this will be reflected initially in a declining expenditure in
order to close a constant fraction of the NAR gap. In fact, it will probably
be the case that capital expenditures will reach zero before the model’s
horizon has been reached. This is because spending on school increases the
capacity of the education system to meet the needs of future students. At
some point, this capacity can exceed the entire eligible population. (Box
4.1. illustrates this process using the example of Ukraine.) At the primary
level, 68 countries in our sample reach this situation before the end of the
15 horizon, averaging 7.9 years of zero expenditure. For lower secondary
the corresponding amounts are 60 countries and 6.6 years, reflecting lower
initial attendance rates at this level.
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Table 4.1. Net attendance rates by level and region
Region Primary Lower secondary
Transitional countries 89.5 84.7
Asia and Pacific 76.8 47.8
Latin America 91.4 49.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 56.4 27.8
North Africa and Middle East 82.3 62.7
Total 76.2 48.9
The recurrent unit costs in the country studies consisted of current unit
costs (as reported by the Ministries of Education), plus required quality im-
provement according to the criteria specified above, for which the under-
lying pupil-teacher ratios and non-salary expenditures were also gathered
from the Ministries of Education. These were combined into an augmented
unit recurrent cost total, which was then used as the basis for imputation
to the rest of regions 2 to 6. The unit capital costs were calculated from the
Ministries’ of Education reported expenditure on buildings and equipment
and the corresponding capacity to accommodate students. (We did not have
sufficient data to distinguish between primary and secondary unit costs.)
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Box 4.1. Population decline and lower secondary education costs in Ukraine
The net attendance rate in Ukraine for children between the ages of 12 and 14 is .86. If
we assume that the current ratio of schools to students must be maintained as atten-
dance increases, this requires a spending programme on building new schools. The unit
cost per student served by such schools is reported to be $4,475, and the population of
children in this age bracket in 2005 is projected at just over 1.9 million. Thus, with one-
fifteenth of the schooling gap to be made up in the first year of the second wave, the ex-
penditure comes to approximately $80 million (undiscounted). But the population of
12 to 14 year-olds is expected to decline in Ukraine, arriving at only 1.1 million in 2020.
This represents an annually compounded decrease of 3.7%.
The relevant information is summarized in the following table.
Table 4.2. Lower secondary school capacity
and student population in Ukraine
Year Capacity Population
Initial 1 659 737 1 940 131
1 1 677 742 1 868 677
2 1 696 435 1 799 854
3 1 713 776 1 733 567
4 1 730 479 1 669 721
The initial education capacity is assumed to be equal to the initial population times the
attendance rate. The capacity rises in the first year of the second wave as a result of the
spending on additional schools; meanwhile, the population being served falls. (Because
of this decline, capital expenditures will be less in the second year of wave 2: $77.6 mil-
lion.) With each subsequent year, money spent on building new schools leads to an in-
crease in the capacity of the school system, while the decline in the number of students
needing to be schooled reduces the gap. After three years, there is no need for further
school-building, even if the population were fully enrolled. Hence, secondary education
costs for Ukraine include 15 years of recurrent expenses but only three years of capital.
A rapidly diminishing population rate is characteristic of transitional countries: only
one anticipates population growth, while three have rates of decline even greater than
Ukraine’s. By contrast, only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa anticipate fewer 12-14
year-olds than at present.
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Box 4.2. Direct costs of education
Three of our study countries reported significant education costs being borne by house-
holds. They are large enough to have a bearing on the prospective costs of achieving full
attendance by 2020, and they constitute a potential disincentive on the demand side of
education as well.
Pakistan
Public records do not distinguish between expenditures on primary and lower secondary
schools, so the Pakistani researchers determined the recurrent cost at both levels by di-
viding the total amount spent on primary education by the number of students at the
primary level. This amounted to $182 in PPP 2000. But households also pay directly for
school, as revealed by a 1998 household survey. These direct costs averaged $68 for public
primary school students and $150 for public secondary students in PPP 1998. Even con-
sidering that lower secondary students probably pay less in direct costs than those in
higher grades, the importance of household contributions is striking.
Nepal
Government spending on public primary education averaged $170 per pupil in 2000. A
1996 survey, however, found that households paid the equivalent of $39 in direct costs
(both in PPP 2000). Thus, the direct costs were 23% of the public expenditures.
Kenya
A 1994 survey found that public spending per pupil was $151 at the primary level and
$507 at the secondary, but that the corresponding direct costs to the household were $56
and $620. Remarkably, the majority of expenses of secondary education were borne by
students and their families. By the time a further survey was conducted in 1997, these
costs had declined to $32 and $428 (in $PPP 1977), but they remained substantial.
Overall, it is clear that in many countries it is not enough to canvass government agen-
cies to determine the amount spent on education. We include direct costs in our calcu-
lations of total expenditures for two reasons. First, it is an important component of the
total resource cost envisioned for achieving full attendance. Second, we propose that, as
part of the larger programme modelled in this study, the public sector should assume the
full financial cost of education through the lower secondary level. Only in this way can
the transfer programme considered in the following chapter be regarded as sufficient to
achieve its demand-side objectives. Hence, we allocate direct costs to the public sector in
our distributional analysis, even though they are currently paid by households.
Table 4.3. Average unit costs of education supply by type and region, in $PPP
Region Recurrent Capital
low medium high
Transitional countries 345 345 777 3 728 
Asia and Pacific 295 295 663 3 183 
Latin America 407 407 916 4 396 
Sub-Saharan Africa 170 170 383 1 838 
North Africa and Middle East 349 349 784 3 765 
Total 277 277 623 2 989
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In one instance, we adjusted recurrent costs to incorporate the project
effects of HIV/AIDS. This disease strikes down adults, including teachers,
during their prime productive years. Given the need for even more teachers
to achieve full attendance and the cost of training them, it is likely that,
among the other hardships resulting from this epidemic, there will be an in-
crease in needed expenditures on education. Among our study countries,
Kenya is seriously affected by the spread of HIV/AIDS, with a prevalence
rate of 13.5% in 1999. We do not have a direct basis for inferring from this
the likely burden on the country’s educational system, but we do have this
information for Mozambique, which can serve as a benchmark. Mozam-
bique, with a 13.2% prevalence in 1999, has been estimated to face an in-
crease of 6.79% in its cost of providing teachers for the public school system.2
Extrapolating on the basis of relative prevalence rates, this translates to a
6.94% increase in Kenya. We did not perform this calculation for other African
countries, but using Kenya as a partial basis for our global extrapolation em-
bodied this effect indirectly. In the absence of other bases for projecting the
future incidence of this disease, we made the conservative assumption that
it would continue at its current level throughout the 20-year implementation
period of our model. During the years of peak expenditure on the recurrent
costs at the primary level in this model, 2015-2020, the results correspond
roughly to the World Bank (2002) estimate that HIV/AIDS will add between
$450 and $550 million per year to the cost of achieving universal education.3
An additional problem is raised by direct costs of education, defined
as expenditures made by households directly to schools for the education
of their children. These may include fees as well as purchases of books or
other essential materials. The importance of these costs differs widely among
the countries we studied, ranging from insignificant (Ukraine and Brazil) to
substantial, as Box 4.2 demonstrates.
The extrapolation of these eight observations to the global level is de-
scribed in Annex 2. A modest relationship between the ratio of unit recur-
rent costs to per capita income and per capita income itself was used to
generate estimates on this variable to the remaining countries. There was no
systemic relationship that could be used to a similar effect with unit capital
costs, however. In lieu of this, we estimated low, medium and high capital
costs based on the range of ratios of unit capital to recurrent costs in the
eight study countries. The medium set of estimates is our baseline in this
study, but Table 4.3 reports all three, along with unit recurrent costs. Re-
gional averages are weighted by the number of children not attending school,
as derived from age populations and estimated net attendance rates.
As can be seen, capital costs take the form of a multiple of recurrent
costs. This multiple is 1, 2.25 and 4.8 respectively for low, medium and high
estimates. (The regional averages in Table 4.3 do not reflect this precisely
2 UNDP (2000).
3 World Bank (2002).
because they include the eight countries that were recorded directly, rather
than estimated.)
The most consequential estimates, from the standpoint of our education
cost calculations, are the unit recurrent costs. There are two reasons for this.
First, they are cumulative throughout the 20-year model period, whereas cap-
ital costs are one-time only. That is, a $1 increase in unit capital costs will be
multiplied by the number of additional children for whom education is to be
provided, whereas the same increase in unit recurrent costs will be multiplied
by the number of children, and then multiplied again by the number of years
this additional supply will be maintained. Second, we estimated unit capital
costs as multiples of recurrent. How much room is there for underestimation
of these recurrent costs? One way to cross-check our estimates is to compare
them to teacher salaries. Drawing on the LABORSTA dataset (see Chapter 7
for details), we find 60 countries with observations on both average unskilled
wages and average teacher salaries. (Two additional data points were deleted
because they appeared implausible.) In Table 4.4 we report the average ratio
of the teachers’ to unskilled wages and the average annual teacher salary it-
self. Regional and global averages apply only to those countries for which we
had data, and they were weighted by total population.
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators, drawing on UN-
ESCO’s Institute for Statistics, provide data on average pupil teacher ratios
in most countries. The population-weighted average for PTR in the coun-
tries in regions 2 to 6 is 27. Combining this information with the teacher
salary data above, and bearing in mind that teacher salaries represent the
largest portion of recurrent education costs, the estimates in Table 4.3 ap-
pear entirely plausible. At the global average, the teacher salary per student
would come to $158, i.e. 57% of the corresponding unit recurrent cost. It is
unlikely, then, that we are underestimating these costs to the degree that the
overall conclusions of this study would be affected.
With this established, we will move to the total cost calculations them-
selves.
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Table 4.4. Average teacher-to-unskilled wage ratio
and average annual teacher salaries by region in $PPP
Region Ratio of teacher Annual 
to unskilled wages teacher salary
Transitional countries 0.93 4 598
Asia and Pacific 1.2 3 598
Latin America 2.31 7 967
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.51 6 273
North Africa and Middle East 2.40 7 305
Total 1.45 4270
Recurrent costs increase rapidly from wave to the next because they
are cumulative, except for primary education in wave 4, since this last wave
recapitulates the cost of the final year of wave 3, discounted at five addi-
tional years. The expansion of primary education entails greater costs, due
to the larger number of grade levels and the extra wave of provision.
There are no capital costs in primary education in wave 4, since the
model assumes that educational capacity will have expanded to include all
children by that point. (We do not include an additional cost to accommo-
date possible school-age population increases during the final five years.)
Note the substantial reduction in expenditures for both levels over time, due
to the early attainment of full capacity in population-diminishing countries
as well as the effect of discounting.
Comparing the four tables 4.5 through 4.8, several patterns emerge. Re-
current costs per wave are approximately the same for both levels, consid-
ering the role played by discounting. Capital costs are somewhat larger at
the secondary level, even though they are discounted over an extra five years,
due to differences in attendance rates. Also, the vast majority of all costs are
accounted for by the educational needs of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 4.5. Recurrent costs, primary education by region and wave,
in $billion PPP (baseline calculation)
Region Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Transitional countries 0.5 0.9 1.6 2.1
Asia and Pacific 11.9 23.1 45.8 61.0
Latin America 1.0 1.9 3.8 5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 7.4 15.9 29.0
North Africa and Middle East 1.6 3.2 6.3 9.1
Total 18.4 36.5 73.3 106.3
Table 4.6. Recurrent costs, secondary education by region and wave,
in $billion PPP (baseline calculation)
Region Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Transitional countries 0.3 0.6 0.9
Asia and Pacific 10.4 20.2 39.0
Latin America 2.3 4.5 8.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 5.0 10.7
North Africa and Middle East 1.4 2.7 5.3
Total 16.8 32.9 64.6
To sum up, we will consider the effects of substituting the low and high
unit capital cost estimates for our baseline medium calculation. Table 4.9
compares the three possible costs of education by region based on these dif-
fering capital cost assumptions.
These costs increase at a increasing rate, since the recurrent compo-
nent, which plays a more important role when capital costs are low, is fixed.
It is pertinent to consider the effect of the highest assumptions about cap-
ital costs on our summary results. These are portrayed in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.7. Capital costs, primary education by region and wave,
in $billion PPP (baseline calculation)
Region Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Transitional countries 0.8 0.1 0.0
Asia and Pacific 20.9 14.5 8.5
Latin America 1.5 1.1 0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.0 5.2 4.5
North Africa and Middle East 2.4 1.9 1.1
Total 31.6 22.8 14.8
Table 4.8. Capital costs, secondary education by region and wave,
in $billion PPP (baseline calculation)
Region Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Transitional countries 0.6 0.1 0.0
Asia and Pacific 19.8 15.0 9.1
Latin America 3.5 2.7 1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.9 6.0 5.1
North Africa and Middle East 2.1 1.7 1.0
Total 32.8 25.4 17.1
Table 4.9. Education costs by region using low, medium and high unit 
capital cost assumptions, in $billion PPP
Region Transitional Asia Latin Sub-Saharan North Africa Global
countries America Africa and Middle East
Low 8.0 266.0 34.2 95.9 34.0 438.0
Medium 8.6 299.1 38.7 107.4 39.6 493.4
High 9.8 366.8 47.8 131.0 51.1 606.3
Net global benefits remain strongly positive, both globally and in every
region. The difference between our baseline measures of the costs and ben-
efits of expanding education is so large that plausible increases in these costs
cannot alter the overall findings.
Returning to our baseline numbers, it may be observed that the unit
costs estimated in this report are, on balance, substantially higher than those
put forward by UNESCO. Table 4.11 provides the relevant comparisons:
This table reports the unit recurrent costs from this study and Scenario 2
of UNESCO, which incorporates adjustments for quality changes, along
with average teacher salaries. (We converted the UNESCO estimates from
1995 to 2000 $PPP.) It is evident that, not only are our global estimates half
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Table 4.10. Summary costs and benefits based on «high» estimates
of unit capital costs of education, in $billion PPP
(Percentage of aggregate national income in parentheses)
Region Transitional Asia Latin Sub- North Global
countries America Saharan Africa and
Africa Middle East
Total costs 26.9 526.5 85.7 162.9 71.2 873.2
Education supply 9.8 366.8 47.8 130.8 51.1 606.3
Transfer implementation 0.7 6.3 1.2 1.5 1.1 10.7
Intervention 0.4 2.4 5.8 0.6 0.2 9.4
Opportunity cost 16.0 151.0 30.9 30.1 18.8 246.8
Total benefits 149.8 3 321.3 407.2 723.9 504.1 5 106.3
Education 145.8 3 307.2 403.4 721.8 500.2 5 078.4
Health 4.0 14.0 3.8 2.2 3.9 28.0
Net economic benefits 122.9 2 794.8 321.5 561.0 432.9 4 233.2
(5.1%) (26.4%) (9.1%) (51.8%) (22.6%) (21.7%)
Transfer payments 13.1 125.8 23.5 29.1 22.1 213.6
Net financial benefits 109.8 2 669.0 298.0 532.0 410.8 4 019.6
(4.5%) (25.2%) (8.4%) (49.2%) (21.4%) (20.6%)
Table 4.11. Current average unit cost of education, $PPP (year 2000)
Region Transitional Asia Latin Sub-Saharan North Africa Global
countries America Africa and Middle East
ILO-IPEC 345 295 407 170 349 277
UNESCO
Scenario 2* 535 79 364 91 447 180
Teacher salaries 4 598 3 598 7 967 6 273 7 305 4 270
* Source: Brossard and Gacougnolle, forthcoming. Financing Primary Education for All: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, UNESCO.
again as large as UNESCO’s, but there are even greater variations across
regions. There are several differences in methodology that illuminate these
comparisons:
1) Our study is based on the research performed in eight study countries,
from which we extrapolated to the rest of the world. These were con-
ducted by independent researchers familiar with local conditions. UN-
ESCO obtained data from a larger number of countries, but these were
survey responses by education ministries.
2) Our study separated out the capital costs, whereas UNESCO’s did not.
Thus the combined unit cost disparities would be greater than those
reported in Table 4.11.
3) Our study included direct costs of education, which UNESCO’s did
not. As we have seen from Box 4.2, these are significant in many coun-
tries. Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are the two regions in which
we found the greatest direct costs, and they are also the regions in which
the ratio of our cost estimates to UNESCO’s is the largest.
One way to evaluate these regional differences is to compare them to data
on teacher salaries, row 4 in Table 4.11. These regional averages were com-
puted from the LABORSTA data described above. We might suppose that
education costs, particularly recurrent, will be roughly in proportion to these
salaries. If so, we would be interested in the ratio of unit education costs to
teacher salaries between regions. For instance, the average unit cost ratio for
our study between the transitional countries and Asia is 345:295 or 1.17.
The same ratio for UNESCO is 535:97 or 6.77. But the ratio of teacher
salaries is 4598:3598 or 1.28. Assuming for the sake of analysis that the re-
gion-to-region teacher salary ratio is the correct benchmark, we can define
either ILO’s or UNESCO’s error as the difference between its unit cost ratio
for a given pair of regions and the corresponding ratio of teacher costs. To
continue our example, the ILO error is –.11 and UNESCO’s is 5.49. To put
some perspective on these numbers, the absolute value of ILO’s error is 8.5%
of the potentially more reliable ratio of teacher salaries between these two
regions, compared to 430% for UNESCO.
Over the five regions there are four fundamental ratios, in the sense
that any other ratio can be expressed as a combination of these four. Here
we will identify them as (region) 2:3, 3:4, 4:5 and 5:6. If we perform the
above calculations for all four regional pairs, the ILO error is always less
than UNESCO’s; the average ILO error is 50% of the average teacher salary
ratio, while the equivalent figure for UNESCO is 242%. Hence, to the ex-
tent that differences in teacher salaries are thought to correspond to differ-
ences in regional unit education costs, there is support for the estimates we
use in this study.
A different way to compare our costs of education with other estimates
is to look at the annual flows over the 20-year duration of the programme.
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(For additional discussion of annual flow methodology, see Chapter 9 and
Annex 3.) Table 4.12 tracks these undiscounted costs by region.
Recently, the World Bank published a detailed estimate of the cost of
achieving universal primary school completion worldwide by 2015 (Bruns
et al., 2003). The incremental cost, the difference between the expenditures
required to achieve this goal and those currently financing primary educa-
tion, amount to approximately $17.5 billion in the horizon year, just over a
sixth of our corresponding amount. What explains such a large difference?
First, the two estimation exercises are not comparable. Our goal is to
achieve universal attendance by this age group in 2015, whereas the Bank
targets universal completion. Even more significant from a cost standpoint
is the difference in methods for calculating the resources needed to expand
education. The Bank advances a standard set of education supply criteria
for implementation in all countries: universal pupil-to-teacher and to-class-
room ratios of 40:1 (neither lower nor higher), best practice capital con-
struction costs (which may differ from current costs), and a fixed range of
teacher salaries (which entails raising them in some countries but lowering
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Table 4.12. Annual undiscounted additional costs of education by region,
in $billion PPP
Region
Programme Transitional Asia Latin Sub-Saharan North Africa Global
year countries America Africa and Middle East
1 0.4 6.4 0.5 1.8 0.8 10.8
2 0.4 6.7 0.5 1.9 0.8 12.3
3 0.3 7.2 0.5 2.1 0.9 13.9
4 0.2 7.7 0.6 2.3 0.9 15.7
5 0.2 8.3 0.6 2.5 1.0 17.7
6 0.5 16.6 2.1 5.1 2.0 32.3
7 0.6 17.9 2.3 5.6 2.2 35.4
8 0.6 19.4 2.5 6.1 2.4 38.9
9 0.5 19.9 2.7 6.8 3.2 42.1
10 0.5 22.1 3.0 7.6 3.3 46.5
11 0.6 24.8 3.3 8.6 3.4 51.7
12 0.7 28.1 3.7 9.7 3.3 57.4
13 0.8 32.0 4.2 11.1 3.4 64.5
14 0.9 36.9 4.7 12.9 3.5 72.8
15 1.1 40.1 5.4 14.8 3.6 79.9
16 1.1 40.2 5.6 13.9 3.1 80.0
17 1.2 42.7 6.2 14.6 3.1 84.8
18 1.2 45.4 6.8 15.5 3.1 90.0
19 1.3 48.2 7.6 16.6 3.1 95.8
20 1.4 52.4 7.9 17.9 3.1 102.7
them in others). Our study, by contrast, extrapolates from existing unit cap-
ital and recurrent costs and assumes no change in PTR or the intensity of
classroom use unless these figures are inordinately high.
Second, several of the Bank’s methods have the effect of reducing their
estimates relative to ours. The most important of these is their decision to
use market exchange rates rather than purchasing power parity ratios to
translate local currencies into US dollar equivalents.
Others include the option of designating five years as primary school
duration in countries where this is the norm and incorporating the expec-
tation that a portion of enrollment growth will be captured by the private
sector, leaving it outside their cost model. Our study standardizes all coun-
tries on six years of primary school and assumes no expansion of private
schooling.
Taken together, these differences in method roughly explain the dif-
ferences in estimated costs.
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In the model employed by this study, households incur costs from the elim-
ination of child labour, but also receive benefits. They forego the opportu-
nity costs of withdrawing their children from work, namely the lost income
or productivity in kind generated by them. In return, they receive income
transfers according to the formula postulated by our model. Of course,
these are not exactly the same households: non-poor households with child
labourers incur only costs, while poor households whose children were not
gainfully employed receive only benefits. We abstract from this issue, how-
ever, and treat the household sector as a single unit. We assume in doing
so that non-poor families are generally able to bear the opportunity costs
with their own resources, while transfers to poor families serve useful so-
cial purposes in addition to promoting the education and child labour goals
of our model.
In this chapter, we will describe the methods used to estimate costs and
benefits at the household level. Before doing this, however, we must first dis-
tinguish between economic costs and those which are financial but not econ-
omic. From the standpoint of economic theory, the only true costs of any
course of action are opportunity costs (what could have been gained from
using resources elsewhere rather than in a particular activity) and disutility
(the direct unpleasantness of undertaking an activity). In conventional usage,
however, costs refer to expenditures that need to be made in order to achieve
some result. These are not the same, since some expenditures are not econ-
omic costs, and some economic costs are not expenditures. An example of
the former would be an income transfer programme, such as we will describe,
in which money is moved from one account (the government’s) to another
account (a poor family’s), but there is no corresponding effect on real re-
sources: no goods or services are directly foregone as a result of the transfer.
(In principle, it is conceivable that the poor family could spend its new money
on exactly the same items that the government would have chosen.) Of course,
the administrative costs of the transfer programme are true economic costs,
since the money paid for government employees compensates them for the
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disutility of their work as well as the loss of other possible uses of their time.
Since income transfer programmes are expected to play an important role
in the study, it is important to maintain this distinction. By measuring transfer
and true economic (opportunity/disutility) costs separately, we can provide
both an economic expression of these costs (what society gives up to pay
them) and a fiscal expression (how great a burden these costs would place
on private and public budgets).
An example of economic costs that are not expenditures would be the
economic value of unpaid child labour. When a child takes care of a younger
sibling or gathers firewood, for example, money is unlikely to change hands,
but the activity has real economic consequences. Human needs – child-
minding and fuel provision – that would otherwise go unmet are being ser-
viced. It is essential to put an economic, which is to say a monetary, value
on these activities. If children withdraw from some or all of these activities,
either households will have to accept a lower level of self-provision or they
will have to find some other people (other family members, other members
of the community) to fill in. Of course, it is difficult to estimate the mone-
tary equivalent for work that is neither paid nor leads to marketed output,
but a tentative approach is made here.
Another point to be clarified is how the costs are distributed within the
sectors. In this chapter we will discuss the costs and benefits to “households”,
but this is an incomplete account of how individuals within this sector will
be affected. First, we include in this category only the household in which
the child who is part of the target group now lives, and not the child’s fu-
ture household, particularly in the context of education benefits calculated
over a 40 year time horizon. Second, we do not consider how costs and ben-
efits will be apportioned among the individuals who make up these house-
holds. There is a substantial literature in the social sciences that considers
the allocation of money and other goods within the household. This is far
from a trivial issue, since in many countries unequal allocation at this level
can have far-reaching consequences for health and human opportunities.
Nevertheless, these refinements are beyond the scope of the present study,
which must go to considerable lengths to estimate economic flows to and
from households in the aggregate, much less the complex flows within them.
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THE VALUE OF CHILD LABOUR
The opportunity cost of eliminating child labour is the value of this labour
itself: to the children, to their households and to the larger community. Here
is where controversies surrounding policy are joined. Those who would move
more rapidly to oppose child labour see this cost as relatively manageable
and dwarfed by the benefits of taking action. Those who would go slower
believe these costs to be quite large; they stress that well-intended actions
by child labour activists may actually hurt those they are trying to help. For
some with a rational choice perspective, there is an initial presumption that
the opportunity costs must be substantial, since parents (from this view-
point) are often seen to choose to put their children to work. If parents are
economically rational, and if they care about the future well-being of their
children, they must be calculating that the benefits of child work exceed the
costs of reduced opportunities for education.
An attempt to obtain the opportunity cost of eliminating child labour
was made by the country study teams. In some cases, in which country teams
had no household survey data, the wages of one or two occupations com-
monly held by children were used. In countries where there were available
household survey data, the study teams used the children’s monthly earn-
ings, including salaries and payment in-kind, as the value of their work. The
average monthly earnings were calculated for occupations related to do-
mestic work, i.e., baby sitter, cleaner, cooker, cloth washer, etc.. When a child
was reported to be doing domestic work and was not attending school, since
there was no information on hours spent in household activities, researchers
attributed a “domestic servant” salary earned by employed children. The
earnings obtained by these methods were then pooled to determine the av-
erage opportunity cost of removing children from work.
We place great credence in the efforts of these study teams, whose
methods are documented in their reports. Unfortunately, we have these de-
tailed calculations for only a handful of countries. These could not be sup-
plemented by data from labour force surveys, since, in general, these do not
account for working children below the age of 14, and when they do, the
work performed in the household and/or without monetary payment are
seldom reported.
Because extrapolation from so few observations was not feasible, we
chose to impute the value of child labour in most countries from the un-
skilled adult wage. The first step was to construct a series for the adult wage
itself. We had direct observations for a few countries, primarily drawn from
our study teams, but these too were insufficient for extrapolation. Instead,
we relied on the ILO’s LABORSTA database. These figures are reported by
national governments are not vetted for accuracy; their precision is uncer-
tain, but the general contours are plausible. We utilized the occupational se-
ries compiled by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and extracted the principal
unskilled occupational categories to construct a composite unskilled wage
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for each of the 25 countries included in the LABORSTA sample. (The wages
were converted to $PPP using conversion ratios for the years corresponding
to the observations.) This core of observations was then extrapolated to the
rest of the countries, as documented in Annex 2. Population-weighted mean
unskilled wages estimated in this fashion are reported in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Mean annual unskilled adult wages by region, in $PPP
Region Wage
Transitional countries 4 158
Asia and Pacific 2 386
Latin America 2 791
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 040
North Africa and Middle East 3 485
Global 2 687
Using the above adult wage estimates for countries for which we also have
data on the value of child labour, we find that the unweighted mean of the
ratio of child to unskilled adult wages is approximately 20%. This propor-
tion is plausible, given that the younger age group, 6 to 11, comprise 43%
of all working children (based on the medium estimate for the number of
working 12 to 14 year-olds). Thus, we impute the value of child labour in
each country as 20% of the adult wage, except for those countries for which
we have direct observations on this variable. Since nearly all countries are
estimated (only a few of our study countries provide direct measurements),
the sensitivity of our measure of opportunity costs varies in approximately
the same proportion as variations to this 20% ratio. That is, if the alterna-
tive ratio were 25% instead of 20%, the opportunity cost of child labour
eliminated would rise by approximately one-fourth.
In estimating the value of child labour in this fashion, the study makes
two important assumptions. First, it assumes that the remuneration, whether
monetary or in kind, to children represents the value of their work. This
may not be the case, however. Children may be overpaid as a disguised ben-
efit to their parents from employers or other community members. They
may be underpaid due to exploitation, a risk attributable to their suscepti-
bility to adult authority. There is no way to determine which effect pre-
dominates a priori. Also, it assumes that the value of child labour foregone
is not made up through the reallocation of unemployed adults to these same
tasks, or that, if such reallocation occurs, it produces an equivalent loss in
terms of other tasks abandoned. This assumption biases our estimates up-
ward, since there are likely to be opportunities for substitution that mitigate
the direct effects of withdrawing children from their work.
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To complete the calculation of opportunity costs, each country’s esti-
mate of the value of child labour was multiplied by the number of working
children from 5 to 14 years old. These results are reproduced in Table 5.2,
which reports baseline totals for opportunity costs by wave.
Table 5.2. Baseline opportunity costs of child labour by wave, in $billion PPP
Region Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Total
Transitional countries 2.0 3.0 4.4 6.7 16.0
Asia and Pacific 15.6 25.5 41.7 68.2 151.0
Latin America 3.1 5.1 8.5 14.1 30.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 4.5 8.2 14.8 30.1
North Africa and Middle East 1.8 3.1 5.2 8.7 18.8
Global 25.0 41.2 68.0 112.6 246.8
Since the total amount of child labour eliminated is approximately the same
in each wave (subject to population growth or decline), the difference be-
tween these totals can be attributed primarily to discounting.
Here is an example at the level of a single country. Tanzania is esti-
mated to have nearly two million child labourers. Their average opportunity
cost is approximately $260 per child per year. Multiplying these two together
yields $520 million. Since Tanzania’s national income in 2000 was nearly
$16.9 billion, the total economic contribution of this country’s child workers
(market and non-market) amounts to just over 3% of all market earnings.
DEFRAYING HOUSEHOLD OPPORTUNITY COSTS
BY AN INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMME
Underlying the perspective on education in this study is the assumption that
there are three overriding factors that determine whether parents will choose
to transfer their children from work to full-time school attendance. First,
education of sufficient quality must be readily available to them. This has
been addressed in the previous section on the supply side of education.
Second, they must be able to overcome the purely economic barriers to
having their children engaged in study. This includes the direct cost of
schooling, such as fees and uniforms, but also, and especially, the opportu-
nity cost, i.e. the value of the work children might have to give up if they
increase their school participation. Third, even if they enjoy the physical
and financial availability of education for their children, parents may choose
not to have them take advantage of it for various cultural or social reasons.
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In this section, we explore in more detail the second of these reasons; the
third is addressed in Chapter 6.
School attendance is sometimes prohibitively expensive because of the
fees imposed on parents, such as for books and uniforms. Even when school
attendance is completely “free”, however, its opportunity cost – the value
of the work children perform when they are not in school – may be too
great to bear. Increasingly, analysts of child labour are coming to the view
that some form of monetary transfers to low-income parents may be nec-
essary to defray the explicit and implicit costs of education.
The study envisions that some sort of income transfer programme will
be adopted on a global basis. National governments will target eligible house-
holds, calculate specific amounts to be transferred to each, disburse the
money and monitor the school attendance of children. Actually, in many
countries, such programmes have been already launched, such as Bolsa Es-
cola and the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) in Brazil,
the Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) in Mexico,
Food for Education (FFE) in Bangladesh, and others. See Box 5.1 for fur-
ther details on two of these, Bolsa Escola and PETI.
To obtain the transfer expense of eliminating child labour, the country
study teams determined the appropriate level of income below which house-
holds were classified as “poor”, as well as the number of poor households
with school age children. A hypothetical income transfer programme was
then established that would provide poor families with a grant equal to 80%
of the value of child labour times the number of school-age children, irre-
spective of whether their children were actually working, provided the sum
does not exceed the average poverty gap (the average amount poor families
would need to meet the poverty line). If it does, they receive an amount
equal to the poverty gap, unless 60% of the value of child labour times the
number of children still exceeds this amount, in which case they get the
latter grant. We envision the programme being phased in over the 20-year
study horizon; thus the stimulation of education demand through transfers
takes place at roughly the same pace as the expansion of the quantity and
quality of education.
Contrary to many government programmes that target working chil-
dren in general or those in hazardous activities, we estimate a programme
in which all poor children are eligible to receive transfers. We have three rea-
sons for this. First, children tend to move in and out of the labour force
more frequently than adults; so it would be hard to distinguish between
“working” and “non-working” children (Levison et al., 2002). Second, even
if we had longitudinal data that permitted a distinction of this sort, it would
be prohibitively expensive to monitor it at the household level. Finally, ex-
isting surveys rarely account for household activities, which are among chil-
dren’s main tasks in developing countries.
Quite clearly, our hypothetical transfer programme is generous. We are
guided by our mission to model the elimination of child labour and not
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merely its diminution. More modest and targeted programmes, like Bolsa
Escola and PETI may also be more cost effective, but they fall short of the
objectives of this study. We propose to limit reimbursement to a maximum
of 80% of the value of child labour, on the other hand, because we expect
that education will be seen as transmitting noticeable benefits to households,
particularly in light of the quality improvement expenditures described in
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Box 5.1. Examples of income transfer programmes
The Bolsa Escola programme distributes income to families below the poverty line while
requiring school-age children to attend class. Each child receives R$15 or US$12 (PPP)
per month, but no more than three children per household can receive this financial as-
sistance. This programme benefited more than 8.2 million children as of December 2001,
amounting to almost US$1.2 billion (PPP) per year. This programme has existed
since 1995, and although it does not directly address the issue of child labour, it does
help to reduce its incidence through income received by the family, which substitutes for
the children’s earnings. The only requirement for eligibility is to have children of school
age (6 to 15) and to have an income that is not above the poverty line, calculated by di-
viding the total money income (as a multiple of the monthly minimum salary) by the
number of family members. In return, the family commits to the children’s school at-
tendance while receiving the benefit.
Another effective social programme implemented in Brazil is the Child Labour Erad-
ication Programme (PETI), which is similar to Bolsa Escola, except that the money is
given to poor families with school-age children (7 to 14 years old) engaged in the worst
forms of labour, and it is conditioned on children going to school instead of working.
The PETI programme started in 1996 in 13 counties in Mato Grosso do Sul state, where
a significant number of children worked in coal mines, and it has since expanded to all
states of Brazil. Children from counties above 250,000 inhabitants and from the state’s
capital receive US$32 PPP per month (R$40), while others receive US$20 PPP (R$25).
In December 2001, 749,353 children benefited from this programme in Brazil, resulting
in government expenditure of US$27.6 million (PPP) or US$330.9 million (PPP) per
year, which equals a monthly value of US$36.80 (PPP) per child. In addition to the di-
rect benefit given to each child, the programme also includes a supervised time of leisure,
culture and sports, complementing children’s school time. Moreover, orientation and sup-
port through social and educational activities are given to children’s families. Currently,
the industries targeted by the programme are: coal and other mining, brick manufacture,
milling, joinery, trash collection, quarrying, textiles, salt processing, meat-packing, fishing,
and plantation agriculture in cotton, tobacco, sugar-cane, citrus, sisal, etc..
The Education, Health and Nutrition Programme (PROGRESA) in Mexico started
in August 1997 and targeted rural households living in extreme poverty. It now operates
in almost 74,000 rural communities distributed across more than 2,000 counties in 31 states
and benefits approximately 3.2 million households. Children below the age of 18 are pro-
vided with monetary grants if enrolled in school. In addition, a basic preventive health
package is provided to family members free of charge, including a dietary supplement
to undernourished pre-school children. PROGRESA accounts for less than 20% of the
federal government budget allocated to poverty reduction.
The Food for Education programme (FFE) in Bangladesh began in July 1993 and
relies on food transfer (rice and wheat) to the poor conditioned on school attendance.
The programme was able to appreciably increase school attendance at a modest net cost
to the current income of poor families. In 2000, the programme covered almost 18,000 pri-
mary schools and benefited about 2 million households.
Chapter 4. Even at 80% reimbursement (or less depending on the effect of
the poverty gap), the transfer programme could be regarded as occupying
the upper end of the policy spectrum: it is more likely to overstate than un-
derstate the necessary costs of meeting the study’s education and child labour
objectives.
In addition to the transfer of funds, we assumed unit administrative
costs for the programme to be 5% of unit transfers. In principle, it is im-
portant to keep these two types of costs separate, since only the administra-
tive costs are “real”resource costs in the economic sense. It is vitally important,
from the standpoint of economic theory, to maintain the distinction between
real resource expenditures, such as administrative costs, and income trans-
fers. Redistributing money from some members of society to others is a fi-
nancial cost to those from whom the money is taken, but it does not in itself
represent a diminution of the productive resources of society.
Table 5.3 reports the baseline transfer expenditures (without adminis-
trative overhead) by wave:
Table 5.3. Total transfers by region and wave, in $billion PPP
Region Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Total
Transitional countries 2.2 3.7 1.9 5.2 13.1
Asia and Pacific 21.6 35.7 18.3 50.2 125.8
Latin America 4.0 6.7 3.4 9.4 23.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 8.2 4.2 11.6 29.1
North Africa and Middle East 3.8 6.3 3.2 8.8 22.1
Total 36.6 60.6 31.1 85.3 213.6
By combining data on the value of child labour foregone and the transfer
payments received by households, we can construct an estimate of the net
short run effects of the study model on the household sector. This is re-
ported in Table 5.4, recalling that the specific households experiencing the
opportunity costs and receiving the payments are not necessarily the same.
Overall, transfers are slightly lower than the lost value of child labour,
with modest variation between regions. The household sector experiences
its sole gain in North Africa and the Middle East, where families are larger,
and nearly breaks even in Africa for the same reason. In general, the slightly
negative balance elsewhere can be regarded as acceptable. Since there is con-
siderable economic advantage to schooling, full compensation should not
be necessary to provide an incentive for parents to choose education over
work for their children. Also, many child workers come from non-poor
households, so the transfer programme most likely exceeds the opportunity
cost of the poor households in particular.
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To conclude this chapter, we would like to consider the consequences of al-
terations in the assumptions made in the model and the process of data ex-
trapolation. First, we can consider the impact of a decision to reimburse a
maximum of 75% of the value of child labour, rather than 80%. This coun-
terfactual is reported in Table 5.5:
Table 5.5. Sensitivity of transfer programme costs to a reduction
in maximum reimbursement rate, in $billion PPP
Region Transfer at 80% Max. Transfer at 75% Max.
Transitional countries 13.12 13.12
Asia and Pacific 125.79 125.78
Latin America 23.53 23.37
Sub-Saharan Africa 29.05 28.92
North Africa and Middle East 22.09 22.09
Total 213.58 213.29
Due to the role of the poverty gap in the transfer formula, the decrease in
global transfers is negligible.
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, there were insufficient data
on the value of child labour to perform a valid extrapolation to the entire
set of countries, and we simply assigned to most of them a value of child
labour equal to 20% of the unskilled adult wage. Table 5.6 reports the sen-
sitivity of the transfer calculation to an increase in this ratio to 25%.
Global transfers rise at a rate of approximately 21.5%, somewhat less
than the percentage increase in the estimate of the value of child labour.
Note that this higher transfer rate would be applied against an upward re-
vision of opportunity costs.
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Table 5.4. Opportunity costs and transfer payments within
the household sector by region, in $billion PPP
Region Costs Transfers Net Position
Transitional countries 16.0 13.1 -2.9
Asia and Pacific 151.0 125.8 -25.2
Latin America 30.9 23.5 -7.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 30.1 29.1 -1.0
North Africa and Middle East 18.8 22.1 3.3
Total 246.8 213.6 -33.2
Taking these sensitivity exercises together, it is apparent that the opportu-
nity cost and transfer totals are stable across a wide range of alternative as-
sumptions. Fluctuations in the calculated amounts due to these factors would
not substantially alter the basic relationships reported in Chapter 2.
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Table 5.6. Sensitivity of transfer programme costs to changes in the assumed
ratio of the value of child labour to the unskilled adult wage, in $billion PPP
Region Total Transfer at 20% Ratio Total Transfer at 25% Ratio
Transitional countries 13.12 16.19
Asia and Pacific 125.79 154.05
Latin America 23.53 26.51
Sub-Saharan Africa 29.05 35.18
North Africa and Middle East 22.09 27.57
Total 213.58 259.49
In Chapter 4, we considered the costs of expanding the quantity and quality
of education to accommodate the influx of children withdrawn from child
labour. In this chapter, we turn to the costs assumed by the public sector to
directly reduce both demand and supply for child labour. On the supply
side, the main intervention we envision is an income transfer programme
that would defray the cost to households of removing their children from
productive work. On the demand side (and also to some extent supply), we
propose a diverse set of targeted activities that would reach children for
whom the income transfer programme is not sufficient.
The first of these, the income transfer programme, has been analysed
in the preceding chapter. It was pointed out there that income transfers,
while placing a financial burden on governments, do not constitute true
economic costs, since no goods or services are reallocated from other uses.
This is fundamental to the economic perspective and characteristic of cost-
benefit studies in particular. Nevertheless, such programmes need to be ad-
ministered, and the labour and related resources devoted to this task are
economic costs in the above sense. For this reason, we will briefly turn to
administrative costs connected with implementing the income transfer.
We have uncovered little evidence that would point to a procedure for
estimating these costs. Instead, we make the ad hoc assumption that 5% of
the transfer would be required for administration. This is less than the rate
for well-established income transfer programmes in the developed countries,
but we recognize that it may be either to high or too low (or both across
different regions). Thus, while 5% is used for baseline calculations, this figure
can be raised or lowered by plausible amounts to gage the effect on net ben-
efits as established in Chapter 2. Each 1% change is associated with ap-
proximately $2 billion in present value costs over the 20-year study horizon.
This sum, however, does not appear large in the context of this study.
The second public sector cost, pertaining to intervention programmes,
requires more analysis. The elimination of child labour, particularly in its
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worst forms, can only be a complex undertaking, involving changes in many
dimensions of society. In practice, however, institutions pursuing this goal
have to take background conditions as given and work within their con-
straints. The result has been a flow of programmes designed to combat spe-
cific instances of child labour through direct intervention. Such interventions
can be supply-side, such as campaigns to dissuade children from working
in particularly hazardous occupations, or demand-side, such as investment
in increased surveillance and enforcement capacity to deter those who would
exploit child labour. In either case, they attempt to achieve their objectives
even though many of the underlying conditions that give rise to child labour
persist.
This is also the approach taken in this study, since more far-reaching
transformations are beyond its scope and, in any event, too little is known
about the systemic forces that generate child labour overall and in its worst
forms. Thus, the study envisions a replication of successful existing inter-
ventions up to the level needed to eliminate child labour. In order to gen-
erate the costs of these programmes, we needed to know three components:
(a) the number of children targeted, (b) the appropriate mix of programmes,
and (c) their unit costs.
a) The number of children targeted: It is assumed that, over time, all chil-
dren in the worst forms of child labour will be prevented from future work
of this sort by programme interventions. In addition, children whose work
interferes with schooling – either prohibiting it altogether or interfering with
its success – may be targeted for intervention if there are reasons to believe
that income transfers, combined with the availability of quality schools, will
not be enough to get the job done. We assumed that all children in the un-
conditional worst forms of child labour (see Chapter 3) fall into this cate-
gory, as well as socially excluded children, such as children of the lowest
caste in some countries, or refugee children. Moreover, since we envision the
elimination of the worst forms of hazardous labour within the condensed
time frame of ten years, children in hazardous activities might be targeted
by special interventions beyond those related to education demand and
supply. Nevertheless, we also considered that it might be unnecessary to en-
compass the entire target group through interventions, since there may be
spillover effects (setting examples, bandwagon effects, a minimum number
of children engaged required for the continuation of a particular form of
child labour) that permit child labour to be curtailed even without 100%
coverage.
b) The appropriate mix of programmes: The last decade has seen an enor-
mous expansion of new programmes to combat child labour. In a spirit of
learning from experience, many institutions have experimented with a wide
variety of methods, some more successful, others less. Our study built on
this experience in the following way: (1) It assumes that the most effective
mix of interventions is likely to be country-specific. Rather than proposing
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a universal recipe, we followed the lead of those who have worked on the
ground to develop these programmes. In other words, the actual country
mix was the starting point for determining the putative effective country
mix, incorporating only those interventions, or portions of interventions,
that were concerned with the elimination of child labour in its various forms.
For example, if a programme provides medical assistance to children per-
forming hazardous work, it is not considered part of the mix necessary to
eliminate such work. (2) It assumes that we can learn through trial and error
to the extent of not repeating programmes that had weak results. In deter-
mining the mix and unit cost of interventions, we eliminated from the ref-
erence group (the set of interventions used for cost extrapolation in the
study) those significantly above the median in unit costs. (3) It assumes that,
drawing on successful experience and having access to an adequate supply
of human talent, we can replicate past interventions at whatever scale is nec-
essary. This last assumption permits direct extrapolation.
c) The unit cost of interventions: Calculating the unit cost of programme
interventions is difficult, as there is no pre-existing literature from which we
could have constructed benchmarks to be used at the country level. In each
instance, numerator and denominator data had to be calculated directly from
country experience.
 The numerator was the total cost of intervention, summed over the en-
tire mix. We would have liked to distinguish start-up from recurrent
costs, and use only the latter for calculating the cost totals for the out
years of existing programmes. However, such information was not forth-
coming in many countries. The costs included expenditures made by
(or financed by) all actors, including all units and levels of government,
all nongovernmental organizations and all external donors. Only those
expenditures tied to the portions of programmes relevant to the elim-
ination of child labour were counted.
 The denominator was the number of children withdrawn or prevented
from engaging in child labour, as reported to us by the programme
managers.
Using this approach, we assumed that the elimination of child labour, in
general and in its worst forms, requires the replication of interventions so
as to reach all target children directly or indirectly, and that the appropriate
mix of interventions is given by the actual mix at the country level. Thus,
we estimated the unit cost of a standard package of interventions and mul-
tiplied it by the number of children to be reached.1
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1 It is reasonable to expect that there will be increasing marginal unit costs of interven-
tion to the extent that later programmes target the most resistant cases remaining after others
have been resolved. We are unable to pursue this, since we had no data from which a marginal
cost schedule could be derived. This introduces a modest downward bias to our estimates.
DATA SOURCES AND RESULTS
IPEC commissioned a review of Action Programmes to eliminate child
labour. Based on a review of the IPEC Programme Database and several
other documents, a questionnaire was developed and distributed to the IPEC
Field Offices for selected Action Programmes. The questionnaire requested
general information on the Action Programmes (implementing agencies, im-
plementation period, major interventions etc.), information on the target
group (age, gender, and nature of work) and cost information (start- up
costs and operating costs broken down by sources of fund, allocation of
total costs by major interventions, and grand total of costs).2
The survey yielded data collected from 77 ILO-IPEC Action Pro-
grammes in 18 countries, which were used as a basis for the regional ex-
trapolation. While the reviewed Action Programmes included interventions
targeted not only toward unconditional worst forms of child labour (many
were in fact targeted toward hazardous work), we assumed that, on the
whole, the unit costs would not differ significantly across different forms of
child labour.3
Table 6.1 presents the costs of interventions for to withdraw and pre-
vent children from the unconditional worst forms of child labour, according
to low, medium and high estimates of the number of children as presented
in Chapter 3. Unit costs are calculated on the basis of a case-weighted av-
erage, corresponding to the different case estimates – which is why they vary
between low, medium and high estimates.
Unit costs are highest in Latin America. This can partly be explained
by the fact that a high percentage of programmes in Latin America have
targeted children in sexual exploitation. Such programmes are typically ex-
pensive due to the importance of one-on-one work and the necessity of re-
habilitative measures. Regional differences also reflect the local costs of
labour and other expenses. Note that, as larger numbers of worst forms es-
timates are incorporated, the weight of total costs shifts from Latin America
to Asia. This in turn accounts for the decline in global unit costs (due to
composition effects).
We can add socially excluded children on whom we had data (refugee
children and dalit children in Nepal) to the target group of interventions.
The number of children and the costs of interventions targeting them are
presented in Table 6.2, applying the same unit costs as above.
It should be stressed that this table is based on a highly incomplete count
of potentially socially excluded children. Presumably, millions of children are
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2 For a closer look at the results by country, form of child labour and type of inter-
vention, see Ueda (2002).
3 At least, this seems to be the case for forced and bonded labourers, who represent
more than two thirds of the total of children in the unconditional worst forms, whereas the
unit costs of removing children from sexual exploitation or trafficking may be higher.
stigmatised in some fashion that would complicate their withdrawal from
child labour and full participation in school, but are not refugees or mem-
bers of a low caste (in a single Asian country). On the other hand, it also as-
sumes that 100% of such children must be targeted, at a marginal cost equal
to those entailed in reaching just a small fraction at present. To the extent
that there are spillover effects of interventions, it may be that extending in-
tervention to a larger population will not be accompanied by a proportionate
increase in costs.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in principle we expect that in-
terventions will be directed toward not only children in unconditional worst
forms of child labour or in social exclusion, but also many in hazardous
occupations. Unfortunately, there are not sufficient data on this target pop-
ulation to permit extrapolation to national or even regional levels.4 Never-
theless, in Table 6.3 we add the additional costs of programmes directed
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Table 6.1. Costs of interventions to eliminate the unconditional worst forms
of child labour, in $million PPP (unit costs in $PPP)
Low estimate Medium estimate High estimate
Region Unit costs Total costs Unit costs Total costs Unit costs Total costs
Transitional countries 637 6 637 6 637 6
Asia and Pacific 199 1 310 172 2 188 164 3 017
Latin America 1 615 1 432 1 623 1 545 1 629 1 658
Sub-Saharan Africa 306 211 300 231 296 252
North Africa and Middle East 139 19 139 19 139 19
Total 359 2 978 274 3 989 242 4 951
Table 6.2. Costs of interventions for socially excluded children,
in $million PPP (number of children in 1’000)
Region Number of children Costs of interventions
Transitional countries 689 453
Asia and Pacific 1 222 344
Latin America 101 116
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 222 384
North Africa and Middle East 997 208
Total 4 231 1 505
4 ILO (2002) reported only global, not regional, totals for hazardous work.
toward those children identified as working under hazardous conditions in
the 13 countries utilized in ILO (2002). Note that this is an enumeration,
in the sense that no attempt was made to extrapolate these cases to the rest
of the world. We have chosen this approach to maintain consistency with
the other worst forms treated in this chapter.
Table 6.3. Costs of interventions for children in hazardous occupations,
in $million PPP (number of children in 1’000)
Region Number of children Costs of interventions
Transitional countries – –
Asia and Pacific 5 047 729
Latin America 4 587 9 882
Sub-Saharan Africa 731 212
North Africa and Middle East 408 62
Total 10 774 10 885
Despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence, it is almost certainly the
case that hazardous work constitutes the majority of the worst forms of
child labour. In fact, the ratio of the number of children reported in Table 6.3
to those in other worst forms likely understates the relative importance of
hazardous work. On the other hand, taken in the context of the previous
two tables, Table 6.3 should be viewed as giving too large a profile to the
cost of removing children from dangerous work situations. One reason is
that a large fraction of the observations come from Latin America, which
also has a far higher unit cost of intervention. But this cost difference is
largely due, as was pointed out earlier, to the concentration of interventions
against prostitution in the programme mix. Since very few of the interven-
tions directed against hazardous work are likely to address prostitution, this
cost differential may be misleading. Also, and more generally, it is not clear
that programmes will be required to target all children in hazardous work.
Many of these will be removed from their situations in the course of elim-
inating child labour overall. On the other hand, at least some programmes
will be required, either because the occupations in question are resistant to
other approaches, or to rehabilitate children who have been harmed by this
work, or in order to accelerate its elimination as a matter of priority. Thus,
for the purposes of this study, we include hazardous work in the same manner
as social exclusion and the unconditional worst forms.
In scrutinizing the programme cost data in this chapter, it is apparent
how fragmentary our evidence is, a point to which we will return in Chapter 9.
For now, it should be borne in mind that the combined costs to the public
sector are significantly underestimated; they could well be several times those
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we calculate in this study. On the other hand, even if this uncertainty is taken
into account, given the relatively limited weight of programme costs com-
pared to other cost and benefit items, the general conclusions of the study
– the pronounced surplus of costs over benefits and the approximate mag-
nitude of funding flows needed to implement the model – remain intact.
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In the cost calculations for the supply side of education, we assumed that
all children aged 6 to 14 who are out of school would be in school by 2020
and that the quality of the existing schools would be improved where nec-
essary, decreasing the pupil to teacher ratio where necessary and establishing
a minimum expenditure on books and other materials. This chapter attempts
to calculate the benefits children out of school would obtain if their years
of education were increased. Of course, there is also an economic gain to
the individual who had his or her school’s quality improved, which would
ideally be taken into account. This is not feasible, however, both because
our measures of quality are highly imprecise, and because there is little in-
ternational evidence on the economic returns to quality. For these reasons
the study adopts the simplified assumption that the benefits come only from
increased years of education.
It is also an assumption of this study that many important benefits of
the elimination of child labour, such as the enhanced opportunity for per-
sonal development and social inclusion, are resistant to economic quantifi-
cation. As a result, no attempt will be made to account for them. Only the
strictly economic benefits from more widespread education – greater income
for the individual, more rapid economic growth for the society – will be es-
timated, and not the cultural and social benefits. As Chapter 2 stressed, in
a technical sense, this is not a true cost-benefit analysis but a study of net
economic costs (or benefits). It is not designed to tell us what decision to
make, but to advise us of the economic costs and benefits of that decision.
There are two general ways economists have calculated the benefits of
education, through earnings equations and macroeconomic growth ac-
counting. A brief review of the techniques and results will be illuminating,
since they point toward the complex problem of determining how the ben-
efits are distributed.
To measure the benefit to an entire economy, we could use either a
longitudinal, growth-accounting approach or a cross-sectional regression
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Box 7.1. Earnings equations
The earnings approach attempts to measure the present value of increased lifetime in-
come attributable to greater educational attainment. What we would like to know, ac-
cording to this method, is, if an average individual acquires Y rather than X years of
schooling (where Y>X), how much more is she likely to make over the course of her
working life, discounted back to the present? We could then compare this amount to the
cost of acquiring Y-X additional years (including of course the opportunity cost) to de-
termine whether education as an investment enjoys a positive rate of return. To conduct
such an analysis, we would need detailed information on a large number of individuals
with different levels of education, including all the other factors that might affect their
income, based on the assumption that past relationships will continue into the future.
The best method would be that of “full discounting”, in which each specific year of
education is analysed separately. After all, while sixth grade, twelfth grade, and the final
year of a Ph.D. are all “one year of education”, each is likely to have a different effect on
an individual’s earning profile. This approach is highly data-intensive however, since it
seeks to determine a large number of values (the economic effects of all the specific years
of education), rather than just one. As a result, economists have more often employed the
less demanding “Mincerian” approach, which treats years of education as essentially in-
terchangeable.* Differences in the marginal effect of an extra year’s education are cap-
tured, if at all, by enabling curvature in the wage-education relationship – for instance, by
introducing a term for the square of the years of education. The general form of a Min-
cerian wage equation is:
Wi = C + βXi Xi + βEi Ei
where C is a constant, Wi is the wage of the ith individual, Xi is a vector of wage-relevant
personal characteristics for i, Ei is i’s educational attainment, and the β’s are regression
coefficients that convey the contribution of E and X to W. In effect, the equation solves
for the effects of education and other characteristics (age, experience, gender, etc.) on the
distribution of wages. (Typically W is the natural logarithm of wages, so that the coeffi-
cients measure percentage effects.) Thus a Mincerian analysis provides an average of the
greater or lesser effects that might be attributed to additional years of schooling at dif-
ferent grade levels. The main assumptions are that the effects of all variables are inde-
pendent of one another, all relevant variables are included in the model, there are no
measurement difficulties, and the structure of the model is correct (shape of the functions,
role of the constant, etc.). Such a model is theoretically less precise, because it forces each
year of education to play the same role, whether or not that is true in actuality.**
A troublesome question is whether causation runs from education to the individual
or from the individual to the likelihood of education. Is an individual’s higher wage at-
tributable to greater schooling, or are more skilled or ambitious individuals more likely
to attend school, so that differences in both schooling and income are due to these in-
dividual traits? A large literature has developed in which economists have attempted to
disentangle these influences. Recent evidence in developed countries tends to support the
view that apparent returns to schooling really are what they seem, and not a proxy for
unmeasured individual differences (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 2000). On this issue, the Min-
cerian approach appears justified.
In the Mincerian model, βEi represents the percentage increase in individual i’s wage
attributable to an additional year of education. If we sum these amounts, evaluated at
the average wage for the community, we would get the total individual wage effect of ed-
ucation. This is not necessarily the same as the economy-wide benefit, however, for rea-
sons considered below.
* The name comes form Jakob Mincer, an economist who pioneered this technique; see Mincer
(1974). ** There is another assumption embedded in the use of Mincerian, as well as economy-
level, approaches to the economic benefits of education in a study such as this: that past benefits are
a reliable guide to future ones (Bennell, 1996). Economic transformation in the course of develop-
ment can alter these relationships. To some extent, the baseline nature of the current study, abstracting
as it does from development, blunts the force of this critique. Nevertheless, achievement of universal
primary and lower secondary attendance, as we envision, would be expected to alter past patterns.
While this appears true, there is no means to correct for it, and so we can simply note it here.
similar to the Mincerian technique for individuals, only applied to coun-
tries. The first of these fits the historical data for a single country to an ag-
gregate production function; by relating growth in output to growth in
broad categories of inputs, the approach seeks to determine the extent of
each input’s contribution to output. The result – again, predicated on the
assumption that the model captures the relevant variables in the correct
way – provides us with a measure of education’s contribution to economic
growth. The advantage of this approach is that, being country-specific, it
avoids attributing to education or other variables the effects of a country’s
unique historical and social dynamics. For this reason, the longitudinal
method is often called a “fixed effects” approach. Also, by looking at changes
within one country over time rather than many countries at a single mo-
ment in time, the approach avoids the necessity of imposing a one-size-fits-
all model on countries that may be too diverse to model in the same way.
The disadvantages with this approach are twofold: it is highly dependent
on assumptions regarding the relationship between inputs and outputs in
production, and, with many events taking place simultaneously over time,
it is difficult to discern what is causing what. The cross-section method, by
contrast, attempts to explain the variation in national economic growth
rates (or static levels of income per capita) by differences in explanatory
variables such as education. Given sufficient cross-national data sets, this
type of analysis is easy to perform, but care is required to determine if the
results reflect true causal effects or merely the spurious correlation of mea-
sured differences with unmeasured ones. For instance, if countries with
more widespread education also have more effective economic institutions
(not easy to measure), the explanatory power attributed to education may
be misplaced.
The sum of individual benefits is not necessarily equal to the benefit
of the entire society; in principle it could be either greater or less. It can
be less, because education may have positive externalities. For example, a
more educated worker may make his colleagues more productive as well,
and a more educated populace can be the foundation for more effective po-
litical and economic institutions. If there are positive externalities, the
macroeconomic benefits will exceed the sum of individual wage gains. On
the other hand, it is possible that the macroeconomic benefit could be less.
This is because educational credentials (not actual skills acquired through
education) may give their possessors an inside track in the labour market,
permitting them to get choice jobs in place of others with fewer qualifica-
tions. To the extent that moving to the front of the job queue in this way
reflects differences in credentials and not actual skills, the gain of the more
educated is the loss of the less educated. If the entire value of education
were of this sort – which it certainly isn’t – we would see positive individual
gains to schooling but no macroeconomic benefit at all. The issue boils
down to how large the credentialing effect actually is; some studies find
that it accounts for as much as a quarter of the total individual benefit of
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education.1 The net effect of these two factors, positive externalities and cre-
dentialism – would determine whether the macroeconomic impact of edu-
cation is greater or less than the sum of its measured wage benefits. In an
ideal procedure, we would subtract the individual benefits of education from
the macroeconomic benefits; if the difference is positive, we would be mea-
suring positive externalities, and negative otherwise.
Unfortunately, as Krueger and Lindahl (2001) painstakingly demon-
strate, current attempts to estimate macroeconomic returns to education are
not robust enough to set alongside the individual-level benefits. The para-
meters specifying return to education in growth accounting studies are wildly
sensitive to specification choices, while cross-national regressions are beset
by massive measurement error. (The quality of education and wage data for
most countries is poor.) Little confidence can be placed in their results. More-
over, as these authors point out, the notion that society-wide returns to ed-
ucation can be isolated from other factors that affect economic growth is
illusory: if the spillover effects of education operate through changes in tech-
nology and social institutions, what does it mean to hold these other fac-
tors constant in order to isolate the effect of education? The result of their
study is essentially negative – that there is no reason to suppose that the so-
cial return to education is any greater or less than the sum of individual re-
turns. Intuitively, we could imagine that a country that combines investment
in education with complementary economic and institution-building poli-
cies would enjoy a large social return, but that in the absence of this coor-
dinated effort spillover benefits from education would be more modest –
perhaps sufficient to offset credentialing effects. If so, abstracting from the
potential for coordinated policy would be in the spirit of this study, which
does not address causes or consequences of socio-economic development
other than child labour. Therefore, this study will measure the social returns
to education by equating them with individual returns.
The value of the Mincerian coefficient used in the computations is based
on Psacharopoulos’ (1999) study, which compiles a large number of cross-
sectional data from many different countries in the world, obtaining their
wage returns to education. The actual number used is 0.11, an approximately
mean among developing countries, meaning that workers would have 11%
increase in earnings for each year increase in the level of education. In the
benefits of education we considered that the 11% return to education would
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1 The treatment of credentialing in the economics literature has been clouded by a ten-
dency to conflate it with the signaling/screening model of Michael Spence (1973). This is one
potential explanation for credentialing, but the job competition model of Thurow (1975), fur-
ther formalized by Knight (1979), is another. Evidence for any particular model is less com-
pelling than evidence for credentialing effects in general, as proxied by the extra return to
diploma years. Significant empirical studies pertaining to the US include Hungerford and
Solon (1987), Heywood (1994) Jaeger and Page (1996) and Habermalz (2003). Developing
country evidence can be found in Shabbir (1991) and Schady (2000).
affect the average unskilled worker’s wage, since only up to a lower secondary
school education is considered in the cost calculations, i.e., children that were
out of school would study eight years and therefore would not have high
skills to get very large wages. Of course we can here be underestimating the
benefits if after those eight years children actually foresee the importance of
education to their well-being and decide to continue studying.
Hence, for calculating the direct monetary benefits of increased edu-
cation we used the total number of additional years of education to be re-
ceived multiplied by the Mincerian coefficient times the average unskilled
adult’s wage. The present value of the total benefit was obtained assuming
that each person would receive earnings during 40 years of his or her life
commencing at age 15, i.e. for every additional year of education there will
be 40 years of enhanced earnings. However, this work span is a conserva-
tive forecast if we consider that life expectancy is increasing and has reached
more than 70 years in many developing countries, as indicated in Table 7.1.
Since most such countries afford few public pension benefits, and very few
unskilled workers possess private pensions that would allow them to stop
working, they usually continue working as they age. In some countries chil-
dren support their parents, but there is little evidence that this would reduce
work life expectancy by a significant amount.
When calculating the benefits of education our assumption is that each
individual, upon reaching the age of 15, becomes economically productive.
In the narrowest sense, this would mean that all children, upon leaving
school, enter the paid labour force and remain there until retirement. This
narrow understanding of “economically productive”corresponds to the pop-
ulation on which estimates of the Mincerian coefficient are based. Of course,
this is an extreme assumption, which would be difficult to justify. A less de-
manding view is that many adults are not in the paid labour force but re-
main productive in some other way. This would include, above all, a wide
range of household activities that are seldom remunerated but which are es-
sential for the production of essential goods and services, such as subsis-
tence agriculture, cleaning, cooking, raising children, etc. Taking into account
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Table 7.1. Average life expectancy at 15 by region
Region Life Expectancy at 15,
2000 – 2005
Transitional countries 57.78
Asia and Pacific 56.41
Latin America 58.93
Sub-Saharan Africa 44.58
North Africa and Middle East 57.65
Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2000 Revision.
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Table 7.2. Education benefits by region and wave, in $billion PPP
Region Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Transitional countries 9.5 28.0 43.6 64.7
Asia and Pacific 150.4 531.8 964.3 1 660.7
Latin America 10.1 54.9 111.7 226.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 31.4 111.0 212.0 367.4
North Africa and Middle East 22.2 79.6 145.9 252.4
Total 223.7 805.3 1 477.5 2 571.9
Table 7.3. Primary education benefits by region and wave, in $billion PPP
Region Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Transitional countries 9.5 20.9 28.2 31.5
Asia and Pacific 150.4 372.2 569.9 682.9
Latin America 10.1 25.2 38.5 45.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 31.4 84.9 141.7 177.0
North Africa and Middle East 22.2 56.1 87.0 104.7
Total 223.7 559.3 865.3 1 041.9
Table 7.4. Secondary education benefits by region and wave, in $billion PPP
Region Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Transitional countries 7.2 15.4 33.2
Asia and Pacific 159.6 394.4 977.8
Latin America 29.7 73.2 180.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 26.1 70.3 190.4
North Africa and Middle East 23.5 58.9 147.8
Total 246.0 612.2 1 530.0
Table 7.5. Education benefits by region and alternative Mincerian coefficients,
in $billion PPP
Region 5% 7% 9%
Transitional countries 66.3 92.8 119.3
Asia and Pacific 1 503.3 2 104.6 2 705.9
Latin America 183.4 256.7 330.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 328.1 459.3 590.5
North Africa and Middle East 227.3 318.3 409.2
Total 2 308.4 3 231.7 4 155.0
this broader conception of economic activity, our calculation of the educa-
tion benefits implicitly assumes that the Mincerian coefficient measures in-
creased productivity not only in the paid labour force, but also in unpaid
tasks. There is no reason to assume that this is the case of course. Never-
theless, there is considerable evidence that household and other self-pro-
duction activities benefit from higher levels of education, and so applying
the same rate to both types of work may not be greatly off the mark.
With these caveats, consider Table 7.2, which reports the benefits of in-
creased education by five-year wave.
Note that the benefits are cumulative: in the first wave, a third of the
primary-age children not initially in school begin to attend. Then in the
second wave an additional third are brought in, but the first third remain
continuing beneficiaries. This explains why there are rapidly rising totals
from one wave to the next, despite the countervailing effects of discounting.
The distribution of benefits is clarified further by distinguishing be-
tween primary and secondary education, as indicated by Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
Several points need to be mentioned. First, Table 7.4 reports only three
waves, since the model assumes that no expansion of lower secondary at-
tendance will take place during the first wave. Second, the totals for lower
secondary are much larger than for primary due to the much greater atten-
dance gap to be made up during those grades. Third, the above results should
not be interpreted as providing evidence for the relative merits of devoting
resources to these two levels of education, because the methodology (based
on the Mincerian coefficient) assumes equal returns to both for a given year
of additional schooling.
Most of the inputs into the calculation of the education benefits are also
inputs into the calculation of costs, so the ratio of the two will not be altered
by adjustments for measurement error. The principal exception is the Min-
cerian coefficient itself. For purposes of comparison, Table 7.5 reports the to-
tals by region for three alternative values of the coefficient, 5%, 7% and 9%.
Of course, given the formula employed, the education benefits are
strictly proportional to the coefficient used to value each year of additional
schooling. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, even under the most
pessimistic forecast of the effect of education on future earnings, the bene-
fits far exceed the costs. Indeed, this would remain the case if we were to
further scale down the benefits by a further third or even a half, under the
presumption that no economic gains accrue to adults who are outside the
paid labour force.
The conclusion of this chapter is that households can expect to ben-
efit substantially from the redirection of children from work to education.
They may require an income transfer programme to assist them in this, but
the financial costs of such a programme (which are not economic costs in
the technical sense) are also substantially less than the prospective benefits.
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This study breaks new ground by attempting to put an economic value on
the health improvements associated with eliminating the worst forms of child
labour. In doing this, we are following a recent pattern in research on in-
ternational social policy: considering the linkages between social conditions
and economic growth and development. There are good reasons for this
trend. While it has long been known that economic development has im-
portant implications for social conditions, we are now recognizing that the
arrow of causation runs in the other direction as well: health and education
in particular are important determinants of economic success at the na-
tional level. In addition, countries have limited economic resources to de-
vote to improving social conditions, and it is helpful to know the extent to
which they may expect to find these offset by future economic gains.
The field of health has seen a tremendous growth of interest in econ-
omic aspects. Much of this has been spearheaded by the World Health Or-
ganization’s (WHO) Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. By
documenting the economic impact of preventable disease, WHO has mo-
bilized global interest in public health initiatives. This has been reflected in
proposals to alleviate the burden of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, link
public health expenditures to external debt relief and create a global fund
to combat tropical diseases like malaria. In addition, during the last decade,
developed countries have sponsored research designed to estimate the econ-
omic impact of injuries and illnesses suffered at work. We will survey some
of these studies in this chapter and relate them to our own attempt to iden-
tify the economic aspects of the worst forms of child labour.
In Chapter 3 we considered the available evidence for the prevalence
of worst forms of child labour. Some of these, such as hazardous work and
prostitution, are directly health-related, while others, such as bonded labour
or illicit activities are not. The global elimination of child labour envisioned
in this study entails the elimination of all worst forms as a priority within
the first ten years. In doing so, we propose to eliminate the great majority
of all negative health effects. (It is possible that some child work, when it
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entails suitable hours and activities, may even generate positive health ef-
fects. Under the guidelines of our model, based on the relevant ILO con-
ventions, this work would continue.) Unfortunately, it is difficult to put a
precise number on the health impacts we might expect to alleviate.
First, the linkage between worst forms of child labour and health out-
comes is complex. Exposures due to improper work may have long-run con-
sequences well into adult life, but no longitudinal studies have been conducted
to generate this information. Simple comparisons between the health status
of former child workers and those who did not work as children are not
helpful due to the “healthy worker” effect: the tendency for the most healthy
individuals to be placed in difficult and dangerous work situations. Thus, it
may appear as though having been a child labourer is beneficial to future
health, when it is actually healthy characteristics that cause both adult health
and the greater likelihood of having worked as a child.
Second, epidemiological data on the health consequences of work are
insufficient for both children and adults. We have reasonable data in the de-
veloped countries on industrial accidents, but not on industrial diseases,
many of which have long latent phases and are subject to multiple causa-
tion. We have virtually no reliable data on occupational injuries in the de-
veloping world. In other words, we know little about children’s occupational
risks because we know little about occupational risks in general (Dorman,
2000). Even in the developed countries, where adult risks are relatively well-
studied, far less research focuses on the risks facing children (Dorman, 2001).
Such data as exist focus primarily on injuries, yet one ILO country survey
found illnesses to be somewhat more common (ILO, 1998).
Third, to the extent that the reduction in child labour is accompanied
by an increase in education, we may expect to see future improvements in
health. More educated individuals enjoy better health, even controlling for
economic status, and as parents they are more successful at providing for
the health of their children. We have case study evidence for these effects,
but not yet the sort of data that could be used in a global cost-benefit study.
Nevertheless, the health benefits of the elimination of child labour are
too important to overlook. As we have seen, millions of children perform
work that damages their current and future well-being, and researchers are
increasingly aware of the role that public health plays in economic devel-
opment. Moreover, the model embodied in this study posits an accelerated
elimination of the worst forms of child labour, and, in the absence of a
quantified health benefit, our focus on the goals of ILO Convention No. 182
would add only to the cost totals. Hence it was decided to generate mea-
sures of the health consequences of the worst forms and of the economic
effects to which they might give rise.
An immediate practical difficulty is that health impairments take a
great variety of forms, from the minor and transient to permanently dis-
abling or even fatal. For the purposes of this study, the Disability-Adjusted
Life Year, or DALY, developed by the WHO, serves as a convenient index.
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Each type of impairment is rated according to its effect on an individual’s
functioning. Immediate death would represent the maximum number of
DALYs, calculated as one DALY for each year of remaining life expectancy
at the victim’s age. Lesser impairments are calculated as fractions of a
DALY (based on the percentage of function lost) and multiplied by the
number of years (which may also be less than one) the impairment is ex-
pected to persist.1 The main justification for employing DALYs in this study
is that we are interested only in the economic aspects of injury and illness
and not in the other human dimensions; therefore a measure of lost func-
tion is appropriate.
The second step was to estimate the number of DALYs attributable to
inappropriate child labour. This task was complicated by the general lack
of information on the health consequences of child labour, of course.
Drawing on the work of Fassa (2003), we applied DALY methodology to
the health impairments reported for working children in the United States.
The frequency of each major type of injury by one-digit industry was con-
verted into a unit expected DALY, on the basis of the number of children
(full-time equivalent) employed in that industry and the DALY conversion
by specific impairment. Thus Table 8.1 was constructed:
To apply this to country data, we utilized the composition of the child
labour force. That is, for a given country, we first calculated the number of
full-time equivalent (FTE) child workers in each industry by multiplying
the actual number of working children by the ratio of average annual hours
to 2000:
FTE workers = (total number of workers)  (average hours per week)
 (average weeks per year) ÷ 2000
This calculation was performed separately for 5 to 14 and 15 to 17 year-
olds and for each major industry. We then multiplied the number of FTEs
(in hundreds) by the corresponding DALY coefficient from column four of
Table 8.1. Summing over all industries and age groups, this gave us a total
DALY estimate for the country. We had detailed employment data of this
sort for 20 countries, derived from household surveys, and we used these
observations to impute estimates for the rest of the world. Total DALYs
associated with the worst forms of child labour are distributed by region
as in Table 8.2.
It is clear that there are several biases built into this procedure.
(1) Using US data biases our results downward, since it is likely that child
work is safer in the developed countries, even after controlling for compo-
sition by major industry. (2) Using only injury data introduces a further
downward bias, since illnesses are excluded completely. (3) Using all re-
ported injuries for working children biases our results upward, since some
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1 For further details on the construction of the DALY index, see WHO (2002).
portion is attributable to work not in violation of Convention No. 182.
Taking all three into account, it is likely that our calculation significantly
underrepresents the true health costs of unsuitable child work. To the ex-
tent that this effect is constant across the countries in our sample, the im-
pact can be assessed by simply scaling up our reported health costs by the
corresponding hypothetical ratio of actual to reported DALYs.
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Table 8.1. Expected DALYs per 100 FTE child workers by major industry (US data)
YLL per 100 FTE workers YLD per 100 FTE workers DALY per 100 FTE workers 
per year per year per year
Agriculture
5 to 14 year-olds 0.74397 0.770908 1.514878
15 to 17 year-olds 0.68693 0.759466 1.446396
Mining
5 to 14 year-olds 1.19904 1.470104 2.669144
15 to 17 year-olds 1.16760 1.448284 2.615884
Construction
5 to 14 year-olds 0.56205 0.825893 1.387943
15 to 17 year-olds 0.55200 0.813394 1.365394
Manufacturing
5 to 14 year-olds 0.14988 0.271402 0.421282
15 to 17 year-olds 0.14720 0.276644 0.423844
Service
5 to 14 year-olds 0.11241 0.151844 0.264254
15 to 17 year-olds 0.11040 0.158149 0.268549
Retail
5 to 14 year-olds 0.11241 0.364978 0.477388
15 to 17 year-olds 0.11040 0.378888 0.489288
YLL = Years of life lost due to premature mortality YLD = Years lost due to disability
Source: Fassa (2003)
Table 8.2. Disability-adjusted life years due
to worst forms of child labour by region
Region Total DALYs
Transitional countries 192 710
Asia and Pacific 1 492 618
Latin America 206 897
Sub-Saharan Africa 730 562
North Africa and Middle East 274 100
Global 2 896 887
The next step is to convert these DALY estimates into monetary im-
pacts. Here it is important to be very clear. This study does not take the po-
sition that health outcomes can be reduced to monetary equivalents. The
most important aspects of human health cannot be captured in economic
measurements: they include the pain or discomfort of the individual suf-
fering the impairment, the emotional burden on family members and the
disruption to the many activities of daily life outside the economic sphere.
We make no effort to incorporate them into our study. Nevertheless, ill health
also has an economic dimension: work is performed more poorly or not at
all, and there are disruptions to co-workers as well as disincentives to the
accumulation of human capital. We would be missing a significant econ-
omic aspect of child labour if we did not make an attempt to measure and
incorporate these effects. To put it differently, the economic costs of ill health
due to the worst forms of child labour represent the economic component
of a problem that is much more than economic.
The strategy for translating DALYs in monetary units can be described
as follows. First, we surveyed the literature on the macroeconomic impacts
of specific health stressors for estimations of economic outcomes. These are
usually expressed as percentages of national or regional income. Second, we
searched for estimates of the total number of DALYs associated with these
stressors; this gave us economic cost per DALY. We then expressed this as
a percentage of the average per capita income in the region under study, cal-
culating this from the population-weighted average of national income per
capita. Third, we applied this percentage to all the countries in our sample,
using their values for worst form DALYs and income per capita. The result
is the health cost estimate reported in our summary in Chapter 2.
Three health stressors of this sort appear in the literature: HIV/AIDS,
occupational risk (from all sources) and malaria. While many studies have
estimated the economic impact of HIV/AIDS, we were unable to obtain cor-
responding DALY estimates; hence this was not employed as a basis for im-
puting health costs.2 Research on several countries, all in the developed
world, has attempted to calculate the economic costs of occupational in-
juries and diseases; for a summary discussion, see Dorman (2000). The figure
of 3% of GDP is typical, and this is also the overall number arrived at by
the most meticulous study, that of Leigh et al. (1996). Using their result for
the US as a benchmark, and taking the corresponding DALY estimates from
WHO (2003), we arrived at 4.24 times per capita income as the cost per
DALY.3 This represents the upper boundary of our cost estimate.
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2 Economic impacts are estimated at the country level, whereas WHO reports DALY
estimates only at the regional level.
3 There are two caveats: (1) Since WHO reports DALYs for a North American region
including Cuba and Canada, we extended the Leigh result to the entire region, using the re-
gional average for per capita income as well. (2) The Leigh et al. study goes to great lengths
to incorporate estimates of occupational disease, whereas these are largely missing from the
WHO DALY estimates; hence the ratio of economic impacts to DALYs is biased upwards.
Due to the initiative of WHO, malaria, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa, has received considerable attention. We found three studies that pro-
vide plausible estimates of the economic impact of malaria in this region,
McCarthy et al. (1999), Bonnel (2000) and Gallup and Sachs (2000). Using
their estimates of aggregate economic impact, along with WHO data on
DALYs and World Bank data on incomes, we arrive at percentages of per
capita income per DALY of 3.6, 4.2 and 37.4 respectively. All of these DALY
calculations are summarized in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3. Proportion of per capita income lost per DALY in four studies
Study Leigh et al. McCarthy et al. Bonnel (2000) Gallup and
(1996) (1999) Sachs (2000)
Stressor Occupational safety Malaria Malaria Malaria
and health
Region North America Sub-Saharan Sub-Saharan Sub-Saharan
Africa Africa Africa
Total economic cost
($billion at PPP) 314.1 2.1 4.8 21.4
Total DALYs (billions) 46.0 35.7 35.7 35.7
Per capita income ($PPP) 32 199 1 600 1 600 1 600
Per capita income per DALY 4.243 0.036 0.042 0.374
Several aspects of this table are striking. The estimated loss of per capita in-
come per DALY varies by a factor of approximately 100, more than one
might expect. The higher North American result can be attributed to the
high cost of medical treatment and the direct relationship to production. The
malaria estimates, while lower, differ among themselves for technical reasons
beyond the scope of this study. From the standpoint of the current analysis,
it is likely that the most appropriate translation from health to economic im-
pacts lies well between the extremes. The effects we are looking for are in de-
veloping countries, which do not generally share the highly institutionalized
medical services of the United States and Canada. On the other hand, the
health costs of the worst forms of child labour are exactly the sort of occu-
pational injuries and illnesses that Leigh et al. were tabulating and should
enter into the economy more directly than malaria. On yet another hand,
however, the Leigh et al. results are biased upwards, from our perspective,
by the fact that they pertain almost entirely to adults, whose wages and pro-
ductivity are substantially higher than those of children (see Chapter 7).4
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4 Because they occur at younger ages, fatal and permanent non-fatal impairments to
children will be associated with more DALYs, but not more economic impact per DALY. The
difference in time structure between adult and child DALYs will be taken up in Chapter 9.
Table 8.4 demonstrates the sensitivity of our measure of health bene-
fits to these different DALY–per capita income conversion rates.
In choosing between such disparate estimates, we should bear in mind their
intuitive implications. At the high end, the Leigh et al. study implies that
each DALY generates an ultimate economic cost over four times the average
per capita income; at the low end, McCarthy et al., one full life year lost
generates a cost of only 3.6% of per capita income. For our purposes, we
judge the first too large and the second too small. Consider the case of a
child who dies as a result of a worst form exposure. This will generate a
stream of DALYs, beginning with an initial year in the current period and
a series of additional years, each discounted to present value. The economic
cost of the first year may be approximately equal to the child’s productivity,
which we estimate to be approximately 20% of an unskilled adult’s. If the
child’s labour can be replaced without imposing a cost elsewhere in the
economy, the immediate impact may be less; if there are disruptive effects
that extend beyond the individual child, the impact may be greater. Future
lost years are reduced in value due to discounting, but may be of greater
future value, since they represent adult productivity. There are other con-
siderations, however. Children who suffer debilitating but nonfatal injuries
or diseases may require care which imposes significant burdens on family
members, and a pattern of frequent and serious child disabilities can inter-
fere with the accumulation of human capital.
With these considerations in mind, we judge that the intermediate result
of Gallup and Sachs is, of the four, the most plausible, and we therefore em-
ploy it for our baseline estimates. It is likely that, as societies develop, and as
medical care absorbs a higher fraction of national income and as education
assumes a larger role in support of productivity, the share of per capita in-
come represented by a DALY is likely to rise; hence the assumption that this
relationship is fixed over the 20-year study period is conservative. Since cal-
culated health costs are proportional to the DALY/economic conversion factor,
the effects of hypothetical adjustments to this factor are straightforward.
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Table 8.4. Health benefits (in $billion PPP)
by DALY–income per capita conversion rates
Study Leigh et al. McCarthy et al. Bonnel (2000) Gallup and
(1996) (1999) Sachs (2000)
Transitional countries 45.1 0.4 0.4 4.0
Asia and Pacific 159.1 1.4 1.6 14.0
Latin America 43.7 0.4 0.4 3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 24.6 0.2 0.2 2.2
North Africa and Middle East 44.7 0.4 0.4 3.9
Global 317.2 2.7 3.1 28.0
It is useful to compare the health benefits of eliminating the worst
forms to the programme costs discussed in Chapter 6. Once again, we stress
that the desirability of taking this action does not depend in any way on
the comparison between economic costs and benefits, since the non-econ-
omic aspects of this problem carry enormous moral weight. Nevertheless,
we can see that programme costs, to the extent they succeed in eliminating
this enormous health burden, may well pay their own way, depending on
the degree of undercounting of the worst forms target population examined
in Chapter 3. As with other aspects of the child labour elimination model,
however, the costs accrue more rapidly than the benefits. This time discrep-
ancy plays an important role in the flow analysis of Chapter 9.
82
IPEC · Investing in every child
In Chapter 2, we provided the main result of the study, that there are sub-
stantial net economic benefits to the global elimination of child labour and
its replacement by universal primary and lower secondary education. In the
subsequent chapters we examined the individual cost and benefit compo-
nents in greater detail, demonstrating their degree of plausibility and indi-
cating the likely range within which alternative calculations would fall if the
underlying assumptions were modified. We found that the baseline results
are robust to these adjustments.
In this chapter we will consider two sets of implications for future ef-
forts in the field of child labour elimination. First we will take a closer look
at the financial feasibility of implementing the study model; then we will
call attention to the most pressing data gaps revealed by this exercise.
FROM PRESENT VALUE TO FLOW ANALYSIS
The main results of the study were presented in Chapter 2 in the form of
present values: the stream of costs and benefits were discounted back to
their values in 2000. While this is appropriate for the purposes of comparing
costs and benefits, it sheds little light on the issue of practicability. Means
must be found to finance costs in each year, and the expectation of benefits
in the future is no guarantee that this can be achieved. In this chapter we
will convert the baseline results to year-by-year flows, so that practicability
can be assessed.
In doing this, we are not altering the fundamental methodology of the
study. The formulas for calculating costs and benefits remain exactly the
same, except that, instead of generating future flows discounted back to pre-
sent value (and reported in five-year waves), we generate 20 yearly flows
without discounting. This permits us to identify the financial gaps (excesses
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Table 9.1. Undiscounted yearly net benefits (costs) of the baseline model,
in $billion PPP
Region
Programme Transitional Asia Latin Sub-Saharan North Africa Global
year countries America Africa and Middle East
1 -0.8 -9.3 -1.2 -2.3 -1.2 -14.7
2 -0.8 -10.2 -1.3 -2.5 -1.3 -16.2
3 -0.8 -11.3 -1.5 -2.8 -1.4 -17.8
4 -0.8 -12.5 -1.7 -3.1 -1.6 -19.6
5 -0.9 -13.9 -1.9 -3.5 -1.8 -21.9
6 -1.3 -23.0 -3.5 -6.3 -2.8 -36.9
7 -1.2 -23.4 -3.8 -6.6 -2.7 -37.6
8 -1.2 -22.9 -3.7 -6.8 -2.7 -37.3
9 -1.0 -20.5 -3.7 -7.0 -3.0 -35.1
10 -0.9 -19.0 -3.6 -7.1 -2.8 -33.5
11 -0.7 -17.1 -3.5 -7.2 -2.5 -31.1
12 -0.6 -15.1 -3.3 -7.4 -2.0 -28.5
13 -0.5 -12.6 -3.2 -7.6 -1.7 -25.6
14 -0.4 -9.6 -3.0 -7.8 -1.2 -21.9
15 -0.2 -3.4 -2.7 -7.8 -0.6 -14.7
16 0.2 8.1 -1.8 -4.6 0.8 2.6
17 0.6 19.7 -0.8 -2.5 1.8 18.8
18 1.1 34.0 0.2 0.1 3.2 38.6
19 1.7 51.8 1.6 3.4 4.7 63.2
20 2.4 72.6 3.8 7.6 6.6 93.0
Figure 9.1. Undiscounted annual net financial benefits (costs), in $billion PPP
-100
0
100
200
300
billion $
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Year
of economic costs over benefits) in future time periods, and to compare the
burdens they impose to other flows in the global economy.
One particular difficulty with this time decomposition is that it requires
assumptions about the distribution of DALYs between immediate and de-
layed effects. In the present value wave calculation, all future impacts of
DALYs were incorporated into the period in which impairment occurred.
In the flow analysis, we must apportion these impacts into the years in which
they are felt, not from which they originate. Of course, each type of injury
or disease will have its own characteristic time profile, and the aggregate
DALYs of each country will reflect different compositions of injuries and
diseases. Because a more precise analysis is not possible, we made ad hoc
assumptions about the flow of health costs over time. We assumed that 25%
of the DALY would occur in the year of the trigger event, with 3% incre-
ments accruing in each succeeding year.1 The calculation of education ben-
efits was more straightforward: we assumed that benefits would commence
six years after the completion of an additional year of primary school and
three years after a year of lower secondary school. Only benefits accruing
during the 20-year period were counted; the flow analysis does not incor-
porate the decades of continuing benefits after 2020.
Table 9.1 consolidates the cost and benefit items into yearly flows in
this manner. It does not include the income transfer payments, but it does
include the costs of administering the transfer programme. It also assumes
that the benefits of primary education begin to accrue six years after the
additional schooling takes place, whereas the delay is only three years in the
case of lower secondary education.
This table vividly portrays the fundamental pattern in our economic
flows: they are negative at the outset of the model, attain negative peaks in
the middle of the first decade, turn positive up to a decade after this, and con-
tinue to become more strongly positive as time elapses. This pattern is gov-
erned above all by the front-loaded expenses of supplying and the back-loaded
benefits of receiving additional education. Regions vary in their timing on the
basis of the ratio of primary to lower secondary expansion. Transitional,
Asian, North African and Middle Eastern countries achieve positive net flows
first, 16 years into the programme, followed by the other regions two years
later. Globally, negative net flows peak in year 7 at over $37.6 billion and turn
positive by year 16. The global results are displayed graphically in Figure 9.1.
Here we can see the length of time required for the flows to turn pos-
itive, and the enormous difference between the magnitudes of the initial net
costs and subsequent net benefits.
The main point of the flow analysis is this: there is a lag of approxi-
mately fifteen years between the inception of the child labour elimination
programme and the beginning of net economic payoffs. This should not be
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1 Since only the first twenty years of costs and benefits are being modelled, there is little
risk of overcounting DALYs. Indeed, there is greater risk of undercounting them.
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Table 9.2. Annual fiscal impacts of child labour elimination, in $billion PPP
Region
Programme Transitional Asia Latin Sub-Saharan North Africa Global
year countries America Africa and Middle East
1 0.8 10.3 1.4 2.7 1.5 16.6
2 1.2 14.3 2.1 3.7 2.2 23.4
3 1.5 18.4 2.8 4.7 2.9 30.2
4 1.8 22.6 3.5 5.7 3.6 37.1
5 2.2 26.8 4.2 6.8 4.3 44.3
6 2.8 38.8 6.4 10.2 5.9 64.2
7 3.2 43.4 7.2 11.5 6.6 71.9
8 3.6 47.9 8.0 12.8 7.4 79.7
9 3.8 51.2 8.8 14.1 8.8 86.8
10 4.2 56.0 9.7 15.6 9.4 94.9
11 4.5 61.0 10.3 17.1 10.0 102.9
12 4.9 66.4 11.2 18.8 10.4 111.8
13 5.3 72.3 12.2 20.7 11.0 121.6
14 5.7 78.7 13.1 22.9 11.5 132.0
15 6.1 83.2 14.2 25.1 12.1 140.7
16 6.4 84.0 14.8 24.5 12.0 141.6
17 6.7 86.5 15.5 25.3 12.3 146.3
18 7.0 88.6 16.3 26.1 12.5 150.5
19 7.2 89.9 17.2 27.0 12.7 153.9
20 7.4 91.6 17.4 27.6 12.9 156.9
Figure 9.2. Global fiscal impact of child labour elimination, in $billion PPP
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surprising given that the costs and benefits are both dominated by invest-
ments in education.
Perhaps the main practical concern is arranging the financing of the
programme. Here we are concerned with the public sector, which is re-
sponsible for implementing it. To isolate the fiscal impacts, we sum up the
costs of education, targeted interventions and the transfer programme, in-
cluding the transfer payments themselves as well as administration costs.
From this, we deduct 20% of the benefit flows, under the assumption that
this proportion will be captured by the public sector in the form of increased
revenues. Excluded are opportunity costs and the remaining 80% of bene-
fits, since they do not accrue to the public sector. The result over twenty
years is presented by region in Table 9.2 and globally in Figure 9.2.
The fiscal burden in Asia comprises more than half the total. Glob-
ally, the burden increases monotonically throughout the period, although
the rate of increase falls off during the final years when revenue gains begin
to be noticed. The average annual burden during the first decade is $54.9
billion; during the second it is $135.8 billion.
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Table 9.3. Annual fiscal impacts of child labour elimination,
net of primary education, in $billion PPP
Region
Programme Transitional Asia Latin Sub-Saharan North Africa Global
year countries America Africa and Middle East
1 -0.4 -3.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.7 -6.9
2 -0.8 -7.6 -1.6 -1.8 -1.4 -13.1
3 -1.2 -11.2 -2.2 -2.6 -2.0 -19.3
4 -1.6 -14.9 -2.9 -3.4 -2.7 -25.5
5 -1.9 -18.5 -3.6 -4.3 -3.3 -31.7
6 -2.6 -29.8 -5.7 -7.5 -4.8 -50.4
7 -3.0 -33.7 -6.5 -8.4 -5.4 -57.1
8 -3.4 -37.6 -7.2 -9.4 -6.1 -63.7
9 -3.6 -41.4 -8.0 -10.4 -7.3 -70.6
10 -3.9 -45.3 -8.7 -11.3 -7.9 -77.1
11 -4.3 -48.9 -9.3 -12.3 -8.4 -83.2
12 -4.6 -52.9 -10.1 -13.3 -9.1 -90.0
13 -5.0 -56.9 -10.8 -14.4 -9.7 -96.8
14 -5.4 -60.9 -11.7 -15.5 -10.3 -103.8
15 -5.7 -63.9 -12.5 -16.6 -11.0 -110.0
16 -6.1 -68.2 -13.4 -17.8 -11.5 -117.0
17 -6.5 -72.6 -14.2 -19.1 -12.2 -124.6
18 -6.8 -76.9 -15.2 -20.5 -12.7 -132.2
19 -7.2 -80.9 -16.2 -22.0 -13.4 -139.7
20 -7.6 -85.8 -16.7 -23.5 -14.1 -147.7
Earlier it was pointed out that the child labour elimination programme
we model expands on an existing commitment to universal primary educa-
tion. It is therefore reasonable to ask what additional costs are entailed by
our extending this commitment to achieve the more ambitious goals of uni-
versal lower secondary education and adherence to ILO Conventions
Nos. 138 and 182. To calculate this, we eliminate the fiscal costs and rev-
enues associated with primary education from Table 9.2; the results are in
Table 9.3.
Comparing the final columns of Tables 9.2 and 9.3, we find that elim-
inating the fiscal role of universal primary education reduces the cost of fi-
nancing the first year of the programme by approximately $9.8 billion. This
difference between the total and incremental impacts increases from year to
year, reaching its peak in 2015, when it reaches nearly $31 billion, 22% of
the corresponding total impact. After this, the difference falls, as capital
costs for primary education end and additional benefits associated with in-
creased years of primary schooling accumulate. By the end of the programme
period, the difference is just under $9.3 billion. Thus the effect of presenting
child labour elimination as an “add-on” to the existing Millennium Devel-
opment Goal in education is to reduce its fiscal burden substantially, al-
though the bulk of the costs (and a smaller portion of the revenue) remain.
PUTTING THE RESULTS INTO PERSPECTIVE
The sums appearing in Table 9.2 are meaningful only in the context of the
resources employed for other purposes. Table 9.4 provides four points of
comparison. The first three are national public expenditures, the fourth an
international financial flow.2
The simplest way to approach the issue of feasibility is to compare the
two averages of annual fiscal impact at the global level (corresponding to the
two decades of the programme) with the bottom row of Table 9.2, as in
Figure 9.3 below. Recall that this approach considers only the fiscal impact;
it does not take into account the full range of economic costs and benefits.
If the programme were perceived as an extension of the education budget
(which, bearing in mind the great proportion of education to total expendi-
tures, it largely is), and if education spending were carried forward without
change until 2020, the child labour elimination programme during the first
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2 Expenditures were reported as shares of income. UNDP data were available for 1997-
99 only and were converted based on 2000 GNI. For missing observations, expenditures were
imputed using an unweighted regional average. For debt service, such imputations were not
performed for oil-producing countries, where data was not reported. Also, it may be noted
that our totals for education spending exceed those reported elsewhere, e.g. Delamonica et al.
(2001). The difference can be explained by our use of PPP conversions for GNI, whereas the
UNICEF authors convert GNI at market exchange rates.
decade could be financed by an average 7.4% increase in the aggregate public
education budget in regions 2-6; the corresponding amount for the second
decade is 18.2%. If child labour elimination were added to social expendi-
tures in general, encompassing both health and education, the increase would
be 4.4% and 11% respectively. These are not impossible increases over cur-
rent spending, particularly when potential economic growth is taken into ac-
count, but they would be difficult to finance all the same. Of course, averages
such as these conceal large differences in the financial capacities of different
countries. While middle-income countries are better placed to assume this
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Table 9.4. Payments in 2000 on education, health, military,
and debt service, in $billion PPP
Region Education Health Military Debt service
Transitional countries 116.6 108.8 70.7 132.3
Asia and Pacific 314.4 192.9 241.0 444.6
Latin America 161.6 120.9 46.6 286.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.3 25.8 24.2 44.6
North Africa and Middle East 92.9 44.1 110.9 100.8
Total 744.8 492.5 493.4 1008.7
Source: UNDP, Human Development Indicators 2001; The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002.
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Figure 9.3. Annual fiscal cost of eliminating child labour compared
to other annual costs, in $billion PPP
additional burden, low-income countries are not. In fact, if this latter group
were to increase taxes to meet these obligations, they might exacerbate child
labour if the effect of decreasing the disposable income of taxpaying house-
holds outweighed the effect on programme beneficiaries (Rogers and Swin-
nerton, 2001).
Aside from simply increasing public sector resources, three alternative
sources of funding suggest themselves.
1) Budgetary transfers. Countries could transfer funds from other budget
items to social expenditures. One benchmark that indicates the poten-
tial scope for such actions is column 4 of Table 9-4, military spending.
If coordinated reductions could be achieved across all countries, a por-
tion of these funds could be released with little cost (or even positive
gain) to security. The average fiscal burden in the first decade repre-
sents 11.1% of year 2000 military spending in these five regions; the
average in the second decade represents 27.5%.
2) Debt relief. Virtually all of the countries considered in this study are
net external debtors. Column 5 of Table 9.4 reports their payments,
largely to creditors in Region 1. The negative effects of these flows on
macroeconomic prospects in the developing world, as well as on the sta-
bility of global finance, are well known, and there have been continuing
discussions on the potential scope and mechanisms of debt writedowns.
One concern of creditors has been to link reductions in debt to increased
domestic spending on items that will further the provision of basic needs
to the poorest members of the world community, as well as promote
economic growth. The model described in this study addresses both of
these concerns, and would provide an alternative that debtors and cred-
itors alike might find attractive. The average public sector cost during
the first decade represents 5.4% of the aggregate debt service flow re-
ported in 2000; the average for the second decade represents 13.5%.
3) Development assistance. Funds already transferred from rich to poor
countries could be augmented and consolidated to meet financing gaps
during the first decade of the programme. According the UNDP (2002),
net official development assistance in 2000 amounted to $54.9 billion.
While sufficient to provide a significant portion of the net financial costs
of child labour elimination during the first few years, it currently falls
well short of what would be required to meet the needs during the pe-
riod of greatest impact. Similarly, the global financial assistance targeted
at prevention, care and orphan support in connection with HIV/AIDS,
proposed by UNAIDS (2002), reaches a peak of approximately $14.5
billion in 2007, well below the funding needs identified by this study.
While each of the above funding vehicles was considered separately, a real-
istic approach to financing the elimination of child labour would take most
or all of them into account. When their combined potential is compared to
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the cost, it is clear that the feasibility of implementing a model such as ours
is not in doubt. Indeed, when reflecting on the elements of the model – uni-
versal education through lower primary school, an urgent elimination of the
worst forms of child labour (including rehabilitation when necessary), and
an income transfer programme in every country that would replace most of
the lost value of child labour –, this conclusion may be both surprising and
reassuring.
DATA LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As we have made clear in prior chapters we were faced with several data
limitations in key areas of our study. Here we are recapitulating the most
important ones, emphasizing the urgent need for further research to fill
these gaps.
 Value of child labour: While data on adult wages are widely available,
data on the wages earned by children of different ages in different oc-
cupations are virtually non-existent. Such information is essential for
calculating the benefits of child labour to the household and estimating
the necessary income transfers to compensate parents for the oppor-
tunity costs of their children’s schooling. For our study, the few ob-
servations from our country studies were insufficient for extrapolation,
and we had to resort to estimating child wages as a fraction of un-
skilled adults’ wages. However, this must be regarded as merely a guess
of children’s actual wages. We require more data on the wage and pro-
ductivity of children, broken down by age and gender.
 Ongoing surveys: Household surveys are typically a one-off affair, pro-
viding a snapshot of child labour without permitting the investigation
of changing trends in child labour (the annual national household
survey PNAD in Brazil being a notable exception). Thus, it is difficult
to assess how economic factors alter child labour. This hampered our
study’s ability to determine the prescribed size of income transfers, and
it also required us to merge together observations from different time
periods. There is an evident need for time-series data on child labour.
 Education quality: The indicators proposed in this study, pupil-teacher
ratios and non-personnel expenditures, are input measures and must
be considered as rough approximations at best of the quality of edu-
cation in countries around the world. Their relevance for programmes
designed to prevent children from working is far from clear (Matz,
2003). Instead, what is urgently needed are outcome measures derived
from standardized tests, which are related to children’s school atten-
dance. These could include literacy and numeracy, as well as other
school-imparted skills and competences. The OECD’s Programme on
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International Student Assessment (PISA) may be in important mile-
stone in this endeavour.
 Lower secondary education: A lot of attention has been given to pri-
mary education in previous decades, which is indeed very important,
as we have discussed. However, from the point of view of IPEC, chil-
dren up to the age of 14 must be provided with a viable alternative to
child labour, and therefore primary education alone is not sufficient.
Unfortunately, little is known about school attendance rates at this level
(Matz, 2003); where data is reported, it often pertains to secondary ed-
ucation as a whole, which skews the results. More information is also
needed on the factors that determine a household’s decision whether
or not to allow a child’s transition from primary to secondary school.
The latter issue may be related to potential increases in the value of
child labour as the child grows older and is thus connected to another
research bottleneck.
 Health outcomes: Very little is known about the impact of child labour
in various occupations on children’s health, particularly in developing
countries. This is true for the effects of hazardous work on children’s
present health status, but also (and even more so) for the future health
consequences of these activities. Longitudinal studies are called for to
alleviate this research gap. Similarly, the future health benefits flowing
from improved education are not yet documented well enough. This
lack of information presented a serious obstacle for our estimation of
the benefits of eliminating child labour. Besides their potential contri-
bution to future studies like this one, more complete health data can
play a role in helping direct resources to those children in the most
pressing need of intervention.
When attempting a large-scale accounting project such as the current study,
the lack of critical data can appear as an obstacle to success. On the other
hand, one of the main purposes of our work was, by making strenuous de-
mands on the existing information base, to expose its gaps and weaknesses.
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The following 36 countries were eliminated from the study, either because
they were deemed high income, or because data were generally unavailable
for them: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Channel Is-
lands, Denmark, East Timor, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guade-
loupe, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Malta,
Martinique, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Occ.
Palestinian Territories, Portugal, Reunion, Saint Lucia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA, Western Sahara.
This left two countries in Region 1, Cyprus and Turkey. We incorpo-
rated them in Region 6 (Middle East and North Africa).
The final composition of regions was as follows:
Region 2: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania,
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbek-
istan, Yugoslavia
Region 3: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cam-
bodia, China, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong SAR, India, In-
donesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New
Caledonia, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vanuatu,
Viet Nam
Region 4: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
French Guiana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
Region 5: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Dem. Rep.
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COUNTRIES EMPLOYED
FOR REGIONAL EXTRAPOLATION
of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Region 6: Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
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Two sets of variables were employed in this study, core and auxiliary. The
core variables were those directly utilized in cost and benefit calculations.
Auxiliary variables were of use solely for the purpose of enabling the im-
putation of missing core observations. All economic variables were con-
verted to $PPP for year 2000 using World Bank conversion factors.
Tables A2.1 and A2.2 indicate the sources for these variables.
Countries fell into three general categories: those studied by our country
teams, for which data were virtually complete; those with household sur-
veys, primarily based on the methodology of IPEC (SIMPOC) or the World
Bank (LSMS), for which we had observations on most but not all variables;
and the remainder, who were represented to varying extents in publicly re-
ported data sets. The middle category, which overlaps partially with the first,
consisted of the following countries:
 Transitional countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine
 Asia: Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka
 Latin America and the Caribbean: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay
 Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Namibia,
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia
 Middle East and North Africa: Egypt, Turkey (added from Europe),
Yemen
The imputation proceeded sequentially. Variables with few missing obser-
vations were completed first; then they were used to assist in the imputa-
tion of other variables. The preferred method was multivariate regression.
Regressions were selected on the basis of explanatory power (adjusted R2)
and the plausibility and significance of individual coefficients. Neighbour-
hood imputation and regional averaging were employed as necessary. In a
few instances, outliers were trimmed. The rest of this section describes the
methods in greater detail.
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IMPUTATION METHODOLOGY
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Table A2.1. Core variables
Variable Source
Working children 5-11 SIMPOC
Working children 12-14 SIMPOC
Value of child labour SIMPOC, C/B Country studies
Families with school age children in poverty SIMPOC, LSMS
Poverty gap LSMS, C/B Country studies
School age children per family SIMPOC, LSMS, C/B Country studies
Net attendance rate in primary education SIMPOC, UNICEF
Net attendance rate in secondary education SIMPOC, UNICEF
Unit recurrent cost education C/B Country studies
Unit capital cost of primary education C/B Country studies
Unit capital cost of secondary education C/B Country studies
Unit cost of intervention IPEC
Unconditional worst forms children IPEC
Socially excluded children UNHCR, Nepal country study
Children in hazardous work SIMPOC
Worst forms DALYs SIMPOC, IPEC
Average unskilled wage LABORSTA
Population ages 6-11, 2000 World Bank
Population ages 6-11, 2015 World Bank
Population ages 6-11, 2020 World Bank
Population ages 12-14, 2000 World Bank
Population ages 12-14, 2005 World Bank
Population ages 12-14, 2020 World Bank
GNI per capita WDI
Table A2.2. Auxiliary variables
Variable Source
Dependency ratio, 5-11 Generated from core variables
Dependency ratio, 12-14 Generated from core variables
Dependency ratio, 5-14 Generated from core variables
Life epectancy at 15, 2000–2005 WDI
Education expenditures, % of GNP WDI
Health expenditures, % of GDP WDI
Pupil teacher ratio, primary WDI
Gini coefficient CIA World Fact Book, World Bank
Total fertility rate WDI
Pupil teacher ratio, secondary WDI
Illiteracy rate WDI
Mortality rate WDI
1) Gini (GINI). Neighbourhood methods were used to extend this variable,
for which we initially had 94 observations. Data are for various years be-
tween 1990-97.
2) GNI per capita. Population data are from the World Bank, as are data on
Gross National Income, both for the year 2000. Missing observations (17)
were drawn from the CIA World Fact Book series on GNP. There is poten-
tial for error in the range of 25% above or below GNI in this procedure.
3) Populations 6-11, 12-14. These were adapted from World Bank data using
triangular adjustments. This method assumes equal yearly increments over
the age ranges being measured. Thus, the average for a reported range is as-
signed to the midpoint of that range, with annual increments calculated
based on the ratio of midpoints.
4) Average unskilled wage. The LABORSTA data have been compiled by
Freeman and Oostendorp (2000). From this source, we extracted the fol-
lowing occupations as representative of unskilled labour: field crop farm
worker, plantation worker, forestry worker, deep sea fisherman, miner, un-
derground helper, meat packer, thread and yarn, spinner, labourer (industry:
spinning), garment cutter, wood grinder, labourer (industry: printing),
labourer (industry: manufacturing, except chemicals), labourer (industry:
manufacturing, chemical products), labourer (industry: metal and steel),
labourer (industry: manufacturing, machinery), labourer (industry: electric,
light power), bricklayer, construction, labourer (industry: construction).
There were 77 observations in all, with countries reporting various years
during the period 1990-99, and not all occupations reported for each country.
We represented each country’s unskilled wage as the unweighted average of
the detailed occupations for which data were available. (By “unskilled” in
this context is meant work available to individuals with limited formal
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Table A2.3. Imputation regression for dependent variable,
average unskilled wage (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Constant 3441.68
(2.95)
GNI-PC 0.317
(6.20)
GNP-ED 18 773.46
(1.53)
GNP-HEALTH 133.02
(1.54)
GINI -80.05
(-3.91)
Adj. R2 0.87
N=24
schooling.) Many of the observations constructed in this manner appeared
unreliable in light of economic data from WDI. We dropped all data points
with significant discrepancies, after which 25 remained. These were used as
the basis for a regression to impute the rest.
Table A2.3 reports the regression on this variable.
All signs are appropriate: the average unskilled wage is increasing in
per capita income and the percentages of income spent on education and
health; it is decreasing in inequality (GINI) and fertility (school age chil-
dren per household).
5) Working children 5-14. As described more fully in Chapter 3, we utilized
28 observations from the data on which Every Child Counts (ILO, 2002) was
based, also employing the same set of adjustments. We extrapolated to the
remaining countries on the basis of the unweighted regional averages of
working children to the total of all children between these ages.
6) Families with school age children in poverty. We initially had 11 observa-
tions on this variable. To avoid spurious results, it was converted into a ratio
whose denominator was the combined populations of children ages 6 to 11
and 12 to 14 in 2000. Table A2.4 reports the regression model employed.
Table A2.4. Imputation regression on dependent variable,
ratio of families with school age children in poverty
to population ages 6 to 14 (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Constant -0.01
(-0.01)
GNI-PC -0.0004
(-2.84)
GINI 0.008
(3.07)
Region2 0.15
(1.92)
Adj. R2 0.42
N=11
Signs are appropriate: higher per capita income results in fewer poor fami-
lies; greater inequality results in more. A dummy variable for transitional
countries proved significant, reflecting the income pressure on households
during the 1990s. The estimated ratio was multiplied by the corresponding
age population to yield the final result.
7) Poverty gap. We had 21 observations, which we denominated by GNI
per capita for regression purposes. Table A2.5 reports this model.
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Table A2.5. Imputation regression on dependent variable,
ratio of poverty gap to GNI per capita (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Constant -0.236
(-1.56)
TFR 0.025
(1.95)
GNP-ED -0.886
(-1.49)
LE-15 0.005
(2.08)
Region5 0.151
(2.70)
Adj. R2 0.68
N=21
Most variables are appropriately signed. Higher fertility is associated with
deeper poverty; expenditures on education are associated with smaller poverty
gaps. Africa has deeper poverty even controlling for other factors. Only the
coefficient on life expectancy is counterintuitive, perhaps capturing influences
on the setting of national poverty lines. The estimated value of this ratio was
multiplied by GNI per capita to yield an estimate of absolute poverty gap.
8) School-age children per family. Table A2.6 reports the regression model
used to impute this series.
Table A2.6. Imputation regression on dependent variable, 
school age children per family (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Constant 2.963
(6.99)
ILLITRATE 0.013
(2.13)
GNI-PC -0.001
(-3.18)
GNI-PCSQ 4.39
E-08
(2.74)
Adj. R2 0.67
N=13
A higher illiteracy rate is associated with larger family size; the opposite
relationship holds for GNI per capita, with curvature picked up by the
squared term.
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9) Unit cost of intervention. Table A2.7 reports the regression model used
to impute this series.
Table A2.7. Imputation regression on dependent variable,
unit cost of intervention (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Constant -1004.431
(-0.58)
GNI-PC -0.218
(-3.02)
GINI -57.471
(-2.84)
DEPRAT12-14 44 296.44
(2.21)
Region 4 2137.163
(5.08)
Adj. R2 0.85
N=16
Higher per capita income is associated with lower intervention costs, as is
greater income inequality. Higher ratios of children ages 12 to 14 to total
population are associated with higher intervention costs. Latin America
tends to have higher costs, since a larger percentage of programmes in that
region targeted children in prostitution, a problem for which solutions are
relatively more resource-intensive.
10) Net enrolment rates, primary and lower secondary education. Procedures
for extrapolating the initial set of observations are described in Chapter 4.
11) Unit recurrent cost of education. We had eight observations on this vari-
able, all generated by our country teams. Two appeared to be outliers; the
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Table A2.8. Imputation regression on dependent variable, 
ratio of unit recurrent costs of education to GNI per capita
(t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Constant 0.512
(1.95)
ln GNI-PC -0.051
(-1.51)
Adj. R2 0.20
N=6
other six were modestly correlated with ln GNI per capita. Table A2.8 re-
ports a simple regression of the ratio of unit recurrent costs to ln GNI per
capita on ln GNI per capita itself.
The sign on the natural log of per capita income is what one would
expect: personnel and related costs of supplying education do not vary to
the extent that per capita income does, thus poorer countries have a higher
ratio of unit recurrent costs to GNI per capita than wealthier countries do.
The natural log of income was selected because it produces more plausible
results for higher-income countries, particularly those whose income per
capita exceeds all six of our observations. Nevertheless, the formula did not
perform adequately for the 33 countries with income per capita above $8,500;
in theses cases the ratio of unit recurrent costs to ln GNI per capita was
truncated at 5%.
12) Unit capital costs of education. We had eight observations on this vari-
able, four of which included different values for primary and secondary
levels. Since there were too few observations incorporating this distinction,
and since there appeared to be no relationship governing the ratio of pri-
mary to secondary costs in these four cases, we converted them into average
unit costs, weighted by the corresponding age populations. Moreover, there
was no systematic variation in the full set of observations that could be used
as a basis for extrapolation. We found a substantial range, from 0.7 to 4.8,
in the ratios of unit capital to unit recurrent costs and chose to use this as
the basis for low, medium and high estimates. First, the same two outliers
were deleted. The low estimate was established near the bottom end of the
remaining range; this proved to be approximately 1. (That is, for these ob-
servations, the ratio of unit capital to unit recurrent costs was unity.) The
high estimate was 4.8. For the medium estimate, we took a simple average
of the ratios for these six observations; it came to approximately 2.25. These
ratios were applied to the estimates for recurrent costs in the remaining coun-
tries to generate estimates for unit capital costs.
13) Worst form DALYs. From the 20 observations, computed in the manner
described in Chapter 8, we eliminated three due to a lack of other data
needed for regression. We also transformed the dependent variable (DALYs)
by denominating it by the population of children ages 6 to 14. The model
selected and its results are presented in Table A2.9.
The coefficients are presented three decimal places to the right be-
cause the ratio of DALYs to child population is very low. (The mean of
the dependent variable is 0.003.) We also considered regional dummies, two
of which proved to be significant. Unfortunately, there are no unambiguous
theoretical relationships between these variables and our estimates of the
DALY ratio. The industrial composition of child labour in the transitional
countries yields higher predicted DALYs and that of North Africa and the
Middle East lower. Illiteracy and the percent of social expenditures are
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correlated with more DALYs, and average wages with less. These are nei-
ther expected nor unexpected. The fit is surprisingly strong overall. The ra-
tios estimated in the above regression were multiplied by the number of
children ages 6 to 14 to generate the required DALY estimates.
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Table A2.9. Imputation regression for dependent variable, ratio of worst form
DALYs to the population of children ages 6 to 14 (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient ( 1000)
Constant -0.485
(-0.48)
ILLITRATE 0.115
(8.28)
AVEWAGE -0.002
(-6.70)
GDP-HEALTH 0.406
(3.99)
GNP-EDUCATION 88.071
(5.18)
REGION6 -1.926
(-3.46)
REGION2 3.996
(3.68)
Adj. R2 0.85
N=17
For the purposes of this Annex, the variables entering into the cost and ben-
efit calculations have been abbreviated, as in Table A3.1.
Table A3.1. Abbreviations for core variables
Variable Abbreviation
Working children 6-11 WC611
Working children 12-14 WC1214
Value of child labour VCL
Families with school age children in poverty FSACP
Poverty gap PG
School age children per family SACPF
Net attendance rate in primary education NARP
Net attendance cost in secondary education NARS
Unit recurrent cost education URC
Unit capital cost of primary education UCCP
Unit capital cost of secondary education UCCS
Unit cost of intervention UCI
Unconditional worst forms children UWFC
Socially excluded children SEC
Children in hazardous work HWC
Worst forms DALYs DALYS
Average unskilled wage AW
Population ages 6-11, 2000 POP611_00
Population ages 6-11, 2015 POP611_15
Population ages 6-11, 2020 POP611_20
Population ages 12-14, 2000 POP1214_00
Population ages 12-14, 2005 POP1214_05
Population ages 12-14, 2020 POP1214_20
GNI per capita GNIPC
Discount rate r
Mincerian coefficient MC
Monetary cost per DALY MDALY
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FORMULAS FOR CALCULATING
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Calculations take the form either of present values of the entire cost
or benefit stream or of undiscounted year-to-year amounts (as reported in
Chapter 9). Here we will present the methodology for the present values first
and then the undiscounted yearly values.
A. DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUES
1. Opportunity cost of child labour.
The undiscounted growth rate of this variable is
since there are two sources of growth, the population growth of the rele-
vant age group and the increase in child labour prevented from 1/20 of its
amount in the first year to the total amount in the twentieth.
Let 
Then the opportunity cost is given by:
in Wave 1.
Subsequent waves are:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
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2. Cost of the income transfer programme
The main cost of the income transfer programme is the transfer itself. To
compute this, we first calculate the total transfer indicated by the formula
discussed in Chapter 5.
If then 
If then
Otherwise 
We did not factor in a growth rate based on population, given the un-
certainty surrounding family size and poverty rates; hence the growth factor
g = 1.1616 (the twentieth root of 20). As before,
Therefore the wave calculations for the income transfer are:
Wave 1:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
The administrative (real resource) cost is calculated at 5% of the transfer
amount.
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3. Programme intervention cost
This item is discussed in Chapter 6. There is no growth rate anticipated for
the number of children to be targeted by these interventions; exact head-
counts are used, even though they are not representative. Hence:
and the wave calculations are
Wave 1:
Wave 2:
4. Cost of primary education
Capital and recurrent costs are handled differently, since only the latter is
cumulative. We begin with recurrent costs.
The growth rate for the first three waves is
and once more
Thus the corresponding wave formulas are
Wave 1:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
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Wave 4 must be calculated somewhat differently, since there is no growth
occurring due to an increase in the percentage of the age group being served.
For this wave,
and there is no change in the formula for a. Utilizing the new value for a,
Wave 4:
There are only three waves for capital costs. The only source of growth
derives from population:
Thus the waves are calculated as
Wave 1:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
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5. Costs of secondary education
There are only three waves, with the first beginning in 2005.
For recurrent costs,
Since growth in the variable commences in wave 2, we can distinguish
between two values of a:
Then the wave calculations become
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
For capital costs,
and a1 and a2 are calculated as above.
The wave calculations are:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
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6. Benefits of education
Consider first primary education. The growth rate in the number of stu-
dent-years to be valued is
because they are cumulative. This yields values for a1 and a2 as before. For
the wave calculations, we assume that benefits begin 6 years after the av-
erage student-year is acquired and accrue over a 40-year period. (We do not
adjust for the fraction of students expected to complete additional years of
education following primary school.) Hence:
Wave 1:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
(Population growth between 2015 and 2020 is not incorporated to sim-
plify the expression.)
Secondary education is calculated equivalently, with the exception that work
is assumed to begin two years after the average student-year, and there is
no first wave. Thus
with corresponding a1 and a2.
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This yields the wave formulas
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
7. Health benefits
The growth rate for this variable derives entirely from the cumulative growth
over ten years in the benefits accrued; no population growth factor enters
in. Hence g = 1.2589, the tenth root of 10, and a1 and a2 are as before.
Wave 1:
Wave 2:
Wave 3:
Wave 4:
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B. ANNUAL UNDISCOUNTED FLOWS
The general strategy in this set of calculations is to determine an initial an-
nual increment to cost or benefit and its undiscounted rate of change from
year to year. For some variables it is necessary to partition the years due to
changes in growth rates. (These series are spline functions.)
1. Opportunity cost
The annual increment is 
and 
Thus year i is calculated as (increment*g i-1).
2. Income transfers
We assume the flow to increase so as to reach an additional 1/20 of the
target population in each year. Hence the annual increment is 1/20 of the
total transfer calculated as in A2 (the numerator only), and year i is i/20 of
this amount.
3. Programme intervention costs
This variable is non-cumulative; therefore the annual flow for the first ten
years is 1/10 of the total cost given by multiplying the target population by
the unit cost of intervention. There is no cost during the second ten years
of the model.
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4. Primary education costs
First the recurrent costs. The annual increment is given by
and the growth rate is
The years 2016-2020 are set equal to 2015; population growth during
this period is disregarded for purposes of simpicity.
The capital costs are similar. The annual increment is
and
There are no flows during the years 2016-2020.
5. Secondary education costs
These are similar to primary costs, but a different set of years must be cal-
culated. For recurrent costs, the annual increment is
and
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For capital costs the corresponding calculations are
and
6. Education benefits
For primary education the annual increment is
and
Calculation is complicated by the accumulation of benefit years (each
student-year engenders a string of benefit years), and the time delay between
the acquisition of education and the accrual of benefits. The formula for
the benefit in year i is
Bi = increment * g
i-7+ Bi-1
for years 7-20 of the model. (Note that, due to the time lag between edu-
cation and benefits, that the education growth rate for the period 2000-2013
applies to the benefit years 2007-2020.)
Secondary education has nearly the same structure, but with different
time parameters. The annual increment is
and
Similarly,
Bi = increment * g
i-8+ Bi-1
since benefits commence in the eighth year of the model.
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7. Health benefits
Since DALYs aggregate health outcomes arising over a period of time, ad-
ditional assumptions must be made to convert the health benefits to annual
flows. Taking a conservative position, we assume that 25% of the disability-
adjusted outcome occurs during the initial year of injury or illness and that
3% occurs in each subsequent year. (This means that such delayed effects
end after 25 years, so that exactly one DALY is accounted for.) Also, we
can distinguish between BIi and Bi, where the first represents an initial DALY
exposure in year i and the second the cumulative benefits from year i’s ini-
tial exposure plus the continuing exposures carried over from previous years.
The annual increment for BI is
where the denominator incorporates both the ten-year time frame for the
elimination of hazardous child labour and the assumption that a fourth of
the outcomes are experienced in the initial year. The growth rate is simply
1.2589, then tenth root of ten.
Thus, for the first ten years,
BIi = increment * g
i
and
where j denotes the years of prior exposure. Note that multiplying by 0.12
takes into account both the 3% annual carryover and the initial division of
the DALY by 4 in annual increment formula.
For the second ten years BIi equals its value in year 10, and the for-
mula for Bi is unchanged.
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Annex 4a
COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF ELIMINATING CHILD LABOUR IN BRAZIL
Brazil was one of the eight countries chosen to implement the costs and ben-
efits study of eliminating child labour. The country was selected for its rep-
resentativeness in the Latin America region, and for the availability of data
on child labour. The main source of information used in this study is a Na-
tional Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios –
PNAD) undertaken by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute
(IBGE) in 1999. This survey includes more than 330,000 individuals from
the Northeast, Southeast, South, Central and the urban part of the North
of Brazil. It contains information on the participation of children in the
labour force from the age of five, in addition to data on household charac-
teristics, individuals’ education, sex, race, age, wages, hours of work, non-
earnings income, etc.. The sample design established for the survey allows
the expansion of the results to the whole country as well as its regions, states
and metropolitan areas.
The use of micro-data allows precise estimates of the required com-
putations. A problem emerges, however, for the rural area of the Northern
region, where there are no data collected in PNAD due to access difficul-
ties, except for Tocantins state. In this case, the percentage of working chil-
dren, poor children, and children in hazardous work in the rural
Northeastern region was assumed to be the same as in the rural Northern
region, since they are both poor regions. The population in the rural north
of Brazil is known from the demographic census 2000.
Another source of information is the school census. Principals from pri-
vate and public schools at county, state and federal level have provided the
following information on an annual basis since 1995: school infrastructure,
general information about classroom and personnel, pre-school education,
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CONCISE SUMMARIES
OF COUNTRY STUDY FINDINGS
literacy courses, primary school, secondary school, and youths’ and adults’
education and technical education.
In addition, information on expenditures and government programmes
were obtained through the Ministry of Education, Treasury Bureau, and
the Ministry of Retirement and Social Assistance.
Despite the legislation prohibiting children below the age of 16 from
working in Brazil, data from the 1999 national household survey show that
there were four and a half million working children from 5 to 15 years old,
which represents more than 12% of the population in this age group. Most
of these children live in rural areas and are boys. Many are rural workers,
but there is also a significant number of boys in the urban area who are
street vendors and shop assistants. Girls in the urban sector are mainly do-
mestic servants, baby sitters and shop assistants. Classifying by segment of
activity, the largest percentage of children work in agriculture, followed by
services, commerce, manufacturing and construction. The relatively poor
Northeastern region has the highest percentage of working children, fol-
lowed by the Southern region, where the number of agricultural households
is very high. The smallest percentage of working children is observed in the
Southeastern region, which is the richest in Brazil. As the sample does not
include the rural areas of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and
Amapá State, in the Northern region, it therefore underestimates the per-
centage of working children. The States of Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Bahia,
Paraíba e Pernambuco have the highest percentage of working children in
Brazil.
As established in the framework, three sources of costs were obtained
– the cost of providing a quality education to all children in lieu of work,
the cost of programme interventions to alter attitudes and practices, and
the opportunity cost of eliminating this work, i.e. the value of children’s
labour. On the benefit side, economic gains were calculated from a more ed-
ucated population and a healthier population, since both more widespread
education and the elimination of hazardous or unsuitable work have prospec-
tive health benefits.
The costs of the supply side of education were computed, involving
school quality as well as quantity. The costs of achieving universal primary
and lower secondary education encompass the additional costs of achieving
net attendance rates (NAR) equal to 100%, which is the number of children
out of school times the expenditure per pupil. Expenditures to improve
school quality are those required to decrease the student-to-teacher ratio to
an average of 40:1 and to finance purchases of material sufficient to reach
the objective of 15% of overall recurrent education expenditures. Finally,
capital expenditures include the cost of having enough school establishments
to achieve the goal of universal coverage.
There were 1,208,542 children between 7 and 10 years old and 743,204
between 11 and 14 years old identified as out of school at the time of the
survey. Children in pre-school or day care were also considered out of school.
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The recurrent expenditure per student per year was estimated as $441.06
PPP per student, based on data from the National Treasury Bureau, the Fi-
nance Ministry and the Ministry of Education. Those expenditures come
from a Government National Fund to improve primary and secondary
schools (FUNDEF), a State Quota of the Education Salary (QUESE), and
a National Fund for Education Development (FNDE). Each state allocates
15% of four principal taxes (trade, export, state fund, county fund) to
FUNDEF, and when a minimum amount per student is not reached ($215
PPP in 1999), the federal government provides a supplement.
The pupil-teacher ratio was always below the required level of 40 pupils
per classroom; therefore calculations to obtain the additional cost of
achieving it were not necessary.
The amount of money coming from programmes other than FUNDEF,
and therefore not used to pay teachers, relative to total recurrent expendi-
ture, was very close to 15% in Brazil (14.6%). There were 20 states, out of
26, with a current non-wage expenditure of less than 15% of overall recur-
rent expenditure, and the calculation of additional costs was restricted to
those states.
The gross enrolment rate (GER) provides an indication of the capacity
of each level of the educational system, but a high ratio does not necessarily
indicate a successful educational system as this ratio includes over-age and
under-age enrolments. It can be assumed that when GER is above 100 there
are enough school establishments for achieving the goal of universal cov-
erage. In Brazil, the percentages failed to exceed 100% only for the 11 to 14-
year-old children living in rural areas, with the exception of São Paulo and
the Federal District.
Information on the amount the government spent specifically on school
buildings is not available. The total amount spent on the QUESE programme
was used as an approximation, since the money coming from this fund al-
lows the construction of school buildings, the establishments’ maintenance,
and the purchase of consumption materials, among others. The costs for
the supply side of education are presented in Table A4a.1.
In addition to this, we are assuming that there are three overriding fac-
tors that determine whether parents will choose to transfer their children
from work to full time school attendance. First, education of sufficient
quality must be readily available to them, which is the supply side of edu-
cation. Second, they must be able to overcome the purely economic barriers
to having their children engaged in study. This includes the direct cost of
schooling, such as books and uniforms, but also, and especially, the oppor-
tunity cost – the value of the work children might have to give up if they
increase their school participation. The third factor concerns populations
requiring targeted intervention, which will be considered shortly.
Using the national household survey, children’s monthly earnings, in-
cluding salaries and payment in-kind, were used to determine the value of
their work. The average monthly earnings were calculated for occupations
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related to domestic work, i.e., baby sitter, cleaner, cooker, cloth washer and
so on. Since there was no information on hours spent in household activi-
ties, when a child was identified as performing domestic work and was not
studying, we attributed to him or her a “domestic servant” salary derived
from employed children. The earnings obtained in these ways were then
combined to calculate an average opportunity cost for removing children
from work.
To obtain the total opportunity cost of child labour, the number of
working children from 5 to 14 years old, which was more than 3 million,
was multiplied by the average opportunity cost. The results are presented in
Table A4a.1.
A hypothetical income transfer that replaces 80% of the opportunity
cost of children’s work for all poor households was modeled in this study.
Households with per capita income equal or below half the minimum salary
per month (68 Reais or US$ 54.40 PPP) were classified as poor. This poverty
line is the same as the one used by the Bolsa Escola programme. Household
income was calculated from salaries, earnings in-kind, rents, retirements,
pensions, interests from savings, and similar sources as they accrued to all
members of the household, except from household employees, employees’
relatives, renters and children below the age of 14. There were more than
five and a half million households with one or more children 7 to 14 years
of age below this poverty line in Brazil, encompassing nearly 12 million
school-age children.
To obtain the costs of the income transfer programme, 80% of the op-
portunity cost of children’s work was multiplied by the total number of chil-
dren 7 to 14 years old from households at or below poverty line. The
corresponding resource cost is then 5% of this amount (see Table A4a.1).
Finally, the intervention cost associated with the elimination of all of
the worst forms of child labour was obtained multiplying the total number
of individuals below 18 engaged in hazardous activities, which is 2,740,502,
by the yearly expenditure per child with the PETI programme, i.e., $441.52
PPP. This almost certainly represents an overestimate, since a large per-
centage of this hazardous work would disappear in the course of imple-
menting the rest of the model. On the other hand, there is an undetermined
number of children working in unconditional worst forms and excluded
from the hazardous count, and we would anticipate that most or all of them
would require targeted interventions. On balance, it is likely that the first
error (overestimation) exceeds the second.
For calculating the direct monetary benefits of increased education,
the total number of children out of school (1,951,746) was multiplied by
the number of years each child would need to complete eight years of ed-
ucation times the Mincerian coefficient (0.11) times the average unskilled
adult’s wage. This wage was obtained by averaging the earnings of all indi-
viduals from 20 to 60 years old with 1 year of education ($110.54/month),
which is the average number of years of education for the children out of
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school. The present value of the total benefit was then obtained assuming
that each person would receive earnings during 40 years of his or her life.
As shown in Table A4a.1, at a 5% interest rate, the benefits outweigh
the costs by approximately a factor of 10.
The strength of this result in Brazil compared to the regional and global
averages reported in the main body of the study can be attributed to two
factors in particular. First, there is a higher ratio of the unskilled adult-to-
child wage in Brazil. This leads to a greater discrepancy between the bene-
fits of education on the one hand, and the opportunity and transfer costs
on the other. Second, there is little capital cost entailed in expanding edu-
cation. Even if the capital costs were to equal the recurrent, however, the
enormous disparity between benefits and costs would not be in question.
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Table A4a.1. Costs and benefits of eliminating child labour in Brazil, $million PPP
Wave 2001 to 2005 2006 to 2010 2011 to 2015 2016 to 2020 Total
Total costs 1 226 2 825 3 559 6 010 13 620
Education supply 211 1 285 2 413 4 101 8 010
Recurrent costs 187 1 219 2 334 4 070 7 811
Adjustments 24 57 72 26 180
Capital costs – 8 6 5 19
Transfer implementation 75 124 64 174 437
Interventions 519 740 – – 1 259
Opportunity cost 422 676 1 088 1 735 3 915
Total benefits 2 122 16 613 35 594 76 779 131 108
Education 2 040 16 408 35 317 76 503 130 268
Health 83 204 277 277 840
Net economic benefits 896 13 788 32 035 70 769 117 487
Transfer payments 1 497 2 481 1 271 3 489 8 737
Net financial benefits -601 11 307 30 764 67 280 108 750
Annex 4b
COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF ELIMINATING CHILD LABOUR IN NEPAL
Children’s work in Nepal is regulated under the Child Labour Prohibition
and Regulation Act of 1999, according to which it is forbidden for any es-
tablishment to employ children under the age of 14. Nevertheless, child
labour is common in this country, whose population is weighted toward
youth. In particular, many children labour under conditions prohibited under
ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour.
Of the total population of children ages 5 to 14, nearly 2.6 million, or
41.6%, have been identified as working, and just under 1.7 million, 26.7%
of the total, have been deemed economically active. A narrower but still
quite substantial category is occupied by the 1 million children who work
but do not attend school. Most working children do not receive monetary
compensation, although 6% do.
By far the most common activity in which working children are found
is agriculture, accounting for nearly 95% of the total. Girls make up the ma-
jority of all these workers, and they are less likely to receive education than
boys. Of those children receiving money wages, it is common for parents to
collect and keep them.
Because of the commitment of Nepal’s government and several NGOs,
there has recently been a series of studies documenting the child labour
problem. Detailed data were collected in the National Child Labour Survey
of 1996 (Suwal et al., 1997), and subsequent reports published by the Na-
tional Planning Commission and the Ministry of Labour provide additional
information. Also, ILO/IPEC has conducted five Rapid Assessments, fo-
cusing on child porters, rag pickers, domestic workers, bonded labour and
child trafficking. Unfortunately, different studies often disagree in their find-
ings, and there has been no effort to consolidate them.
For the purposes of this study, these sources provided primary inputs,
but were supplemented by several others. Most important were the National
Living Standard Survey (NLSS) of 1996 and the Nepal Labour Force Survey
(NLFS) of 1999. The NLSS was a household survey undertaken with tech-
nical support from the World Bank. Sample size was 3,775 households, and
the survey instrument yielded data on the number and characteristics of
poor households, adult and child wage rates, and population weights used
to adjust data from other sources. The NLFS was administered with finan-
cial support from UNDP and technical assistance from the ILO. It provided
the micro-data used in this study to estimate a Mincerian coefficient. It also
provided the basis for estimates of the extent and distribution of child labour.
In addition to these, a further significant resource was the 20-Year Educa-
tion Projection Model prepared for the World Bank Education Sector Re-
view. This was the basis for estimates of net enrolment rates in primary and
lower secondary education.
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The largest cost of implementing the hypothetical child labour elimi-
nation model in Nepal is that of providing for expanded education quan-
tity and quality. In all subsequent discussions of education it should be
borne in mind that Nepal’s age categories for primary and lower secondary
school do not correspond to those employed in the global report. For pur-
poses of consistency, it was necessary to standardize on a single set of age
groupings, even though each country has its own framework. For the global
report, this meant that ages 6 to 11 were assigned to primary schools and
12 to 14 to secondary. In the case of Nepal, however, the corresponding
brackets are 6 to 10 and 11 to 13. In this annex, freed from the necessity of
conforming to an international standard, we adopt the local framework.
This indicates, however, that the economic totals relating to education would
require adjustment in order to be compared to the regional and total amounts
reported in the main body of the study.
Net attendance at the primary level is 57%; at the lower secondary level
it is only 19%. There are substantial differences in these rates across regions
within Nepal, but only national averages will be employed here. Among pri-
mary school age children, socially disadvantaged groups, and particularly
the girls among them, are over-represented among those not in attendance.
Evidently, a significant expansion of education is envisioned. The cur-
rent pupil-teacher ratio is 38 in primary and 37 in lower secondary, taken
at a national average. Assuming the ability to shift teachers from areas of
low to high PTR, no additional adjustment is required beyond that needed
to accommodate the increased number of students. Although poor in
quality, the number of school facilities at the primary level is sufficient at
present to accommodate full attendance by 2015. Approximately 9,000 new
lower secondary schools will need to be built, however. The costs of ad-
ditional teachers, non-personnel expenditures and new capital facilities
were calculated from a variety of education reports. It is interesting to
note that the unit capital cost was two and a half times as large as the
unit recurrent cost at the primary level, but only 40% larger at the lower
secondary.
A second principal cost of eliminating child labour derives from the
contributions these children make to household income. Survey data on paid
child labour was extrapolated to unpaid labour based on work of a similar
type. Since only daily compensation was reported, it was assumed that an
average child’s work year consists of 100 days; this resulted in the annual
estimate of $343 PPP. To defray households for the loss of this contribu-
tion, an income transfer programme was modelled. (Such a programme
would also defray the costs imposed on parents for sending their children
to school, which can be substantial in Nepal.) Setting the poverty line at
$376 PPP (based on World Bank subsistence estimates), it was found that
just over 1.25 million families with school age children can be classified as
poor, and their average poverty gap is $160 PPP. With a high number of
such children per family and a high ratio of the working child’s productivity
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to the poverty line, our formula for unit transfers was not sensitive at all to
estimates of the poverty gap, however.
A final component of cost is the need for programmes to target partic-
ular groups, either those for whom the income transfer may not provide a
sufficient basis for the elimination of child labour, or those whose involve-
ment in worst forms suggests the need for other sorts of interventions. Into
this first category fall the dalit, a socially excluded cast group. 76,555 chil-
dren are targeted on this basis. Into the second fall children engaged in bonded
and other worst forms of child labour, for which the available estimate is
129,126. The study does not incorporate the potential needs of the refugee
population from Bhutan, approximately 100,000 in all. The unit cost of in-
tervention was calculated from existing IPEC programmes operative in Nepal.
There are two sources of economic benefits anticipated in the model,
the most important of which derives from increased education. The key ele-
ments in the formula for calculating this are the number of children to re-
ceive increased education (already discussed above), the Mincerian coefficient
and the average unskilled adult wage. The Mincerian coefficient was calcu-
lated from household micro-data. It was found to be approximately 0.07, with
the estimating equation having an adjusted R2 of 0.35. Note that this is sig-
nificantly less than the baseline coefficient of 0.11 used in the global report;
it presumably reflects differences in the Nepalese economy’s utilization of
human capital. The adult wage was derived from the surveys mention above.
The economic benefit of improved health was calculated for Nepal in
the same way as for other countries: survey data provided the distribution
of child workers across sectors, and this composition was used in conjunc-
tion with the Fassa (2003) study to estimate disability-adjusted life years
(DALYs). These in turn were converted to monetary estimates based on
comparison with other health stressors and Nepal’s income per capita.
Table A4b.1 summarizes the present value calculation of the costs and
benefits at a 5% discount rate.
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Table A4b.1. Total economic costs and benefits of eliminating child labour
in Nepal, in $million PPP
Total cost 6 118
Opportunity cost 2 117
Transfer programme 126
Interventions 131
Education supply 3 744
Total benefits 7 024
Education 6 982
Health 42
Net economic benefits 906
Income transfers 2 529
Net financial benefits -1 623
The net benefit in the case of Nepal is positive but smaller than those
found at the regional and global levels, due to the high ratio of child-to-
adult wages and the low estimate of the returns to education. Note that, at
a Mincerian coefficient of 0.11 (as used in the global report), net financial
benefits would be positive as well. In any event, it should be remembered
that transfer costs are not resource costs in the economic sense; hence the
positive outcome of the exercise remains intact.
A second way to consider the impact of the elimination model is as a
sequence of net annual flows, as described in Chapter 9 of the global re-
port. Table A4b.2 presents these data for Nepal.
Table A4b.2. Annual flows of net costs of eliminating child labour in Nepal, 
in $million PPP
Year Net Flow
1 -109
2 -134
3 -160
4 -187
5 -214
6 -308
7 -340
8 -373
9 -408
10 -444
11 -482
12 -526
13 -575
14 -630
15 -692
16 -656
17 -671
18 -683
19 -694
20 -703
As can be seen, these flows, on an undiscounted basis, become increasingly
negative throughout the 20-year period. Of course, given the results in Table
A4b.1 (which incorporate the effect of discounting), extension into subse-
quent years would show much larger and fully offsetting positive net flows.
Table A4b.3 presents the same information, but also including the income
transfers (which are not economic costs).
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Table A4b.3. Annual flows of the financial costs of eliminating child labour
in Nepal, in $million PPP
Year Net Flow
1 -150
2 -216
3 -283
4 -351
5 -420
6 -554
7 -627
8 -702
9 -778
10 -855
11 -934
12 -1 020
13 -1 110
14 -1 205
15 -1 308
16 -1 314
17 -1 369
18 -1 423
19 -1 475
20 -1 525
Clearly the financial burden of implementing the programme exceeds its re-
source cost. At the end of the 20-year horizon, the model anticipates a
funding requirement of $1.5 billion PPP.
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Annex 4c
COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF ELIMINATING CHILD LABOUR IN KENYA
Kenya provides an example of a country with significant child labour and
shortfalls in school attendance that is well positioned to benefit from a vig-
orous child labour elimination programme. This is a young country; more
than half the population is below the age of 18, and a quarter are of school
age as defined in this study, ages 6 to 14. It is relatively poor, with a per
capita income of $1,010 in 2000. Due to unfavourable macroeconomic con-
ditions, particularly external debt (and an associated structural adjustment
programme), Kenya’s economic development has stalled, and education sta-
tistics even show a decline during the 1990s. Nevertheless, as we shall see,
the returns are lower than we might expect due to factors that increase the
costs and reduce the benefits.
Overall results for the economic costs and benefits of eliminating child
labour in Kenya are provided in Table A4c.1.
Table A4c.1. Total economic costs and benefits of eliminating child labour
in Kenya, in $million PPP
Total cost 4 715
Opportunity cost 224
Transfer programme 14
Interventions 100
Education 4 377
Total benefits 5 788
Education 5 677
Health 111
Net economic benefits 1 073
Transfer payments 277
Net financial benefits 796
Both net economic and net financial benefits are comfortably positive, but
the ratio is not as great as we saw in the global study. The internal rate of
return, 6.3%, is also lower. The reasons will become clear as we examine the
individual cost and benefit items.
Education supply. Before proceeding to the actual calculations, it should be
noted that Kenya’s educational system is organized on the basis of eight years
of primary school, covering ages 6 to 14, and four years of secondary after
that. We chose, however, to evaluate changes in the educational system as if
Kenya had the “standard” system of primary education through age 11 and
lower secondary through age 14. We did this to facilitate comparisons be-
tween Kenya’s results and those described for other countries and regions.
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The public expenditure on recurrent costs per pupil at the primary level
was $158 in 2000 PPP; to this must be added an additional $30 in direct
household costs. But non-personnel costs made up only 2.8% of all such re-
current expenses in 2000, requiring an additional adjustment of $27. As we
have already seen (Chapter 4), the HIV/AIDS epidemic will impose even
more costs on the system; we calculated this to be a further $13 per student.
Thus the combined unit cost comes to $228.
The Kenya study team was unable to locate reliable information on the
costs of school construction. Based on discussions with education officials,
they made a rough estimate of $14,886 as the cost per primary classroom,
including desks and other non-building items; at 30 students per room this
yielded a unit capital cost of $496.
The net attendance rate in Kenya at the primary level was determined
to be 88.3% based on household survey data. Given the population of
Kenyans ages 6 to 11 and a projected growth rate for this group of 1.2%
per year, we arrived at the totals contained in Table A4c.2.
Secondary costs were calculated in much the same manner. Public re-
current expenses per pupil were $530 and households contributed an addi-
tional $409. Since non-personnel expenditures made up only 5.5% of the total,
an additional adjustment of $105 was required. After a further adjustment
for the effects of HIV/AIDS, the unit recurrent cost became $1,110 – sub-
stantially more than the amount at the primary level. We noted, however, that
these expenses really apply only to 14 year-olds, one third of the age group
we identify in this study as lower secondary. Hence we applied only one-third
of the recurrent cost difference to lower secondary students as a whole, pro-
ducing a revised unit cost of $522. The country team also estimated the cost
of constructing a new classroom; divided by the number of students per room,
this came to a unit capital cost of $532. The same adjustment for distin-
guishing between 14 year-olds and those aged 12 to 14 was made, resulting
in a revised unit capital cost of $508. Taking account of the low NAR for
this group of 23%, initial population size and a projected annual population
growth rate of 0.8%, we generated the costs found in Table A4c.2.
As this table clearly demonstrates, the costs of expanding and up-
grading education in Kenya are dominated by those at the lower secondary
level, despite the much larger number of children in the primary age group.
This is due mainly to the great disparity in net attendance rates and, to a
lesser extent, to the differences in unit costs.
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Table A4c.2. Costs of education supply in Kenya, in $million PPP
Level Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Total
Primary 154 204 274 367 1 000
Secondary 657 1 000 1 749 3 407
Total 154 861 1 274 2 117 4 407
Transfer programme. From household surveys, it is estimated that there are
over 2.6 million families with school-age children living in poverty in Kenya,
and that these families average 2.2 children each. Using our formula for in-
come transfers based on the value of child labour (see below) and the average
poverty gap of $169, the average transfer per family is $58. The reason it falls
so far below the poverty gap is that the value of child labour ($33) is itself a
small fraction of this gap. Over a twenty-year period in which additional fam-
ilies are progressively encompassed within the system, and discounting to the
year 2000, the overall amount of income transferred is $276.9 million. Above
this, 5% or $13.8 million are earmarked for administering the programme.
Interventions. It was difficult to perform this calculation, given the paucity
of data concerning socially excluded children and children in the worst forms
of child labour. There are certainly many children engaged in unconditional
worst forms, but there have been no formal enumerations of them. To iden-
tify children in hazardous occupations, the Kenyan researchers classified
nine such occupations and determined, from household surveys, that ap-
proximately 760,000 children were engaged in them. From UNHCR, an ad-
ditional 90,000 children were recorded as socially excluded. From our survey
of IPEC programmes, we found that the unit cost of interventions in Kenya
was $240. Anticipating the implementation of programmes to address the
needs of 850,000 children over a ten-year period, and incorporating dis-
counting, we arrived at a present value cost of just over $100 million.
Opportunity costs. Of the more than 8.6 million children between the ages
of 5-14 in Kenya, just under 2 million are classified as engaged in child labour.
To determine the cost to households and the economy in general of with-
drawing their labour, we needed to attach a value to this work. A SIMPOC
survey administered in 1998-99 found that the average earnings of a child
worker in Kenya were $32.58. Thus, we arrived at our calculation of the op-
portunity cost:
1 993 584 children  $32.58 per child  20 years = $1 299 019 026
Note, however, that this labour is not all removed immediately. Our pro-
gramme calls for its progressive elimination over a ten-year period. Hence
the figure will be reduced, because of fewer child-years eliminated and dis-
counting, to $223,889,669.
Education benefits. In the absence of direct household survey measure-
ment, we imputed an average unskilled wage of $405, not unreasonable in
light of the country’s per capita income of $1,010. We also utilized the stan-
dard Mincerian coefficient of 0.11, meaning that each additional year of
education was expected to increase an individual’s earnings by 11%. One
important difference between Kenya and other countries, however, is that
in Kenya the average work expectancy is only 30 years, rather than the 40
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we employed throughout this study. We chose, nevertheless, to use 40 years
as the basis for our baseline estimate of economic benefits. The main reason
for this is that the 30-year figure is backward-looking, and it is reasonable
to expect that with economic and social improvements, Kenyans’ work pro-
files will begin to resemble those in better-off countries. On the other hand,
of course, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS casts a shadow over the future,
even though current indications are that this prevalence has begun to slowly
recede. It is worth noting that the difference between 30 and 40 years of
education benefits is not as large as might be expected, due to the effect of
discounting. Our baseline (40-year) estimate is $5,677 million, and reducing
this to 30 years results in $5,086 – not enough to reverse the conclusion
that overall net economic (and financial) benefits are positive.
Health benefits. Based on the detailed occupational classifications utilized
in the Kenya SIMPOC survey, we were able to apply our DALY formula
(Chapter 8) and arrive at an estimate of 38,700 DALYs attributable to haz-
ardous employment of children. As we pointed out in that chapter, this
should be regarded as an underestimate of the true health cost, perhaps a
large underestimate. Our baseline relationship between DALYs and per-
centages of GNI per capita yields the result summarized in Table A4c.1.
Considering all of these items, it is apparent that, as in other coun-
tries and regions, the relationship between education costs and benefits has
the largest impact on the amount of net benefits. The relatively small net
economic benefits in this case are attributable primarily to the low unskilled
wage in relation to the cost of educating a child. The unit recurrent cost
of primary education, for instance, is $288, but the one-year benefit asso-
ciated with this expense is only $45, i.e. 11% of $405, the relevant wage
rate. The accumulation of many such benefit years, as the former child lives
out his or her working life, guarantees that the overall net benefits will be
positive, even with the addition of capital costs, but they are less so in
Kenya than elsewhere.
The annual undiscounted net financial flows for the first 20 years are
given in Figure A4c.1. At their most negative point, in 2008, they represent
0.6% of Kenya’s GNI for 2000.
A more precise measurement of the resource implications of adminis-
tering our hypothetical programme in Kenya is given by the public sector
costs, which we have defined as the sum of education supply costs, inter-
vention costs and transfer costs (both the income transfers themselves and
the administrative overhead) minus 20% of the concurrent economic bene-
fits from health and education. Figure A4c.2 shows the trajectory over the
twenty years of programme implementation.
Several patterns are noticeable. The fiscal burden takes a great leap in
year 6 when secondary education expansion begins. It recedes in year 11,
following the completion of the interventions targeting the worst forms. It
finally begins to decline in year 17, as 20% of the increasing benefits begin
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to outweigh the annual growth in transfer costs. The peak year is 2016, when
the public sector cost is $192.4 million. This sum represents 0.66% of Kenya’s
GNI for 2000, a substantial but clearly affordable investment.
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Figure A4c.1. Undiscounted net financial flows due to child labour elimination
in Kenya, in $million PPP
Figure A4c.2. Public sector costs of child labour elimination in Kenya, 2000-2020,
in $million PPP

